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Abstract 
The devolution of natural resource management to local community groups is a 
dominant theme in contemporary discussion of common property natural resource 
management. Throughout much of Africa and other parts of the developing world 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programs are being 
implemented. Though governments in Africa and other parts of the developing world 
embrace the idea of CBNRM, the actual process of devolution of natural resource 
management to local community groups is problematic. In some countries, like Zimbabwe 
for instance, the central government devolved natural resource management to district 
councils which are themselves arms of the central government operating at the district level. 
In Botswana, the central government issues usufruct rights to local community groups and 
retain ownership of natural resources. These usufruct arrangements are often susceptible to 
cancellation and therefore do not provide sufficient incentives for local community groups to 
invest in long-term sustainability objectives. My study utilizes the advocacy coalition 
framework and social capital theories to understand how local community groups could 
through coalitions and networks with other local, national and international CBNRM 
stakeholders influence government CBNRM policy towards approaches favoring devolution 
and participation as opposed to centralization and regulation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
'The issues of how best to govern natural resources used by many individuals in 
common are no more settled in academia than in the world of politics' (Ostrom, 1990:1). 
Contradictory policy proposals for governing the commons have been suggested and 
implemented in different parts of the world. At one end of the spectrum are policies favoring 
central regulation and privatization. On the other are policies that favor devolution and 
participation. In his argument in support of policies that favor centralization, Ophuls 
(1973:228) argue that "because of the tragedy of the commons, environmental problems 
cannot be solved through cooperation... and the rationale for central government with major 
coercive powers is overwhelming," since the state has the prerogative to use legitimate 
physical violence to enlist cooperation, and a bureaucratic structure facilitating centralization 
and regulation (Weber, 1920). These policies favor government-led processes of decision 
making. Other policy analysts suggest the enforcement of private property rights (market-led 
decisions) in circumstances where natural resources are owned in common (Demsetz, 1967; 
Hardin, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Smith, 1981; Welch, 1983; Sinn, 1984). 
Despite the above prescriptions, Ostrom (1990:1) observes that 'communities of 
individuals have relied on institutions resembling neither the state nor the market to govern 
some resource systems with reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time'. In his 
thesis, "Iron Law of Oligarchy," Michels (1949) postulates that bureaucracies lead to the 
concentration of power at the top in the hands of bureaucrats that rule in a dictatorial manner. 
Centralization of power makes participation difficult, if not impossible. The shortfalls of top-
down imposition of natural resource policies on local people have been documented 
(Chambers, 1983; Blaikie, 1985; Richards, 1985; Poffenberger, 1990). Studies by Murphree, 
1997; Drinkwater, 1991; Lawry, 1989; Murombedzi, 1989; 1990; and Ostrom, 1990 indicate 
that centralization and privatization of natural resource management does not lead to 
improved natural resource management. The call for empowering local communities to 
become valuable participants in the natural resource policy and management decisions seems 
the plausible option to centralization and privatization policies. Participatory, bottom-up 
approaches understand that ecological health is not to be considered in isolation from 
community economic, social, and cultural health (Gary et al., 2001; NCRCRD, 1999). 
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Through advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), other actors, 
disempowered in the bureaucratic, centralized top-down processes of natural resource policy 
and management can interact to accumulate political capital by forming advocacy coalitions 
to contend with the predominant paradigm and push forward an alternative agenda. 
Community power can be augmented by connections with the outside (Flora and Flora 
(2004:109). According to Gary et al. (2001:14), the ability to reach out enables local 
communities to share information, build capacity, and develop networks and coalitions. 
Theories of social capital (Putnam, 1995b; Woolcock, 1998; 2001; Narayan, 1999; and 
Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) highlight the importance of networks for information sharing 
between state, civil society and market actors and capacity building for local communities. 
My study investigates evidence of coalitions and networks between CBNRM CBOs and 
other CBNRM institutional actors in Botswana. The activities of local communities and their 
organizations are channeled and limited by decisions taken beyond the local level. For my 
study, the concepts of bridging and linking social capital provide a useful paradigm for the 
interaction of disparate stakeholders. The guiding hypothesis for my study is that the higher 
the bridging and linking social capital, the lower the conflict between local and central 
government and market actors, and that similarity in desired future conditions and in mental 
causal models will predict current and potential coalitions. 
1.1 Rationale for Study 
My study contributes to the literature on social capital and natural resource 
management by specifying how community-based organizations that develop bridging and 
linking social capital can lower social conflict and environmental degradation. The study 
analyzes the degree to which coalitions and networks between community-based 
organizations and institutional actors at higher levels of decision-making facilitate local 
voices finding their way into higher level policy decisions. There are also practical 
applications of my study. By identifying all the institutional actors involved in CBNRM in 
Botswana and their desired future conditions and mental causal models, coalitions can be 
forged to increase political capital for community-based organizations. Inter-sectoral policy 
integration presumes that the way to achieve increased efficacy in actual outcomes is through 
improved integration of policy across multiple sectors. In Botswana at present, cross-sectoral 
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policy coordination remains a challenge. For instance, implementation of the CBNRM 
program by a central government department with village level organizations, bypassing 
district level planning processes, makes it difficult for cross-sectoral policy coordination at 
the district level. My study determines the utility of specific actions to ensure local and 
district political support to CBNRM projects and the integration of CBNRM into district 
development plans. It is necessary that CBNRM organizations mesh within local government 
structures and development processes. 
This research was conducted in Botswana, in Southern Africa, where issues around 
common property and multiple function rangelands management are pertinent. Rangeland 
degradation and resulting conflicts in African rangelands and strategies to reverse the trend 
remain major challenges. Different programs, ranging from privatization of the commons 
and CBNRM, have been implemented in Botswana. Botswana exhibits little consistency in 
strategies to reduce ecosystem degradation and social conflict. Policies implemented to date 
are contradictory. Some are geared towards privatization of the commons, while the CBNRM 
policy is oriented towards community benefit from management of common property natural 
resources. While the CBNRM program supposedly promotes the strengthening of common 
property regimes, other policies (e.g. the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975) emphasize 
privatization of communal rangelands. The CBNRM program is project based as opposed to 
a comprehensive strategy guiding management and utilization of common property natural 
resources. 
1.2 Research Questions 
a) What are the major market, state, and civil society stakeholding institutions around 
CBNRM in Botswana at the international, national, district, and local level? 
b) What are the desired future conditions, mental causal models and actual 
participation in CBRRM by institutional actors? 
c) To what degree do those that share desired future conditions share similar mental 
causal models on how to achieve those conditions? 
d) What mechanisms are in place to increase bridging and linking social capital 
among the different scales with CBNRM CBOs? 
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e) What differences are there in terms of conflict for those CBNRMs CBOs with high 
bridging social capital (dense and diverse advocacy coalitions) and those with low bridging 
social capital? 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
a) CBNRM CBO's with high and diverse bridging social capital are more successful 
in resolving social conflict than those with low and homogeneous bridging social capital. 
b) CBNRM institutional actors at different levels share desired future conditions. 
c) CBNRM institutional actors at different levels have different mental causal models 
of how to reach those desired future conditions. 
1.4 Organization of Study 
This report is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 is 
the theoretical framework which gives the theoretical basis of the study. The theories 
reviewed in this chapter range from theories of the state, decentralization, participation, 
stakeholder theory, social capital and advocacy coalitions. Chapter 3 details the CBNRM 
context and approach in Botswana. The first section of the chapter presents primary and 
secondary CBNRM context data, followed by a discussion. Chapter 4 describes my study's 
methodology. Chapter 5 is the assessment of CBNRM at the national level. The chapter 
identifies national CBNRM stakeholders and their participation in the CBNRM program. The 
stakeholders are categorized into state, civil society (NGO), donor and market (private 
sector). The first section of the chapter presents the different CBNRM institutional actors and 
their desired futures and mental causal models. The last section of the chapter discusses the 
different CBNRM network organizations in Botswana. Each of these sections are followed 
by a discussions section. Chapter 6 is the assessment of CBNRM at the community level. 
This section is based on data from my four study cases (Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust 
(CECT), Kalepa Conservation Trust (KCT), Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust 
(STMT), and Khwai Development Trust (KDT), all of which are wildlife-based CBNRM 
CBOs. Data from the four study cases have been analyzed using the community 
sustainability capitals model (Narayan, 1999; Flora and Flora, 2004). At the end of this 
chapter are sections on analysis and discussions. Chapter 7 and 8 presents my conclusions 
and recommendations respectively. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Theories of the State 
Social contract theorists like Hobbes (1968), Locke (1960), and Rousseau (1967) 
perceive the state as representing the social collectivity or the common good, hence 
portraying the state as an entity that does not privilege certain individuals and or groups 
interests over others. In his interpretation of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, Carnoy (1984, 
p.47) observe that the social contract theorists have a vision of the state as representing the 
social collectivity, as transcending specific interests and classes and as a guarantee for 
orderly competition among individuals and groups while simultaneously ensuring that 
collective interests of the social whole are preserved in the actions of the state itself. While 
the social contract theorists construe the state as the guardian of the social collectivity, 
Marxists and neo-Marxists perceive the state as an instrument of class domination and a 
constellation of class interests. In Marxist understanding, the state emerges from the relations 
of production and not from the collective will of the people (Carnoy, 1984:46). 
Weber (1920) proposes that the state should be characterized by the means that are 
unique to it, that is, legitimate physical violence. However, Weber was quick to note that 
legitimate violence is not the only means available to the state, but it is the means exclusive 
to the state. Weber defines the state as a type of human community that has prerogative to the 
monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory. The legitimacy of the 
state is premised upon the consent of the ruled in the authority that is claimed by the rulers. 
Weber (1968) argues that political power is attained through balancing legitimacy, on one 
hand, and accumulation on the other. The role of the state therefore centers on balancing 
legitimacy and accumulation functions. In the case of accumulation, the state facilitates the 
accumulation of capital for those classes that through their resources have the power to 
provide resources for the state in the form of economic wealth. Simultaneously, the state has 
the responsibility to protect its citizens from outside threat and to provide basic public goods 
to its citizens. According to Weber (1968) the adequate provision of these goods permits the 
state to retain legitimate monopoly of the use of force to maintain order and ultimately power 
(Weber, 1922/1968). 
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Weber (1920) discusses the increasing role of bureaucracy in the administration of the 
modern state. Weber (1968:957) describes a bureaucracy as 'the principle of office hierarchy 
and the channels of appeal stipulate a clearly established system of super- and subordination 
in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones'. One of the important 
features of bureaucratic administration is the power of bureaucrats derived from their 
possession of technical knowledge. The power of bureaucrats is further enhanced by 
knowledge acquired from experience in the service. The bureaucrat has at his/her disposal 
accumulated data/information from years of service for aiding decision making. Turner and 
Hulme (1997:151) observe that a major obstruction to the effective performance of public 
bureaucracies in most developing countries is the excessive concentration of decision-making 
and authority within central government. They observe that concentration of decision-making 
within a bureaucracy is one of the legacies of European colonization of the Third World 
(Turner and Hulme, 1997:85). 
Smith (1983:49) maintains that state actors have interests of their own, and, in certain 
circumstances, they have the ability to transform these interests into policy. He further argues 
that even within liberal democracies, state actors have the ability, through their authority, 
control over legislation and control over coercive apparatus, to act without negotiation on 
those affected (Smith, 1993:52). Reuschmeyer and Evans (1985:47) maintain that the state's 
ability to act in a unified way is constrained by the fact that it is also an arena of social 
conflict. Society consists of a variety of social groups which often have divergent interests. 
These social groups endeavor to take advantage of the state for fulfilling their group interests. 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) propose the Advocacy Coalitions Framework to explain 
how social groups in society can interact to accumulate power to influence the quasi-political 
process of decision-making and public policy. 
2.2 Decentralization 
Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:18) define decentralization as the transfer of planning, 
decision-making, or administrative authority from central government to its field 
organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local 
governments, or nongovernmental organizations. These types of decentralization differ with 
regard to the degree of power transfer from the center to lower levels of governance 
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(Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:18; Cohen and Peterson, 1999). Justification for 
decentralization is often built around the assumption that greater participation in public 
decision making is a positive good in itself or that it can improve efficiency, equity, 
development, and resource management (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999:475). Cohen and Peterson 
(1999:24), Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:18), and Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) identifies 
three types of decentralization: déconcentration, delegation and devolution. Déconcentration 
is the transfer of authority over specified decision-making (political), financial (fiscal), and 
management (administrative) functions by administrative means to different levels under the 
jurisdictional authority of the central government (Cohen and Peterson, 1999). Rondinelli 
and Cheema (1983:18) and Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) define déconcentration as 
involving the redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central 
government. 
Delegation is the transfer of government decision-making and administrative 
authority for clearly defined tasks to organizations or firms that are either under its indirect 
control or are independent (Cohen and Peterson, 1999:27). Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:20) 
define delegation as the delegation of decision-making and management authority for 
specific functions to organizations that are not under the direct control of central government 
ministries. Thus, while Cohen and Peterson (1999:27) see delegation as involving delegated 
authority to both organizations under the direct control of central government and 
independent organizations, Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:20) see delegation as involving 
delegated authority only to organizations outside the direct control of central government. 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) argue that it is important to understand the structures of 
accountability in which actors are located. For Agrawal and Ribot (1999), there is no real 
difference between déconcentration and delegation, since the lower level actors/organizations 
receiving delegated power are accountable to central government. 
Devolution is the transfer of authority by central government to autonomous local-
level governmental units holding corporate status granted under state legislation (Cohen and 
Peterson, 1999:26). Rondinelli and Cheema (1983:22) define devolution as entailing 
autonomous local government units over which central government exercises little or no 
control, local governments exercising authority and performing public functions within 
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boundaries of their jurisdiction, local government units with corporate status and power to 
secure resources to perform their functions, and local government units providing services 
and accountable to their constituents. Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) equate devolution to 
what they called political decentralization. According to Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475), 
political decentralization is said to have occurred when powers are transferred to local 
government who are downwardly accountable. Elections are seen as the mechanism that 
ensures downward accountability in political decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999:475). 
Rondinelli (1983:89) and Uphoff (1986) make a distinction between local 
administration and local government. Local administration is associated with déconcentration 
and delegation, and local government is associated with devolution or political 
decentralization. According to Uphoff (1986), local administration and local government 
differ in that local administration is responsible to higher levels of decision making, whereas 
local government is accountable at least in principle to constituents. Local administration is a 
bureaucratic institution, while local government is a political institution (Uphoff, 1986). In 
India, Pakistan and Thailand, Friedman (1983:380) found that local government is seen as an 
arm of the central ministries. In the three countries, the perception of local government as an 
extension of central bureaucracy is dominant. Mathur (1983:68) observes that one 
remarkable feature of decentralization is that such policies have usually emanated from the 
center. It is the central government that has accepted the necessity of decentralized 
administration and designed institutions and processes to provide it. Central government sees 
decentralization as a mechanism to increase central government effectiveness. Consequently, 
the process is accompanied by elaborate supervision and control (Mathur, 1983:68). 
Fisher (1999) notes that often there is decentralization of responsibility to local 
government units and local communities without devolution of power to make independent 
decisions or to take action outside parameters set by government authorities. He argues that 
in forestry projects, for instance, major forest management objectives are continuously 
decided upon by governments or bureaucracies, and the decision making authority of local 
government units and local communities is restricted to decisions that meet these objectives 
(Fisher, 1999). He suggests that in genuine devolution, those to whom responsibilities are 
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devolved ought to be permitted to make contribution in the setting of objectives, rather than 
expected to meet objectives set by others (Fisher, 1999). When local communities participate 
in government programs, they often receive responsibility and certain benefits but not much 
or no authority (Fisher, 1999). Fisher argues that evaluating a local community's competence 
in executing a management plan designed by someone else is not a justifiable assessment tool 
for the local community management capacity (Fisher, 1999). 
2.3 Participation 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management literature details the need for a 
shift from classifying communities as resource users to considering communities as resource 
managers. Langton (1978:13-24) makes a distinction between public action and public 
involvement. Public action refers to activities initiated and controlled by citizens for some 
purpose, and public involvement refers to activities initiated and controlled by central 
government for administrative purposes (Langton, 1978:13-24). Kakoyannis et al. (2001) 
observe that natural resource agencies concentrate too much on the social acceptability of 
their decisions as opposed to the acceptability of their decision making process. Kakoyannis 
et al. (2001) is concerned with issues of process. NCRCRD (1999:4) maintains that 
traditionally, success has been measured by input-output analysis. But for sustainable 
development, activities and outcomes need to be included as indicators of process. 
In their study in Indonesia, Fay and de Foresta (2001:186), found that state-
community alliance with regard to natural resource management is not based on the state's 
conviction that communities' participation in natural resource management can bring about 
sustainable natural resource use. They argue that the state in developing countries believe 
that local people are the main cause of forest degradation. For that reason, any effort to work 
with local people must focus on imposing a new land-use system. Thus state-community 
alliance in natural resource management is meant to regulate or guide community utilization 
of natural resources. Fay and de Foresta (2001:186) further argue that state agencies do not 
only consider local people as liabilities in their endeavor to protect natural resources, but also 
perceive of local people as liabilities that have to be and can turn out to be assets in state's 
efforts to restore degraded forest lands and boost tourism revenue. With this mindset, the 
state is progressively opening up to involving local people in predetermined state agency's 
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activities (Fay and de Foresta, 2001:186). However, Strong (1992) observes that local level 
actions in natural resource management are the very foundations of successful sustainable 
development policy. 
Ophuls (1973:228) argue that "because of the tragedy of the commons, environmental 
problems cannot be solved through cooperation... and the rationale for government with 
major coercive powers is overwhelming." The presumption that an external Leviathan is 
necessary to avoid tragedy of the commons leads to recommendations that central 
governments should control most natural resource systems (Ostrom, 1990). The policy 
advice to centralize the control and regulation of natural resources, such as grazing lands, 
forests, and fisheries, has been followed extensively, particularly in Third World countries 
(Ostrom, 1990). Murphree (1997) observes that the regulation of natural resource use by 
central government agencies has not halted the persistent environmental decline in Africa. 
Guha (1989), Gadgil and Guha (1992; 1995), and Shiva (1989) argue that the 
continued espousal of 'Western science' by post-colonial governments for developing 
forestry policies and practices contributes to the alienation of communities from nature and 
intensifies the processes of deforestation and ecological degradation. Meinzen-Dick and 
Knox (1999) observe that if devolution programs simply seek to engage natural resource 
users in implementing regulations that are set by outsiders, such programs will not draw on 
the knowledge of users about their own resource situation. Riker (1993:1) argues that agenda 
setting by outsiders foreshadow outcomes, since the nature of an agenda shapes the 
alternatives made from it. Thus agenda setting by central government agencies for natural 
resource management by users limits the users and they can only implement generic 
programs. Mazur and Tittola (1992) express concern about such generic programs, since 
they often lack local input. 
According to Flora et al. (2000), there ought to be a change in community 
development approaches from community development to community building. Flora et al. 
(2000) associate community development with a specialist model, premised upon the 
presence of individual experts helping the community identify problems and then solving the 
problems for the community. Community building entails the involvement of a wide range of 
participants who develop a shared vision of what the community should be like in the future, 
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looking at the whole and not just a few parts (Flora et al. 2000). Community building forms 
the conceptual framework for assessing my study's CBNRM study cases using Narayan's 
(1999) and Flora and Flora's (2004) community sustainability capitals. While Narayan 
(1999) identifies four types of community sustainability capitals - human, social, financial, 
and natural, Flora and Flora (2004) make an additional two types - cultural and political 
capital. According to Flora and Flora (2004:165), capital is any resource used to produce new 
resources. Flora and Flora (2003:215) maintains that favoring only one form of capital can 
deplete all capital within a community in the future, and each form of capital has the 
potential to enhance the productivity of the others. For instance, Putnam (1993b:35-36) 
observe that social capital enhances the benefit of investment in physical and human capital 
(Putnam, 1993b:35-36). 
Human capital includes those attributes of individuals that contribute to their ability 
to earn a living, strengthen community, and otherwise contribute to community organization, 
to their families, and to self-improvement (Flora and Flora, 2004:80). Putnam defines social 
capital as those features of social life - networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to 
act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives (1995b: 664 - 665). Financial 
capital consists of money that is used for investment rather than consumption. Thus financial 
capital can be transformed into built capital (Flora and Flora, 2004:9). Built capital is the 
permanent physical installations and facilities supporting productive activities in a 
community. Natural capital is the landscape, air, water, soil, and biodiversity of both plants 
and animals (Flora and Flora, 2004:9). Cultural capital can be thought of as the filter through 
which people live their lives, the daily or seasonal rituals they observe, and the way they 
regard the world around them (Flora and Flora, 2004:9). Political capital is the ability of a 
group to influence the distribution of resources within a social unit, including helping set the 
agenda for what resources are available and who is eligible to receive them. Figure 2.1 below 
shows six forms of capitals for measuring community sustainability. 
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Figure 2.1 Community Capitals and Systems Sustainability 
Human Capital Social Capital 
Natural Capital Financial/Built 
Captial 
Cultural Capital 
Political Capital 
Source: Flora and Flora 2004 
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2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Brenner and Cochran (1991) suggest that stakeholder theory can be used to describe 
how organizations function in varying situation, and to assist in predicting organizational 
behavior. Stakeholders are groups, constituencies, social actors or institutions of any size or 
aggregation that act at various levels (domestic, local, regional, national, international, 
private and public), have a significant and specific stake in a given set of resources, and can 
affect or be affected by resource management problems or interventions (Chevalier, 2001). 
Stakeholders possess some combination of three critical attributes: Power, Legitimacy and 
Urgency (see figure 2.2 below). All three factors must be considered simultaneously in that 
"power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exercise through urgency" (Mitchell 
et al. 1997: 869). Mitchell et al., (1997) argue that much of the management literature on 
stakeholder theory fails to address the issue of salience, the degree to which one stakeholder 
can succeed in getting its claims or interests ranked high in other stakeholders' agendas. 
Figure 2.2 Stakeholder salience 
POWER LEGITIMACY 
Dormant / 4 \ 
Stakeholder/ Dominant 
/ Stakeholder Discretionary 
Stakeholder 
Definitive 
Stakeholder 
Dependent 
Stakeholder 
Nonstakeholders 
Demanding 
Stakeholder 
URGENCY 
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1. Dormant stakeholders (Power, no legitimacy and no urgency) 
2. Discretionary stakeholders (Legitimacy, but no power and no urgency) 
3. Demanding stakeholders (Urgency, but no legitimacy and no power) 
4. Dominant stakeholders (Power and legitimacy, but no urgency) 
5. Dangerous stakeholders (Power and urgency, but no legitimacy) 
6. Dependent stakeholders (Legitimacy and urgency, but no power) 
7. Definite stakeholders (Power, legitimacy and urgency) 
8. Nonstakeholders (No power, no legitimacy and no urgency) 
1,2,3 are low salience classes, which are referred to as "latent" stakeholders, 
identified by their possession or attributed possession of only one of the attributes; 4,5,6 are 
moderately salient stakeholders (expectant stakeholders) - they are stakeholders who expect 
something and they possess or are attributed to possess two of the attributes. 7 are highly 
salient stakeholders and possess or are attributed to possess all the three attributes. Latent 
stakeholders can increase their salience and move into the expectant category by acquiring 
just one of the missing attributes. This could be made possible through coalition building 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). 
2.5 Social Capital 
My study adopts Putnam's (1995b) conceptualization of social capital with 
modifications from Woolcock (1998; 2001), Narayan (1999), and Woolcock and Narayan 
(2000). Putnam defines social capital as those features of social life - networks, norms, and 
trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives 
(1995b: 664 - 665). Social capital involves building mutual trust, constructing shared futures, 
strengthening collective identity, working together and forming groups (Flora and Flora, 
2003). While Woolcock (1998; 2001), Narayan (1999), and Woolcock and Narayan (2000) 
identify three dimensions of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking social capital), 
Putnam (1995b; 1993a; 1993b) identifies two (bonding and bridging social capital). Bonding 
social capital consists of connections among homogeneous individuals and groups, which 
may be based principally on class, ethnicity, gender, or another social characteristic (Flora 
and Flora, 2003:217). Bridging social capital connects diverse groups within community to 
each other and to groups outside the community (Flora and Flora, 2003:217). Woolcock and 
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Narayan's concept of linking social capital refers to associations of exchange produced 
among groups which are conscious about their dissimilarities, as in the case of bridging 
social capital, and in addition, are cognizant of their power disparities. Narayan (1999) 
observe that both bridging and linking social capital are crosscutting ties, but differ in the 
sense that bridging social capital is horizontal and linking social capital is vertical. 
In their seminal 1993 work, Putnam et al. (1993) consider horizontally organized 
networks to support social capital, whereas vertical relationships are thought to stall its 
formation. They perceive concentrated horizontal interactions as an essential form of social 
capital. According to Putnam et al. (1993:173 - 174) vertical networks, no matter how dense 
and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. 
Fox (1996:124) is pessimistic about the results of vertical networking, since he perceives that 
it has the capacity to sideline the base. His argument is that if local organizations only 
establish vertical networks, local stakeholders will ultimately have little capacity to monitor 
the activities of their leadership and therefore little capacity to hold them accountable (Fox, 
1996:124). However, Narayan (1999:13) maintain that "when power between groups is 
asymmetrically distributed, it is cross-cutting ties, the linkages between groups that are 
critical to both economic opportunity and social cohesion". Narayan (1999) suggests that the 
development of "weak ties" (Granovetter, 1973) is important for breaking down inequalities 
of power and access. Flora and Flora (2003) use the concept bridging social capital to refer to 
both bridging and linking social capital. According to Flora and Flora (2003), both horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of networking are important. Flora and Flora (1993:56) observe that 
communities tend to learn best from those that are at the same level as themselves. Flora and 
Flora (1993) call this, horizontal networking lateral learning. Besides horizontal networking, 
it is important for communities to be linked to regional and national resources and 
organizations. Flora and Flora (2003:219) caution that community organization's vertical 
linkages should not be based upon one gatekeeper who makes that linkage. 
Figure 2.3 below is an effort by Flora and Flora (2003) to understand how bridging 
(which is inclusive of linking social capital) and bonding social capital interact at the 
community level in order to determine the extent of collective action that takes place in those 
communities. Flora and Flora (2003) maintain that bridging and bonding social capital 
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reinforce one another, and when both are high there is effective community action. Figure 2.3 
captures the different outcomes from the different combinations of bridging and bonding 
social capital. 
Figure 2.3 Dimensions of social capital and their implications for community building 
Bonding Social Capital 
The community resists change; 
there is little trust and little 
cooperation among groups 
Conflict with outside/internal 
factionalism 
Community action arising from 
objectives determined through 
participation, with links with 
external institutions and 
resources 
Participatory Community Action 
+ 
The wealthy resolve their 
problems with financial capital; 
poor people have fewer options 
Apathy, social disorganization, 
extreme individualism 
Community change is controlled 
by outside institutions, mediated 
by local bosses 
Clientelism 
Source: Flora and Flora, 2003 
Woolcock (1998) uses the concepts embeddedness and autonomy to describe the 
desirable interactions within and between community organizations and private and public 
organizations at the micro and macro levels. According to Woolcock (1998) the concepts of 
embeddedness and autonomy denote different things at the different scales. At the micro 
level embeddedness refers to intra-community ties (integration), whereas at the macro-level it 
refers to state-society relations (synergy); autonomy at the micro-level refers to extra-
community networks (linkages), while at the macro-level it refers to institutional capacity 
and credibility (integrity). Woolcock's (1998) model of micro and macro level embeddedness 
and autonomy is an attempt at understanding the creation of social capital based on both top-
down and bottom-up processes. Bottom-up processes of social capital creation entail 
linkages, which involve bridging and linking social capital, and integration, which involves 
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bonding social capital. Woolcock (1998) maintains that for development outcomes to be 
achieved in poor communities, linkage needs to be combined with integration. Too much or 
too little of either dimension at any given moments undermines economic advancement. 
Woolcock (1998:176) observe that the internal dynamics and development of economic 
groups in poor communities does not occur in isolation, but rather in the context of a 
particular history and regulatory framework that can itself strengthen or undermine the 
capacity of independent groups in civil society to organize in their own collective interest. 
The performance of bottom-up processes can be affected by state integrity and the state's 
willingness to invest in synergy. Woolcock (1998) maintains that organizational integrity 
without synergy and vice versa is unproductive. Figure 2.4 below shows the top-down and 
bottom-up processes of social capital creation. 
Figure 2.4 Top-down and bottom-up development and forms of social capital 
Top-Down Z Autonomy \ 
V—(Integrity) Macro-level 
Embeddedness 
(Linkage) 
Embeddedness 
(Synergy) I 
Civil Society 
Bottom-Up 
Autonomy 
(Integration) 
I 
Micro-level 
Source: Woolcock, 1998 
Evans (1996:189) observes that endowments of social capital are essential for 
synergy. According to Evans (1996:189) synergy as endowments is an outcome that hinge on 
the prior existence of social and cultural patterns historically rooted in particular cultures and 
societies. In his analysis of the Italian case, Putnam (1993a) observes that stocks of social 
capital accumulated over longer periods of time was the key ingredient in generating the 
'virtuous circle' in which civic engagement encouraged good government and good 
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government in turn enhanced civic engagement. Synergy as constructability recognizes the 
potential and possibility to create synergy among actors who do not have past synergic 
relations and or endowments. "Synergy becomes a latent possibility in most contexts, waiting 
to be brought to life by the institutional entrepreneurship" (Evans, 1996:190). 
2.6 Advocacy Coalition Framework 
A central feature of the advocacy coalition framework is its focus on the belief 
systems of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993:41). An advocacy 
coalition's objective is to translate its beliefs into policy by altering the behavior of 
governmental institutions in order to achieve its policy goals over time. Hence, within the 
Advocacy Coalition framework, policy formulation and change is a function of competing 
advocacy coalitions within a subsystem. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993:37) maintain that 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework completely rejects the ideology that there exists a 
unified, relatively autonomous state - as proposed by Skocpol (1979). The advocacy 
coalition framework sees the state sphere as highly contested. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993) as interpreted by Flora et al. (2000), argue that public and private institutional actors 
or organizations form advocacy coalitions around specific issues to realize shared desired 
futures. According to Flora et al. (2000:2) "these public and private institutional actors at 
various geographic scales share certain beliefs that anchor common desired futures 
(outcomes), mental causal models (implicit and explicit means for reaching those futures), 
and rules of evidence that allow for members of the coalition to mutually ascertain progress 
towards the goals" (Flora et al. 2000:2). 
Schlager (1995) and Schlager and Blomquist (1996) criticizes the advocacy coalition 
framework as proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) of not accounting for how 
actors with similar belief systems overcome collective action problems and cooperate to 
pursue common strategies and common goals. Flora et al. (2000:3) caution that having 
similar desired futures (beliefs) does not guarantee cooperation between institutional actors, 
since such actors might have different mental causal models. Zafonte and Sabatier 
(1998:479) acknowledge that the advocacy coalition framework as proposed in Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1993) is justifiably criticized by Schlager (1995) and Schlager and Blomquist 
(1996) for assuming that shared beliefs constitute a sufficient reason for coordinated 
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behavior. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) acknowledge that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) 
premise that common beliefs will lead to coordinated collective action ignored the 
temptations to free-ride as identified by Olson (1965). If there is no coordinated behavior, 
there is no advocacy coalition. To address the issues of collective action, Zafonte and 
Sabatier (1998) adopted Chisholm's (1989) explanation on functional interdependencies 
among organizations as an alternative explanation to coordinated behavior in addition to 
shared beliefs. Table 2.1 below shows coalition behavior as the result of belief congruence 
and functional overlap. 
Table 2.1 Coalition behavior as the result of belief congruence and functional overlap 
Functional overlap Beliefs 
Congruent Divergent 
High (1) Strong coordination (2) Strong conflict 
Low (3) Weak coordination (4) Weak conflict 
Source: Fenger, Menno and Klok Pieter-Jan (2001) 
2.7 Justification for Community Based Natural Resource Management 
Literature on CBNRM is fairly recent, developed as part of general processes of 
devolution and democratization. However, community based natural resource management is 
not a new invention (Folke and Berkes, 1995; North, 1990, Bromley, 1991; Fortman, 1989). 
CBNRM is a revival of old practices in a modified form as guided and constrained by state 
policy. Croll and Parkin (1992) and Berkes et al. (1998) argue that rather than being new, 
CBNRM can be viewed as a modern attempt to resuscitate traditional local and indigenous 
cultural and institutional mechanisms for managing and conserving the natural environment. 
In Africa, colonial policies and later, post-independence state policies took away control over 
natural resources from local communities and their traditional institutions and placed these 
resources under state control. The customary rules and knowledge systems for natural 
resource management of traditional institutions were undermined. New bureaucratic and 
technocratic state institutions emerged to replace the traditional institutions. This implies a 
shift from local authority to national authority as guarantor of public interest (Dubois, 1999). 
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Baker and Gathundu (2002) argue that the bureaucratic state resource management 
institutions evolved with a bias towards exploiting natural resources for supporting economic 
growth. Comparatively, traditional institutions' exploitation of natural resources was based 
on local experiences and knowledge regarding resource resilience and sustainability (Baker 
and Gathundu, 2002). Baker and Gathundu (2002) observes that while the state objectives of 
attaining economic growth were met in some instances, the alienation of local communities 
from the resources they depended on for their livelihood led to escalating levels of poverty 
and environmental degradation. The fruits of economic growth from the exploitation of 
natural resources have not filtered down to the local community level, hence the escalating 
levels of poverty. With regard to environmental degradadtion, state institutions often pursue 
policies that are sectoral and not comprehensive in managing the natural resource base. 
According to McNeill (2000:82) state institutions are driven mainly by economic potential of 
resources and do not incorporate the management of those resources that are of value to the 
communities' livelihood, especially those without market value. 
The failure by state institutions to address the problems of persistent rural poverty and 
environmental degradadtion necessitate the revival, at least in modified form, of traditional 
natural resource management practices. CBNRM is seen as better placed to achieve and 
reconcile two persistent and rarely achieved objectives; the alleviation of rural poverty and 
the conservation of biodiversity (Parker, 1997; Butler, 1998; Mehta and Kellert, 1998; 
Wainwright and Wehrmeyer, 1998). The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
recognizes the contribution of local knowledge on natural resource management to 
sustainable development (UNCED, 1992). Traditional knowledge generation systems can be 
revitalized through CBNRM initiatives that give local communities authority to manage the 
resources (Baker and Gathundu, 2002). According to Baker and Gathundu (2002), 
approaches that employ scientific knowledge to fill in the gaps of traditional knowledge 
systems have a higher probability of nurturing sustainable local institutions that also benefit 
from community support (Baker and Gathundu, 2002). 
Though governments in Africa and other parts of the developing world embrace the 
idea of CBNRM, the actual process of devolution of natural resource management to local 
communities is problematic. There is disparity between rhetoric, policy and implementation. 
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It is unclear whether CBNRM can proceed without reversing the resource centralizing 
legislation of the past. According to Lynch (1998), the challenge is to overcome legislative 
impediments to CBNRM and to set up in their place incentives that create and foster 
appropriate legal, regulatory and economic relationships between local communities and 
state institutions. Lynch (1998) proposes recognizing private community-based rights on land 
and the resources therein as a starting point for reversing the land tenure centralizing policies 
of the past. Usufruct agreements such as certificates, leases or other restrictive tenurial 
instruments are not conducive to the promotion of long-term sustainability objectives (Lynch, 
1998). They are susceptible to arbitrary cancellation and, thus, fall short of providing 
leasholders or recipients of privileges with adequate incentives to make the costly 
investments of time and labor required to realize long-term benefits (Lynch, 1998). There is a 
role for the state in CBNRM, and that role ought to be facilitative than obstructive. The 
state's facilitative role may include assistance and guidance to local groups; protection 
against broader forces and/or other economic sectors; clear legal framework which clarifies 
group rights and benefit, as well as rules for conflict resolution; direct economic incentives 
and mechanism to disserminate information (Vira et al., 1998). 
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Table 2.2 Forms of Joint Forest Management 
Mode of Co-opted Cooperating Consulted Collaborating Co-learning Collective 
Participation action 
Role of Political Directive Intermediation Enabling Participant in Full 
Officials the process subsidiary 
Assumptions Expert Expert Expert taking Expert taking Emergent, Local 
about based on based on into into based on experience 
sources of best best consideration consideration shared informed by 
solutions technical technical socio­ socio­ discovery, multi-source 
means means economic and economic learning, expertise 
cultural and cultural pooling local 
factors factors and expert 
knowledge 
Assumptions Has the Has the Has the right The public The public 
about the right to right to to act as the interest lies interest is 
role of the determine determine guardian of in adaptive formed by 
state the public the public the public management aggregation of 
interest interest interest local interests 
Source: Jiggins, 1998 
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Chapter 3: Botswana CBNRM Context and Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the CBNRM context in Botswana. It presents 
information on policies guiding the implementation of CBNRM in Botswana, procedures 
followed by CBNRM CBOs to acquire resource use leases fron the state, CBNRM activities 
of the CBNRM CBOs and the local government framework upon which CBNRM operates. 
Since the CBNRM program is implemented in the rural areas, this chapter explains in details 
the local government setup in Botswana. This chapter's section 3.3 summarizes Zimbabwe's 
CBNRM program for comparison purposes with the Botswana case. 
In Botswana, wildlife inhabit approximately 37% of the surface area, comprising 
National Parks and Game Reserves (17%) and Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (20%) 
(MFDP, 2003:246). According to National Development Plan 9 2003/04 - 2008/09 (MFDP, 
2003:246), WMAs inhibit expansion of grazing land, development of boreholes/watering 
points and access to land for cultivation. In Botswana, wildlife is owned, controlled and 
managed by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Prior to the adoption 
of the CBNRM program in CBNRM areas, individuals interested in hunting had to apply for 
hunting licenses from the DWNP. Hunting licenses were not bundled together and given to a 
community, but rather, individuals had to obtain individual hunting licenses. Safari operators 
obtained commercial hunting concessions and photographic lodge operating licenses from 
the relevant Land Boards and DWNP. With the adoption of the Wildlife Conservation Policy 
in 1986, there was a shift in the wildlife utilization model in CBNRM areas, conceived under 
the catch phrase Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). 
The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 converted stretches of land that were 
formerly designated as "reserved" under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975 into WMAs 
(see Appendix 5 for timeline of CBNRM related events). According to NDP 9 2003/04 to 
2008/09 (MFDP, 2003:246), WMAs were established by the DWNP and Division of Land 
Use Planning to serve as migratory corridors for wildlife between the protected areas as they 
allowed for movement that is essential for the survival of Botswana's wildlife in the arid 
environment. The WMAs were further sub-divided by DWNP and the Division of Land Use 
Planning into Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs), and these CHAs were subsequently 
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earmarked for various kinds of management and utilization. In all, the WMAs were sub­
divided into one hundred and sixty-three CHAs (see Appendix 2). The CHAs are today the 
major land units utilized for CBNRM activities. Under CBNRM, community refers to 
communities of place residing within a CHA and these communities of place could involve 
one village or several villages. Communities of interest residing outside the physical 
boundaries of the managed CHA often have their interests manifested by their involvement 
as either facilitator, member of network organizations or as financiers. 
As the central government agency responsible for Botswana's wildlife resources, 
DWNP spearhead the development and implementation of the CBNRM program. At its 
inception phase, the CBNRM program was developed and implemented through the Natural 
Resource Management Project (NRMP), a jointly funded project by the central government 
and US AID. NRMP was housed within DWNP office blocks in Gaborone, Botswana's main 
administrative center. NRMP-DWNP CBNRM activities started in 1989 and NRMP support 
for CBNRM ceased in 1999. In 1995, the NRMP obtained the support of PACT, a US-based 
NGO interested in issues relating to community capacity building. PACT initiated a program 
called Institutional Reinforcement for Community Empowerment (IRCE), which 
spearheaded the community and institutional development component of CBNRM projects. 
In implementing the IRCE program with CBNRM CBOs, PACT solicited assistance from 
both local and international NGOs to perform the role of CBNRM CBO facilitators. It is 
important to note that there has been no formal CBNRM policy from the inception of 
CBNRM activities to present. Currently there is a Draft CBNRM Policy, which is yet to be 
endorsed by Parliament. 
3.2 CBNRM Procedure 
The projects I selected for research are all wildlife-based CBNRM projects. In 
addition to wildlife based CBNRM projects, there are veld products1-based and cultural and 
or natural sites CBNRM projects in Botswana. Wildlife based CBNRM projects are in 
CHAs. Veld product-based CBNRM projects may operate without any special permission as 
1 Veld products are non-timber forest products including foods, medicines, craft materials, tannings, gums, 
resins, dyes, essential oils, florist materials, ornamental plants, insects, horns, hides, skins and many other 
renewable natural resources. 
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long as the project does not harvest grapple2 and other veld products governed by the 1974 
Agricultural Resources Conservation Act (Arntzen et al., 2003). Cultural and or natural sites 
CBNRM projects involve CBNRM community based organization (CBO) utilization of 
cultural sites and natural sites for tourism purposes. Cultural and/or natural sites CBNRM 
projects are regulated by the Department of National Museum, Monuments and Art Gallery; 
veld products CBNRMs are regulated by the Agricultural Resource Board; and wildlife based 
CBNRM projects are regulated by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks. 
Regarding wildlife based CBNRM, the Division of Land Use Planning Unit 
(DLUPU) and Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) agree on the optimal uses 
from a listing of uses for each Wildlife Management Area and Controlled Hunting Area 
(CHA). The list of potential uses encompasses hunting, photographic safaris or multiple 
purpose uses. Though most CHAs are on land zoned as Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMAs), several others are on multiple purpose areas, which include both wildlife 
management and livestock grazing (Gujadhur, 2000). According to the statement from the 
Tawana Land Board Secretary, a CHA that is zoned for CBNRM activities, even if it is in a 
multiple purpose area, cannot be used for large-scale grazing, as it is not zoned for grazing 
(Gujadhur, 2000). Leases offered by the Land Board for the purposes of a wildlife-based 
project in a multi-purpose area specify that there should be no new cultivation and settlement 
and no introduction or expansion of livestock activities and numbers. Gujadhur (2000) 
observed that because of these restrictions on agricultural activity, CBNRM thus has to 
provide a substantial alternative source of income to agriculture, although agriculture yields 
individual income and CBNRM yields income to the CBNRM CBO. 
Once CHAs are zoned by the Division of Land Use Planning and DWNP, villages 
within the geographic area are subsequently mobilized by the DWNP/NRMP and other 
CBNRM facilitating NGOs and workshops are conducted with these villages to discuss 
procedures, roles and responsibilities of villages in CBNRM (Cassidy and Madzwamuse, 
1999). The ultimate goal of these workshops is to help target village/s within the CHA to put 
2 Grapple or devil's claw (Harpogophytum procumbens)(medicinal plant whose local name is sengaparile) is 
predominantly found in the Kgalagadi District and is harvested by local people who sell it to an NGO, Thusano 
Lefatsheng, which processes it for the local market. 
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together a CBNRM community based organization (CBO) which spearheads the village/s 
wildlife utilization program. The faciltators of these workshops also help village/s conduct 
need assessments. The general membership of the CBNRM CBO elects a CBNRM CBO 
Trust Board to perform the administrative work of the CBNRM CBO. The general 
membership of the CBNRM CBO usually consists of all adults (18 years and over) who are 
residents of a village/s with which the DWNP and the Land Board has signed a resource use 
lease. Before the CBNRM CBO can be registered with the Deeds Office (Botswana), the 
CBNRM CBOs' constitution must be approved by local government authorities. Once 
registered, the CBNRM CBO is entitled to a resource use lease from the Land Board and 
DWNP. The resource use lease entails a tourism concession and a wildlife off-take quota 
(Cassidy and Madzwamuse, 1999). 
The resource use lease awarded to the CBNRM CBO offers the CBNRM CBO an 
opportunity to utilize resources inside a CHA in accordance with DWNP and Land Board 
guidelines. The CBNRM CBOs' right to utilize wildlife resources within a leased CHA is 
regulated by the DWNP by awarding annual wildlife off-take quotas. The CBNRM CBO has 
exclusive rights for the leased resources, and this exclusivity of rights does not extend to 
resources within the CHA that have not been included in the lease agreement. The resource 
use lease is awarded for a period of fifteen years and has to be renewed after every five years. 
The resource use lease permits a CBNRM CBO to sub-lease some or all leased resources to a 
third party. The DWNP and Land Board have set the sublease conditions for CBNRM CBOs 
to follow. According to the Joint-venture guidelines (1999) prepared by the DWNP, if a 
CBNRM CBO desires to sub-lease use of their CHA to a safari company, they ought to keep 
to a 1-1-3-5-5 year contract model. That is, the first and second subleases should last for a 
one year period, the third for three years and the fourth and fifth each for five years. The 
justification for the 1-1-3-5-5 year contract model was given by the DWNP as the desire to 
protect CBNRM CBOs that do not have much experience in business from being trapped 
with an undesirable partner or in an undesirable contract (Gujadhur, 2001). 
At the district or sub-district level, the Central government created a Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC), consisting of personnel from the District Council, District 
Administration, Land Board and DWNP. TAC members hold ex-officio position on 
27 
community trust boards. TAC members are expected to attend community trust board 
meetings in an advisory role and have no vote within the community trust board. Much of the 
TAC influence on community trust boards has been visible in the area of joint venture 
development (Cassidy, 2000). The TAC's role is to obtain detailed information about each 
prospective joint venture partner and to acquaint private sector companies with each 
CBNRM CBOs' joint venture objectives through the publication of tender documents 
(Cassidy, 2000). The TAC is in addition responsible for overseeing the election of the 
community trust board. The TAC works in close liaison with a review committee appointed 
by the community trust board in reviewing and shortlisting all joint venture proposals from 
safari companies. Once potential joint venture partners have been short-listed, the list is 
presented to the general membership of the CBNRM CBO. On a given date, at the kgotla3, 
the general membership of the CBNRM CBO votes for the joint venture partner of their 
choice from the short-listed safari companies presented to them. The vote at the kgotla 
culminates with the selection of the Safari Company to sublease or 'partner' with the 
CBNRM CBO. The CBNRM CBO could either sublease all or part of their leased resources 
to the safari company. 
The joint venture guidelines of 1999 developed by the DWNP encourage CBNRM 
CBOs to enter into joint venture agreements with a safari company. According to the 
guidelines, a joint venture agreement is an agreement between a CBNRM CBO and private 
sector company that does not involve the merging of assets. Joint Venture Agreements 
normally entails any one of the following; 
i) The CBNRM CBO leases the land from the Land Board and in turn sub-leases it, 
and the resources contained therein, to a safari company or companies which pay an annual 
rental fee to the village/s organization. 
ii) The CBNRM CBO sub-leases specific areas to one or more safari companies for 
the development of tourism infrastructure. The CBNRM CBO manages the natural resources 
of the remaining area and benefits from the income derived from hunting, fishing, wildlife 
3 The kgotla is both a place and also an organizational form. It is the traditional administrative place within the 
village or is the chiefs' office. The chief is the leader of this organizational form. 
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viewing and other activities; while safari operators aim to profit from tourist lodge or camp 
income. 
iii) The safari company or companies sub-lease the land from the community 
organization and provide their services at an agreed daily rate per tourist. The remainder of 
the daily rate income (gross profit) is then equally divided between the partners (Cassidy, 
2000). 
3.3 CBNRM in Zimbabwe 
CAMPFIRE is a CBNRM program that is based on devolution of power from central 
government to Rural District Councils (RDCs). Through section 95 of the Parks and Wildlife 
Act of 1975 as amended in 1982, the Minister can gazette a district as having appropriate 
authority (Arntzen et al., 2003). Appropriate authority confers full rights for wildlife to the 
RDC. At the district level, a District CAMPFIRE Coordinating Committee is formed to 
coordinate the program. Ward and village level CAMPFIRE committees are formed at the 
ward and village level. The Village level CAMPFIRE committee forms the basic unit of 
natural resource management and is responsible for controls of veld fires, apprehending 
poachers, problem animal control and participates in off-take quota setting (Arntzen et al., 
2003). Revenue generated by the Village CAMPFIRE committee is managed by the RDC. 
The RDC keeps fifty percent of CBNRM proceeds in district coffers (Hill, 1996) and the 
reminder is disbursed to the Ward and Village CAMPFIRE committee. According to 
Mandondo (2000), the RDC is where effective decentralization ends, at least in terms of legal 
framework. RDCs consist of elected Councilors representing the interests of their consitutent 
wards, district heads of line ministries, council executives, and chiefs as ex-officio members. 
Councilors often owe allegiance and are upwardly accountable to the major political party 
that endorses their candidature (Mandondo, 2000). 
The local government in Zimbabwe, just as in Botswana, is upwardly accountable. 
However, in Botswana, CBNRM bypasses district councils and is implemented by central 
government departments working directly with CBNRM CBOs at the community/village 
level. In Zimbabwe, CBNRM involves devolution of natural resources to RDCs and not 
directly to ward and village CAMPFIRE committees. However, though the RDCs are 
supposed to be a form of local government, just as in the case of Botswana they are 
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dominated by central government and are accountable to it than the local people within the 
district. While revenue earned in CBNRM in Botswana goes directly into CBNRM CBOs' 
coffers, revenue generated by the CBNRM activities of ward and village CAMPFIRE 
committees in Zimbabwe are handled by the RDC. However, ward and village CAMPFIRE 
committees in Zimbabwe have more natural resource management responsibilities than is the 
case in Botswana. In Botswana, CBNRM CBOs just utilizes their annual wildlife quota set 
by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, while in Zimbabwe, ward and village 
CAMPFIRE committees are involved in the actual setting of the off-take quota. From this 
comparison, it is clear that local communities involved in CBNRM in the two countries 
occupy a subordinate position to central government and central government dominated 
district councils. 
3.4 Number of CBNRM CBOs involved in CBNRM over the years in Botswana 
There has been a significant increase in the number of CBNRM CBOs in Botswana 
over the years. This increase has meant that more villages have become involved, and almost 
all districts have one or more CBNRM CBO projects. Only five villages and one district were 
involved in CBNRM in 1993; by 2003, 120 villages and nine districts were involved. The 
geographical spread of CBNRM activity has been made possible by the adoption of non-
wildlife based CBNRM. Wildlife based CBNRM is restricted to the four districts of 
Ngamiland, Chobe, Kgalagadi and Ghanzi. Table 3.1 below shows the cumulative number of 
CBNRM CBOs and villages and districts in CBNRM. 
Table 3.1 Cumulative number of CBNRM CBOs in Botswana 
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
# of CBOs involved in CBNRM 2 6 19 45 61 83 
# of CBNRM CBOs registered (or in the final 
process of registration) 1 4 10 26 46 67 
# of CBNRM CBOs involved in Wildlife-based 
CBNRM 
1 3 6 11 18 26 
# of CBNRM CBOs which are not wildlife based 0 1 4 15 28 41 
% of CBNRM CBOs which are wildlife based 100 75 60 42 39 39 
% of CBNRM CBOs which are not wildlife 
based 
0 25 40 58 61 61 
# of Villages in CBNRM 5 12 30 91 99 120 
# of Districts with CBNRM CBOs 1 3 6 8 8 9 
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3.4.1 Range of CBNRM CBO activities with regard to CBNRM 
A majority of CBNRM CBOs are involved in veld products related activities 
followed by those involved in hunting joint venture agreements with hunting safari operators. 
A small percentage of the wildlife based CBOs auction their wildlife quota. Other CBNRM 
CBOs are involved in agro-forestry, campsite development, cultural tourism, game farming, 
integrated development, photographic tourism and subsistence hunting. In most cases 
CBNRM CBOs are involved in more than one of these activities. For the wildlife-based 
CBNRM CBOs only a portion of the annual wildlife quota is set aside for subsistence 
hunting, while the greater percentage is apportioned to hunting joint venture agreements. 
There is very little CBNRM activity on game farms. Table 3.2 below shows a range of 
CBNRM CBOs' activities with regard to CBNRM. 
Table 3.2 CBNRM CBO Activities and Number of CBNRM CBOs Involved 
Activity Number of CBNRM CBOs 
Joint Venture Agreement with hunting safari operator 15 
Subsistence hunting of part of the quota 11 
Auction wildlife quota 2 
Photographic tourism 7 
Cultural tourism 10 
Veld products 35 
Campsite 9 
Agro-forestry 5 
Integrated development 8 
Game farming 3 
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3.5 Safari Hunting in Botswana 
CBNRM CBOs engaged in CBNRM are faced with the challenge regarding ways to 
earn money from their annual wildlife quota. The options that these CBNRM CBOs have is 
either to carry out the hunting themselves for local consumption or follow the DWNP 
guidelines on joint venture agreements with safari companies. Most CBNRM CBOs have 
opted for the joint venture agreements. Scout Wilson Consultants (2001) found that safari 
hunting in the Okavango Delta in Botswana commences in the United States where 
individual hunters from all over the world attend the Safari Club International (SCI) 
convention in January of every year. At the SCI conference, safari hunting companies, 
including those operating in Botswana, sell their hunts to prospective hunters for up to 2 to 3 
years in advance (Mbaiwa, 2003). Once safari companies enter into a sublease agreement 
with a CBNRM CBO, they are entitled to the wildlife quota within the leased CHA and 
subsequently market it at the SCI Convention in the United States: http://www.safariclub.org 
3.6 Botswana Local Government Structure 
3.6.1 Local Government Institutions 
The Government of Botswana functions through a two-tier system of government: 
central government and local government. Central government operates at the national level 
and local government at the district and sub-district level. There are nine districts in 
Botswana. In large districts, local government has decentralized some of their functions to 
sub-districts. Local governments are comprised of the district administration, district council, 
tribal administration and land board. The district administration consists of central 
government offices operating at the district level, having the status of a local authority 
without corporate status. An Act of Parliament (Parliamentary Act Chapter 40) established 
the district councils with statutory powers to exercise governance and take responsibility for 
development in their districts. The tribal administration is responsible for the administration 
of justice under the system of customary law. The land boards derive their statutory 
responsibilities to hold land in trust for the citizens of Botswana from the Tribal Land Act of 
1968. 
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3.6.1.1 District Administration 
The District Commissioner (DC), who is chosen by the Minister of Local 
Government, heads the district administration. The Office of DC was created during the 
colonial period. The office of DC acted as the center of colonial administration in the tribal 
areas, which today make up districts and sub-districts. It operated as the administrative body 
over tribal chiefs and headmen (Government of Botswana, 2001). When Botswana gained 
independence in 1966, the office of DC remained, but this time to service the new central 
government. At independence, in addition to the DC's office, district councils were 
established. The DC became ex-officio member of the district council. The DC is the highest-
ranking central government representative at the district level (Government of Botswana, 
2001). The DC has the following responsibilities: 
• Chairs the Land Board selection committee 
• Chairs the staff committee of the Tribal Administration. 
• Coordinates the preparation and implementation of district development plans 
(MFDP, 2002). 
According to the report of the Second Presidential Commission on the Local 
Government Structure in Botswana (Government of Botswana, 2001), the decision by the 
central government to have the DC as supervisor of all district level institutions has infuriated 
other local government institutions, particularly District Councils, who find that the central 
government is insensitive to their establishment as a body of governance at the district level. 
District Councils argue that since they are the bodies of governance at the local level, elected 
by the people and granted mandate to govern, they cannot accept the central government 
imposition of control over them by a single employee of central government (Government of 
Botswana, 2001). 
The report of the Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government 
Structure in Botswana (Government of Botswana, 2001) noted that central government 
departments in the districts operate with little or no direct contact with either the DC's office 
or any of the local government authorities. They report directly to their ministries in the 
capital city, Gaborone, and get their work directives from there, with no local control. 
Though the DC is expected to oversee the work of all central government staff operating at 
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the district level, that has been difficult to implement, since different ministries hand down 
orders from their head offices to their personnel in the district with no consideration for the 
DC's office or the elected District Council. Other constraints regarding coordination of 
district activities pertain to the fact that administrative boundaries of central government 
departments, such as education, agriculture, health, etc. often do not coincide with district 
boundaries (Government of Botswana, 2001). Hence coordination of activities at the district 
levels remains a major challenge. Though the office of DC was initially thought of as 
responsible for linking up local government and central government, it is failing in this 
regard, as central government offices at the district level continue to maintain 'hot lines' with 
their ministries in the capital city. 
To facilitate the complementarity of programs and projects between central and local 
government, District Development Committees (DDCs), responsible for district planning, 
were set up. The DDC consist of representatives of the District Council, Land Boards, Tribal 
Administration and District Administration. The DDC prepares District Plans, which are 
often subordinated to National Plans. District councils complained to the Second Presidential 
Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana (Government of Botswana, 
2001) that development planning and decision-making, in spite of DDCs, remain centralized, 
constituting an obstacle to creative responses to local issues by local government institutions. 
Another issue raised by the district councils was the over-representation of central 
government employees within DDCs. 
3.6.1.2 District Council 
District Councils have a legislative and administrative branch. The legislative branch 
consists of elected councillors. District Councillors represent both their political parties and 
their constituency. The Minister of Local Government, who is himself/herself a politician and 
member of the ruling party, nominates additional district Councillors, and often nominates 
District Councillors from his/her own political party. Such a practice neutralizes the political 
will of the local people, since the ruling party can achieve a majority in District Council 
through such nominations. District Councillors provide upward channels of communications 
from their constituents to the government at the district level. Members of Parliament provide 
upward channels of communication from their constitutents to the government at the national 
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level. Fortmann (1986) observes that upward channels of communications from rural 
residents to government at both the district and national level function poorly. 
Since most district boundaries are drawn along tribal lines, the tribal chief is an ex-
officio member of the District Council. In districts were there are more than one chief and or 
more than one tribe, like in the Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, Chobe and North East Districts, none of 
these chiefs hold ex-officio membership to the District Council (Government of Botswana, 
2001). District Commissioners (DC) are members of the District Council. The Local 
Government Act (CAP 40:01) assigned the DC supervisory role over the District Council. 
The District Council Chairperson is the head of the legislative branch of the district council. 
District Councillors select the district council chairperson from among themselves. 
The administrative branch of the District Council consists of the district council 
secretary, who is the chief executive, and supporting staff recruited by the Department of 
Local Government Service Management. The Department of Local Government Service 
Management is a central government department based within the Ministry of Local 
Government. The Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in 
Botswana observes that the legislative branch of the district council have little control over 
delivery capacity and performance of District Council staff since these are handled directly 
by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government (Government of Botswana, 
2001). The District Council is responsible for primary education, health and sanitation, rural 
roads, rural water supplies, social and community development, physical planning and 
remote area development. The source of revenue for District Councils is the revenue support 
grants from central government. In addition to central government funding, District Councils 
raise their funds through trade license fees, stray cattle sale (matimela), water levy and 
investment income from general fund balances (MFDP, 2003). 
3.6.1.3 Tribal Administration 
After Botswana's independence in 1966, the development and governance 
responsibilities of chiefs within their tribal territories were assigned to District Councils. 
Tribal territory boundaries that formed the chiefs' areas of influence were re-demarcated in 
some cases and maintained in others, as new district administrative boundaries were drawn. 
In addition to the chiefs' loss of power to District Councils, they also lost custody over tribal 
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land through the Tribal Land Act of 1968, as power over tribal land was transferred to the 
Land Boards. Chiefs traditionally played a role in land allocation and management of 
communal resources (Zufferey, 1986). Zufferey (1986) observes that early land use practices 
show that land management was a community affair based on the traditional chief-ward4 
relationship in which the chief was expected to be the provider or manager of the common 
patrimony, subject, however, to common decisions taken with the people through the kgotla 
system. The Tribal Land Act of 1968 stripped the chiefs of their land management functions 
and responsibilities and transferred such functions to the Land Board, an institution located 
outside the community and accountable to the central government and not the community, 
though controlling community resources. Zufferey (1986) observes that with the loss of 
control over resources, chieftainship and the kgotla system were weakened as traditional 
community decision making institutions. 
The current functions of the chiefs are: 
• To exercise his/her powers under the Chieftainship Act to promote the welfare of the 
members of his/her tribe - with limited resources after being stripped of most of 
his/her powers 
• To carry out any instructions given to him/her by the Minister of Local Government. 
• To ensure that the tribe is informed of any development projects in the area which 
affects the tribe 
• To convene kgotla meetings to obtain advice as to the exercise of his/her functions 
under the chieftainship act 
• To perform such other functions as may be conferred on him/her by or under the 
Chieftainship Act. 
• To preside over the customary courts (Government of Botswana, 2001) 
The Chieftainship Act subordinated the chiefs to the Minister of Local Government, 
who is their supervisor, and their role has been reduced to informing and winning support 
from their subjects for government programs and projects. The chiefs are on the central 
4 Ward - kin-based residential areas. Each ward was assigned by the chief, cultivation and cattle grazing areas 
and was responsible for its management. Each ward was headed by the wardhead. Today, cultivation and 
grazing areas are occupied by people not just from different wards but from different villages, or in some cases, 
districts (Fortmann, 1986) 
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government's payroll, making them government employees answerable to the Minister of 
Local Government. The Minister of Local Government has the power to suspend a chief who 
contravenes the Chieftainship Act and/or other Ministry of Local Government statutes 
pertaining to their roles and responsibilities. In a way, the chief merely endorses government 
programs in the community he leads. 
3.6.1.4 Land Board 
There are twelve Main Land Boards in Botswana. Main Land Boards have 
decentralized some of the land allocation functions to Sub-Land Boards. There are currently 
38 Sub-Land Boards in Botswana. A Land Board has a membership of ten, half of whom are 
elected by members of the public and the other half appointed by the Minister of Lands and 
Housing. The minister may appoint his/her half from his/her political party to neutralize 
those elected by members of the public. The Land Board derives its statutory responsibilities 
from the Tribal Land Act of 1968. The Land Board chairperson heads the Land Board. The 
Land Board secretary is a paid employee of the central government's Department of Local 
Government Service Management and is responsible for coordinating the administrative 
work of the Land Board. The Land Board Chairperson and locally elected members of the 
land board have no control over the land board personnel since the Permanent Secretary in 
the Ministry of Local Government controls them. The functions of the Land Board involves 
granting of rights to use land, cancellation of the grant of any rights to use any land, 
imposition of restrictions on the use of tribal land, authorizing any transfer of tribal land and 
hearing appeals from decisions of Subordinate Land Board in respect of any of its functions 
conferred on such Sub-Land Boards (Government of Botswana, 2001). 
The Land Board allocates land, rather than land planning. The central government's 
Department of Town and Regional Planning (DTRP) is responsible for land use planning in 
Botswana. This Department is housed within the Ministry of Lands and Housing. DTRP is 
responsible for the physical planning process through the preparation of Regional Master 
Plans, District Settlement Strategies and Settlement Development Plans. At the district level, 
the District Physical Planner, who reports directly to the Director of DTRP in Gaborone, 
represents DTRP. Besides the DTRP plans, a committee composed of staff from the District 
Administration, the District Council and the Land Board also draw up district land use plans. 
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This committee makes up the District Land Use Planning Unit (DLUPU). The secretariat of 
DLUPU is the central government's Department of Lands as represented by the District 
Officer (Lands) at the district or sub-district level. It is not clear how DTRP and DLUPU 
plans are coordinated. The Land Boards allocate land in accordance to these plans. 
3.6.1.5 Village Development Committees (VDCs) 
A Presidential directive established VDCs in 1968 to be the main institution for 
development planning at the village level (Government of Botswana, 2001). From the 
general membership of the village, ten individuals (both men and women eighteen years and 
over) are elected at a public meeting at the kgotla into the VDC. Membership to the VDC 
used to be on voluntary basis, but today, the district council pays VDC members asitting 
allowance, making them 'employees' of the district council. The Village Councillor, who is 
an elected representative of the village at the district council and member of a political party 
and the Village chief are ex-officio members of the VDC. VDCs in most cases do not have 
offices to work from, and in most cases just convene at the kgotla for their business. For 
their projects, VDCs are required to raise a contribution of up to 10% of the estimated cost of 
their projects before assistance funds from district council are released for those projects. The 
VDC receives technical advice from extension workers, especially the Community 
Development Officer, who is an employee of the Social and Community Development 
Division of the District Council. VDC projects are supported through VDC-raised funds and 
through district council funding. The following are functions of VDCs, as provided in the 
District Planning Handbook: 
a) Identify and discuss local needs 
b) Help villagers to prioritize their local needs. 
c) Formulate proposals for the solution of identified local needs 
d) Determine the extent to which the people can satisfy their identified needs on self-
help basis 
e) Develop a plan of action for their village area 
f) Solicit the assistance of donors and other development agencies 
g) Mobilize the community and its institutions for development action 
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h) Provide a forum for contact between village leaders, politicians, extension workers, 
the private sector and district authorities, to enhance the flow of development 
information 
i) Represent villagers in development matters and act as a source and reference point in 
matters pertaining to village development (Ministry of Local Government Lands and 
Housing, 1997). 
3.7 Discussion 
The establishment of districts and sub-district councils by the Government of 
Botswana and the subsequent creation of 'local government institutions', in most cases 
replacing or modifying existing ones, have all been established under the process of 
decentralization. According to Mathur (1983:68), decentralization programs emanate from a 
central government that has accepted the necessity of decentralized administration and as 
such, design institutions and processes to provide it. Mathur (1983:68) argues that a central 
government adopts decentralization programs as a mechanism to increase the central 
government effectiveness and not necessarily because decentralization promotes greater 
participation in public decision making or that it can improve equity, development, and 
resource management, as observed by Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475). Thus, in line with 
Mathur's (1983) argument, the creation of 'local government institutions' is geared towards 
improving central government's administrative efficiency. Hence, Mathur (1983:68) 
concludes that such decentralization is accompanied by supervision and control. 
In Botswana, decentralization was preceded by centralization. For instance, the chiefs 
were stripped of their decision making powers and resources by the Tribal Land Act of 1968, 
and a central government regulatory institution, the Land Board, was created to substitute for 
the chiefs' role. Half of the Land Board members are elected by the local people and receive 
their sitting allowances from central government, and the other half is appointed by a central 
government minister and the Land Board administrative work is carried out by employees of 
the central government. Thus, utilizing Agrawal and Ribot's (1999:475) terminology, it is 
clear that the Land Board is upwardly accountable. Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) argue that 
it is important to understand the structures of accountability in which actors are located in 
order to understand whether institutions or organizations are local administrative units or 
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local government units. Rondinelli (1983:89) and Uphoff (1986) make a distinction between 
local administrative and local government units. According to Uphoff (1986), local 
administrative units and local government units differ in that local administrative units are 
responsible to higher levels of decision making, whereas local government units are 
accountable at least in principle to constituents. The Land Board is a local administrative unit 
as opposed to a local government unit. 
Besides the Land Board, other 'local government institutions' in Botswana include 
the District Administration, Tribal Administration and the District Council. The District 
Administration was created through the process of déconcentration as central government 
ministries and departments in Botswana created regional offices in the districts to facilitate 
implementation of their policies and programs at the district level. Rondinelli and Cheema 
(1983:18) and Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) define déconcentration as involving the 
redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central government. The 
District Administration is upwardly accountable. The Tribal Administration was created after 
the tribal chiefs were stripped of their development and governance responsibility within 
their tribal territories, which was transferred to the District Council. The chiefs also lost 
custody over tribal land in 1973, as the Tribal Land Act of 1968 transferred power over tribal 
land to the Land Boards. The Tribal Administration is upwardly accountable since the chiefs 
are responsible to the central government's Minister of Local Government and are paid 
employees of the central government. Therefore, the Tribal Administration is a local 
administrative unit as opposed to a local government unit. 
In Botswana, an Act of Parliament (Parliamentary Acts Chapter 40:01) established 
the District Councils with statutory powers to exercise governance and take responsibility for 
development in their districts. Cohen and Peterson (1999) perceive devolution as entailing 
the creation of local government institutions with statutory powers and corporate status. 
Despite their creation as statutory bodies with corporate status, District Councils in Botswana 
are subordinated to central government authority. Gasper (1990), argue the Government of 
Botswana changed its position after the 1969 national elections, as ruling party politicians 
became worried that District Councils' could possibly develop into centers of opposition and 
criticism. To neutralize the District Councils, the District Administration was accorded the 
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status of a local government institution without corporate status. The District Commissioner, 
who is the head of the District Administration, was given supervisory powers over the 
District Council. In fact, the District Commissioner has supervisory responsibility over all 
'local government institutions'. The District Council's predicament is further compounded 
by the fact that District Councils rely on the central government for their funding. The 
District Council's administrative staff is on the payroll of the central government's 
Department of Local Government Service Management. The only organ within the District 
Council that is in principle downwardly accountable is the legislative branch. The legislative 
branch is made up of locally elected Councillors. However, the legislative branch of the 
District Council have little control over delivery capacity and performance of District 
Council staff, since these are handled directly by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Local Government (Government of Botswana, 2001). In Agrawal and Ribot's (1999:475) 
terminology, the administrative branch of the District Council is upwardly accountable. Thus, 
the fact that District Councils have been created as statutory bodies with corporate status 
does not make them local government institutions, but like other 'local government 
institutions', they are more like local administrative units. 
The implementation of CBNRM in Botswana is not mindful of the fact that District 
Councils have statutory powers to exercise governance and take responsibility for 
development in their districts. A central government department, the Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks, working with villages within the districts with little participation by 
'local government units', implements the alleged devoluion of natural resource management 
and utilization to villages within districts. In a way, it is a blessing that CBNRM projects are 
implemented outside the local government structure as it is today, since the implementation 
of such projects under the current local government structure means that CBRNM-generated 
resources might end up in central government coffers or District Council coffers and yet 
District Councils are not accountable to the communities generating these resources. This 
does not mean that the alleged devolution of natural resource management and utilization to 
villages can itself be classified as devolution, as chapter five of my study will show. The 
answer lies in the creation of local government units, not just local administrative units, in 
which CBNRM projects could be enmeshed. 
41 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
In this study, I identify local and extra-local institutional actors impacting CBNRM in 
Botswana. I then analyze the institutional actors' political and institutional culture, in 
particular their desired futures and mental causal models. By identifying similarities in 
desired future conditions and differences in mental causal models used by different 
institutions in making decisions, my study's findings will help groups that have hitherto not 
worked together or viewed each other as enemies to analyze alternative paths of action that 
could create coalitions to implement those actions. CBNRM-related networks have been 
analyzed. The study identifies decision makers (institutional actors) that participated in 
CBNRM decisions and their implementation. The study also assesses the networks that exist 
between levels and institutions to facilitate decision-making and/or to give advantage to one 
group over another. 
Content analysis of official documents and institutional interviews to determine how 
issues regarding CBNRM were framed, the sequence of decisions taken by various actors, 
major points of negotiation, and the information and processes that are most helpful in 
reaching the decisions are all data for my study. Using these data sources, I was able to 
determine the desired future conditions the institutional actors seek for the area and their 
mental causal models of how to achieve them. The principal units of analysis are the 
institutional actors: CBNRM CBOs, Local Government Agencies and NGOs; National 
Agencies (central government, donors and NGOs); and International Agencies (government, 
donor and NGOs). The study undertakes a content analysis of central government policy 
documents, development plans (national and district plans), sectoral plans, ministerial and 
departmental reports, organizations and associations records and meeting minutes, and 
CBNRM Support Services publications. The data have been classified into nodes (theme 
areas). The organizing themes for the data include mental causal models; desired future 
conditions; activities; and number of networks. 
Besides the content analysis, interviews were held with the leadership of the four 
study CBNRM CBOs in the month of June 2004. Interviews were held at Pandametenga with 
the KCT leadership; Kasane, with the CECT leadership; Khwai Village with the KDT 
leadership; and Sankuyo Village with the STMT leadership. The interviews with CECT and 
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KCT both of which more than one village is involved, were held with the Trust Board 
Chairperson and Coordinator respectively. The KCT Chairperson and the CECT Coordinator 
pointed out that it is difficult and expensive to bring all the Trust Board members together for 
an interview. At KDT and STMT, interviews were held with the full Trust Board members 
and members of the VDC. At STMT the Sankuyo Village Chief was also present for the 
interview. For KDT and STMT it was easy to bring together the complete Trust Board 
members for an interview since all of them live in the village. All, interviews lasted for one 
and half hours and were tape recorded and later transcribed. For these interviews, there was 
no formal questionnaire, but a compiled list of key theme areas to guide the interview. 
Selecting study CBNRM CBOs 
Presently, there are in Botswana 67 registered CBNRM CBOs, 26 of them wildlife-
based CBNRM CBOs. Due to limited resources, only a sample of these projects could be 
examined. A purposive sample of four wildlife based CBNRM CBOs was drawn. Besides the 
wildlife-based CBNRM projects there are also veld products and cultural tourism based 
CBNRM projects in Botswana. I chose only wildlife-based CBNRMs, since this category is 
the most developed in terms of legislation and policy and has been in place for over a decade. 
In fact CBNRM has been perceived in some quarters as a "wildlife thing" (Amtzen et al., 
2003). I selected the four wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs because they are among the oldest. 
Logistics also influenced the selection. CECT is the oldest CBNRM CBO in Botswana; KCT 
was selected for logistical reasons (since it is located closer to CECT, my first choice study 
case) and would therefore cut on transport costs considering the fact that my study was self-
funded. STMT and KDT are also some of the oldest CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. CECT, 
KCT, STMT, and KDT are all located in almost the same region and therefore saved on 
travel expenses. I initially intended to also study CBNRM CBOs in the Kgalagadi District, 
like the Ngwaa Khobee Xeya Trust, but I was constrained by resources. The selected study 
CBNRM CBOs are located in the North-West District and Chobe Sub-District of Botswana. 
The other selection criteria for the study CBNRM CBOs were single versus multiple village 
and differences in ethnic composition between the study CBNRM CBOs. For each study 
CBNRM CBO, I coded the data collected by context, process and impact indicators of five of 
the seven community sustainability capitals (Flora, 2001; Narayan, 1999). The study carries 
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out a baseline study of the characteristics of the CBNRM CBO (context) in an effort to detect 
the pertinent indicators that can characterize community organizational success in decreasing 
conflict both inside the community and between the community and outside institutional 
actors. 
The study also examines the activities (process) undertaken by study CBNRM CBOs 
in implementing the CBNRM program. My study's analysis of the participation by state, 
civil society, market and donor institutional actors in Botswana is guided by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1993) theoretical framework on advocacy coalitions. By identifying 
similarities and differences in desired futures and mental causal models within and between 
state, civil society, donor and market stakeholders in Botswana, my study seeks to 
demonstrate how these actors in Botswana complement and/or conflict with one another 
along those aspects pertinent to CBNRM. The assessment of CBNRM at the community 
level is guided by Flora (2001) community sustainability capitals - natural capital, 
financial/built capital, social capital and human capital. This section of my also study 
assesses the level of bonding, bridging and linking social capital of the study CBNRM CBOs. 
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Chapter 5: Assessment of CBNRM at the National Level 
5.1 Participation by a range of stakeholders in CBNRM: State (Government), Civil 
Society (NGO), Market (Private Sector) and Donor (Funder) Institutional Actors 
My study's analysis of the participation by state, civil society, market and donor 
institutional actors in Botswana is guided by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) theoretical 
framework on advocacy coalitions. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) observe that 
institutional actors, both public and private, sharing policy beliefs within a subsystem form 
advocacy coalitions to influence government policy to realize their beliefs. Flora et al. (2000) 
observe that advocacy coalitions form around specific issues to realize shared desired futures. 
According to Flora et al. (2000:2) public and private institutional actors share certain beliefs 
that anchor common desired futures (outcomes) and mental causal models (implicit and 
explicit means for reaching those futures). By identifying similarities and differences in 
desired futures and mental causal models within and between state, civil society, donor and 
market stakeholders in Botswana, my study seeks to demonstrate how these actors in 
Botswana complement and/or conflict with one another along those aspects pertinent to 
CBNRM. 
The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, which currently guides the 
implementation of CBNRM in Botswana, holds that CBNRM CBOs ought to economically 
benefit from CBNRM. The expectation is that, such economic benefit for CBNRM CBOs 
will lead to their supporting state wildlife conservation efforts. Botswana's CBNRM desired 
future outcomes are expressed under this policy in terms of natural resource conservation and 
economic development. There is a general agreement between CBNRM institutional actors 
that CBNRM entails conservation of natural resources that supports community economic 
development. However, the mental causal models for achieving natural resource conservation 
and economic development differ between state institutional actors and non-government 
actors. Flora et al. (2000:3) caution that having similar desired futures (beliefs) does not 
guarantee cooperation between institutional actors, since such actors might have different 
mental causal models. 
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Table 5.1 below summarizes the mental causal models of state, NGO, donor, study CBNRM 
CBOs, and market institutional actors for attaining natural resource conservation and 
economic development. 
Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators 
Actor Activity Activity Mental Causal Model 
Desired Future Natural resource Conservation Economic Development 
MARKET (SAFARI 
OPERATORS) 
HCH Hunting Safaris - has joint 
venture agreement with STMT 
Rann Hunting Safaris - has joint 
venture agreement with CECT. 
Blackbeard and Hepburn 
Hunting Safaris - has joint 
venture agreement with KCT 
Undertaking safari hunting within 
subleased CHAs according to the 
hunting guidelines provided by the 
DWNP and enforced by Community 
Escort Guides5 (CEGS) 
Subleasing the CHA from the CBNRM 
CBO to setup hunting camps and 
lodges 
Purchasing the annual wildlife quota 
from the CBNRM CBO for safari 
hunting. 
Providing employment for CBNRM 
CBO members in their hunting camps 
and lodges 
Involvement in community 
development projects for the CBNRM 
CBO with which they have a joint 
venture agreement 
Through joint venture 
agreements between 
CBNRM CBOs and safari 
operators, CBNRM CBOs 
can benefit from the safari 
operators' skills in tourism 
development 
5 Community Escort Guides - members of the CBNRM CBO trained by the DWNP to monitor hunting by safari operators within their CHA 
Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators 
Actor Activity Activity Mental Causal Model 
Desired Future Natural resource Conservation Economic Development 
STUDY 
CBNRM CBOs 
CECT, KCT, 
STMT & KDT 
Utilization of the annual wildlife quota coordinated 
by the CBNRM CBO Trust Board 
Sale of the annual wildlife quota to a 
hunting safari operator 
For sustainable management and 
use of natural resources in 
CHAs, CBNRM CBOs ought to 
be involved in utilization, 
protection, conservation and 
monitoring of natural resources 
Monitoring hunting operations of safari operators 
within the CHA 
Subleasing land within CHA to a 
safari operator for tourism 
development 
Establish a monitoring committee with powers to 
monitor utilization activities, investigate instances of 
non-compliance and to make recommendations to 
the general membership for resolution 
Developing tourism enterprises 
within the CHA (e.g. camps and 
lodges) 
Cooperate with any other body in relation to any 
matter intended to advance the objectives of the 
CBNRM CBO 
Investing money generated from the 
sale of the annual wildlife quota, land 
sublease and CBNRM CBO tourism 
enterprises into community 
development projects 
Draw up a body of resource governance by-laws and 
institute sanctions governing management and 
utilization of natural resources within the area by the 
CBNRM CBO Trust Board 
Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators 
Actor Activity Activity Mental Causal Model 
Desired Future Natural resource 
Conservation 
Economic 
Development 
DONOR 
USASHF - There is need to address issues of 
democracy and democratic institutions as a means of 
promoting social welfare and self-help endeavors of 
local communities 
SNV - regards CBNRM as a means towards 
empowering poor communities to take control over 
their land and resources, to tap their potential and 
acquire skills to design their own development. 
ADF - believes that local communities are a vital 
source of ideas and energy for development 
CFLI 
Funds CBNRM CBO 
capacity building for 
utilization of CBNRM leased 
resources 
Providing grants for 
CBNRM CBO and 
local NGO capacity 
building programs 
Local people are the primary 
actors in their own development, 
and any assistance accorded 
them is geared towards building 
their capacity to plan, implement 
and monitor their development 
activities 
PACT - Local communities must be the driving force 
in ending poverty and injustice 
GEF - The program operates on the premise that 
people will be empowered to protect their environment 
when they are organized to take action, have a measure 
of control over access to the natural resource base, 
have the necessary information and knowledge, and 
believe that their social and economic well-being is 
dependent on sound long-term resource management. 
AWF - Through community based conservation, 
wildlife can be conserved while people's well being is 
also improved. 
HIVOS - aim at a world in which people are equal and 
in which no limits are set on people's opportunities for 
development 
IUCN - Livelihoods of the poor depend on the 
sustainable management of natural resources. 
DED 
Provide grants to CBNRM 
CBOs to help them obtain 
training from service providers 
(NGOs included) on sound 
natural resources management 
practices 
Develop partnerships and 
networks of local stakeholders 
supporting and strengthening 
CBNRM CBOs and NGOs 
capacity to address 
environmental challenges. 
Providing grants for 
CBNRM CBO and 
local NGO capacity 
building programs 
The sustainable management of 
natural resources should be 
linked with improved livelihoods 
of the local people i.e. 
sustainable natural resource 
management has to be linked to 
sustainable livelihoods 
4^ 
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Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators 
Actor Activity Activity Mental Causal Model 
Desired Future Natural resource Conservation Economic Development 
NGO 
CI, FAB, FONSAG, 
PTB, TL, and 
VPR&D 
Developing and implementing environmental 
education programs 
Provision of tree seedlings to local communities 
Community skills training in agro-forestry project 
management 
Provision of extension support and training on soil 
conservation, water harvesting, seed conservation, 
agro-forestry, and organic gardening with farmers 
and home gardeners 
Facilitation of community-based veld products 
domestication trials 
Training CBNRM CBOs in veld resources 
monitoring and management 
Developing community based veld products 
monitoring tool 
Facilitation on community natural resources 
assessments 
CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building and 
facilitation for utilization of CBNRM leased 
resources 
CBNRM CBO 
organizational capacity 
building and facilitation for 
utilization of CBNRM 
leased resources 
The sustainable management of natural 
resources should be linked with 
improved livelihoods of the local 
people i.e. sustainable natural resource 
management has to be linked to 
sustainable livelihoods 
Table 5.1 (contd) Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators 
Actor Activity Activity Mental Causal Model 
Desired Future Natural resource Conservation Economic Development 
STATE 
MEWT - CBNRM Policy 
(Draft June 2004) if 
implemented will 
encompass natural 
resource management, 
utilization and monitoring 
by CBNRM CBOs 
The DWNP, ARB and NMMAG will 
lease out resources under their 
jurisdiction to CBNRM CBOs for 
utilization and monitoring. CBNRM 
will widen activities from just being 
wildlife based (as is the case with the 
Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986) 
to a strategy that encompasses a wider 
range of natural resources. 
CBNRM CBOs involved in wildlife 
off-take quota setting, utilization and 
wildlife monitoring 
CBNRM CBOs' participation in the 
management, utilization and monitoring 
of state owned natural resources is 
essential for sustainable natural resource 
management and use 
MoA - Tribal Grazing 
Land Policy of 1975 
favors private cattle ranch 
creation in communal 
rangelands 
The Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 
1975 converted communal land into 
fenced privately owned ranches for 
effective management 
Commercial cattle farming is 
expected to increase agricultural 
output create employment and raise 
rural incomes. 
Private cattle ranch creation in communal 
rangelands is an essential requirement for 
the effective management of communal 
rangelands and for increased agricultural 
output 
MoA - National Policy on 
Agricultural Development 
of 1991 favors private 
cattle ranch creation in 
communal rangelands 
The National Policy on Agricultural 
Development of 1991 just like the 
TGLP of 1975 converted communal 
land into fenced privately owned 
ranches for effective managment 
Commercial cattle farming is 
expected to increase agricultural 
output create employment and raise 
rural incomes. 
Private cattle ranch creation in communal 
rangelands is an essential requirement for 
the effective management of communal 
rangelands and for increased agricultural 
output 
MEWT - Game Ranching 
Policy of 2002 supports 
the creation of private 
wildlife ranches 
The policy does not give a conservation 
justification of how freehold game 
ranching in fenced farms supports 
conservation of wildlife resources. 
The game ranches are expected to 
create rural employment by 
developing local processing of 
products of the game industry 
Private game ranching will result in 
increased returns from wildlife resources 
NGO 
ACORD, KOMKU, and 
TOCaDI 
CBNRM CBO organizational capacity 
building and facilitation for utilization 
of CBNRM leased resources 
CBNRM CBO organizational 
capacity building and facilitation for 
utilization of CBNRM leased 
resources 
Local people are the primary actors in 
their own development, and any 
assistance accorded them is geared 
towards building their capacity to plan, 
implement and monitor their development 
activities 
Table 5.1 Desired futures, mental causal models and activities for state, NGO, donor, CBNRM CBOs, and safari operators 
Actor Activity Activity Mental Causal Model 
Desired Future Natural resource Conservation Economic Development 
STATE 
Land Board - Tribal Land Act of 1968 
transfers the authority over the 
administration of land from the tribal chiefs 
to the Land Board 
The Land Board regulates the use 
of tribal/communal/customary land 
by granting land use rights, 
imposing restrictions on the use of 
land, cancellation of the grant of 
any rights to use land and 
authorizing any transfer of tribal 
land 
The Land Board is expected to 
allocate land for income generating 
activities like commercial, 
subsistence and industrial enterprises 
State ownership and regulation 
of land resource use is key to 
sustainable land management 
and development 
ARB - Agricultural Resources 
Conservation Act of 1974 brings 
commercial veld product resources under 
Agricultural Resource Board 
ARB regulate the utilization of 
veld product resources by 
individuals and communities by 
issuing harvest licenses and 
permits 
ARB issues licenses and permits to 
individuals and CBNRM CBOs to 
harvest veld product resources for 
processing and sale 
State ownership and regulation 
of veld product resource use is 
key to sustainable mamangement 
and use of veld products 
NMMAG — The Monuments and Relics 
Act of 1984 confers authority over 
monuments and relics to the Department of 
National Museum, Monuments and Art 
Gallery 
NMMAG licenses CBNRM CBO 
cultural and or natural sites tourism 
activities. 
NMMAG issues licenses and permits 
to CBNRM CBOs to develop and 
utilize cultural and or natural sites for 
tourism purposes 
State ownership and regulation 
of cultural and natural sites use 
for tourism purposes is essential 
for their sustainable management 
and use 
DWNP - The Wildlife Conservation and 
National Parks Act of 1992 brings every 
wild animal, as well as insects under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks 
DWNP regulates the utilization of 
wildlife resources by giving 
hunting licenses or permits to 
individuals and wildlife resource 
use leases to CBNRM CBOs. 
DWNP issues licenses or permits to 
individuals and resource use leases to 
CBNRM CBOs for commercial and 
subsistence utilization of wildlife 
resources. 
State ownership and regulation 
of wildlife resource use is 
essential for sustainable wildlife 
management and use 
DWNP — The Wildlife Conservation Policy 
of 1986 regulates the commercial and 
subsistence use of wildlife resources 
DWNP regulates utilization of 
wildlife resources by awarding 
annual wildlife off-take quotas 
DWNP awards annual wildlife 
quotas to CBNRM CBOs which in 
turn auction the quota to a safari 
company 
State ownership and regulation 
of wildlife resource use is 
essential for sustainable wildlife 
management and use 
DoT - The Tourism Policy of 1990 
regulates tourism related activities by 
issuing operation licenses - issued by the 
Department of Tourism 
DoT regulates tourism activities Establishment of tourism enterprises 
in rural areas that will create rural 
employment. Infrastructure provided 
for tourism expected to benefit rural 
development 
State regulation of tourism 
enterprises is essential for eco-
tourism 
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State 
Government legislation and policies presented on table 5.1 show similar desired 
futures of natural resource conservation and economic development. For these legislations 
and polices, however, there are two identifiable mental causal models for achieving natural 
resource conservation and economic development, which are; 
i) Centralization and regulation of natural resource use - the Agricultural Resources 
Conservation Act of 1974, the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, 
Monuments and Relics Act of 1984, Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, and the Tribal 
Land Act of 1968 all aim at regulating the use of natural resources as a means for achieving 
desired future. These legislative and policy documents can be best described as expropriatory 
and regulatory. The Agricultural Resources Conservation Act (CAP 35:06), the Wildlife 
Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992, the Monuments and relics Act (Cap 59:03) 
and the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 expropriate veld products, wildlife and cultural 
and or natural sites resources and put them under the central government Department of 
Agricultural Resource Board, Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Department 
of National Museum, Monuments and Art Gallery respectively. These expropriatory 
legislations and policies brings natural resources under the jurisdiction of the central 
government which then mandates central government departments to regulate the use of such 
resources by issuing licenses, permits and leases. Under these pieces of legislation and 
policies, CBNRM CBOs and individuals benefit from natural resources by obtaining resource 
use leases, permits and licenses from regulatory central government departments. However, 
the Draft CBNRM Policy (2004) as proposed gives some degree of natural resource 
management responsibility to CBNRM CBOs, though such resources still remain the 
property of the state. 
ii) Privatization of natural resources - the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) of 
1975 and the National Policy on Agricultural Development (NPAD) of 1991 view private 
cattle ranch creation in communal rangelands as an essential requirement for the effective 
management of communal rangelands and for increased agricultural output, while the Game 
Ranching Policy of 2002 hold that private game ranching will result in increased returns from 
wildlife resources. These policies are expropriatory in the sense that natural resources are 
53 
taken away from communal use for private use with no compensation for displaced 
communal resource users. The central government maintains that in the long term, such 
private ventures will benefit rural development in terms of employment creation and raising 
rural incomes. TGLP has been evaluated and was found to be a failure since the expected 
improvement in rangeland management and employment creation was not realized. White 
(1993) argues that, the poor performance in TGLP ranches does not warrant the adoption of 
NPAD, for there is no justification in expanding private farm areas. Consultants engaged by 
the Botswana Wildlife Management Association (BWMA), an association of the hunting 
industry in Botswana reported that the introduction of game ranching will negatively affect 
CBNRM CBOs (Mead, 2001). Mead (2001) reports that the hunting of plains game in 
CBNRM CBO areas of Botswana will suffer with the implementation of this policy. He 
argues that there is no reason why outfitters will pay license fees, on top of royalties to the 
District Council and payments to communities, for game which they can hunt on ranches 
with none of these costs (Mead, 2001). 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) 
The local NGO sector was not involved in the initiation of the CBNRM program, and 
was therefore not involved in setting its objectives. The local NGO sector was invited by the 
Natural Resource Management Project6 (NRMP) at the implementation stage to facilitate the 
implementation of the program and to help provide organizational capacity building for the 
newly formed CBNRM CBOs and to assist in the formation of new ones. Thus, the local 
NGO sector did not give rise to the CBNRM program, their role was crafted by the 
proponents of the CBNRM program. The framework for the program was provided by the 
Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986. It is not unexpected therefore, that the activities for the 
CBNRM facilitating NGOs are restricted to CBNRM CBO organizational capacity building 
for utilization of natural resource use leases. There is a discrepancy between the mental 
causal models of NGOs and their CBNRM activities as a result of the framework within 
which they operate. 
6 Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) - a jointly funded project by the Government of Botswana and 
USAID to spearhead the implementation of the CBNRM program 
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NGOs involved in Botswana's CBNRM program have natural resource conservation and/or 
economic development in their mission statements. Table 5.1 shows similar desired futures 
of natural resource conservation and economic development for the different NGOs. The 
mental causal models for NGOs tend to be both expert-based and participatory. I have 
identified two groups of NGOs as follows: 
a) Environmental NGOs - CI, FAB, FONSAG, KCS, PTB, TL and VPR&D place 
emphasis on natural resource conservation. Their mental causal models have a component 
that deals with natural resource conservation. This group of NGOs sees natural resource 
conservation and economic development as inseparable. For them, CBNRM CBOs ought to 
be involved in both. Their approaches to CBNRM CBO facilitation are both expert-based and 
participatory. Their mental causal models emphasize that the sustainable management of 
natural resources should be linked with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. 
sustainable natural resource management has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods. Their 
CBNRM activities involves developing and implementing environmental education 
programs, conducting ecological research and natural resource monitoring, provision of tree 
seedlings, facilitation on community natural resources assessments, developing community 
based veld products monitoring tool, training CBNRM CBOs in veld resources monitoring 
and management, facilitation of community-based veld products domestication trials, and 
community skills training in agro-forestry project management, strategies which are both 
expert-based and participatory. For this group of NGOs, the conservation of natural resources 
is within the domain of their organizational interests. The environmental NGO group sees 
CBNRM as a conservation strategy that supports rural development. 
b) Socio-economic empowerment NGOs - ACORD, KOMKU, and TOCaDI's desired 
futures in addition to economic development, emphasize community empowerment and 
poverty reduction. Unlike the environmental NGOs, natural resource conservation is implied 
but not stated. Their mental causal model state that local people are the primary actors in 
their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared towards building their 
capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities. This group of NGOs 
sees CBNRM as a stepping-stone towards economic development and socio-economic 
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empowerment of marginalized groups. The socio-economic empowerment NGOs sees 
CBNRM as a rural development strategy that supports conservation. 
Donor Agencies 
There is a discrepancy between the mental causal models of donor agencies and their 
CBNRM activities that could be attributed to the framework within which they operate. 
Though all donors listed on table 5.1 favors community ownership and participation in 
natural resource management, they have continued to financially support CBNRM CBOs, 
NGOs and other CBNRM related activities, despite the fact that there is no community 
ownership and participation in the management of natural resources. I have identified two 
types of donor agencies as follows: 
a) Environmental donor agencies - PACT, GEF/SGP, AWF, HIVOS, DED and 
IUCN places emphasis on natural resource conservation. The mental causal model for these 
donor agencies state that the sustainable management of natural resources should be linked 
with improved livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management 
has to be linked to sustainable livelihoods. The IUCN, for instance, holds that the livelihoods 
of the poor depends on the sustainable management of natural resources, and GEF maintains 
that communities ought to know that their social and economic well-being is dependent on 
sound long-term natural resource management. This group of donors sees natural resource 
conservation and economic development as inseparable. The conservation of natural 
resources is within the domain of the organizational interests of this group of donors. For this 
group of donor agencies, CBNRM is perceived as a conservation strategy that supports rural 
development. 
b) Socio-economic empowerment donor agencies - USASHF, CFLI, SNV, and 
ADF's desired futures in addition to economic development, emphasize community 
empowerment and poverty reduction. Their mental causal model state that local people are 
the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance accorded them is geared 
towards building their capacity to plan, implement and monitor their development activities. 
For instance, USASHF believes that there is need to address issues of democracy and 
democratic institutions as a means of promoting social welfare and self-help endeavors of 
local communities. This group of donors sees CBNRM as a stepping-stone towards economic 
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development and socio-economic empowerment of marginalized groups. The empowerment 
process entails CBNRM CBO and NGO capacity building. The socio-economic 
empowerment donor agencies see CBNRM as a rural development strategy that supports 
conservation. 
CBNRM CBOs 
CBNRM CBOs are the CBNRM program target group. CBNRM CBOs selected for 
my study express their desired future outcomes in terms of natural resource conservation and 
economic development. Like the other non-government CBNRM institutional actors, 
CBNRM CBOs role in the CBNRM program was crafted for them by the central 
government. Though the CBNRM CBOs depend on their local natural resources for much of 
their livelihood, they had not had decision making input into the drawing up of the Wildlife 
and National Parks Act of 1992, which brought all wildlife resources under the DWNP and 
the Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, which converted communal hunting land into 
Wildlife Management Areas administered by the DWNP. CBNRM CBOs mental causal 
models for CBNRM state that, for sustainable management and use of natural resources in 
CHAs, CBNRM CBOs ought to be involved in utilization, protection, conservation and 
monitoring of natural resources. However, under the central government CBNRM 
framework, CBNRM CBOs' activities are limited to regulated utilization of the DWNP 
awarded annual wildlife quota or resource use lease or license. Though the CBNRM CBOs 
express their mental causal models for natural resource conservation in terms of natural 
resource utilization, protection, conservation and monitoring, none of my study CBNRM 
CBOs has followed through with their mental causal model for natural resource conservation 
partly because of the CBNRM structural constraints. Lynch (1998) argues that usufruct 
agreements such as natural resource leases to local community organizations are not 
conducive to the promotion of long-term sustainability objectives, since such tenurial 
agreements are susceptible to arbitrary cancellation. 
Safari Operators 
The Joint Venture Guidelines of 1999, developed by the Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks encourages wildlife-based CBNRM CBOs to enter into joint venture 
agreements with safari operators. The safari operator buys from the CBNRM CBO, the 
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annual wildlife quota awarded to the CBNRM CBO by DWNP. The safari operator then 
undertakes hunting according to the hunting guidelines provided by the DWNP and enforced 
by the DWNP trained Community Escort Guides (CEGS). The joint venture agreement also 
involves subleasing the CHA from the CBNRM CBO for setting up hunting camps and 
lodges. The safari operators' mental causal model states that, through joint venture 
agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators, CBNRM CBOs can benefit from 
the safari operators' skills in tourism development. Safari operators are business ventures and 
do not express their desired futures in terms of natural resource conservation. However, the 
safari operators see themselves as contributing to economic development by providing 
employment and in some cases financially supporting CBNRM CBO community 
development projects. The relationship between safari operators and CBNRM CBOs is 
clientelistic. 
5.2 Discussion 
The Government of Botswana is predisposed towards centralization and privatization 
of natural resources under central government and private ownership respectively. The 
central government supposes that communal management and utilization of natural resources 
result in natural resource degradation. Demsetz, 1967; Hardin, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Smith, 
1981; Welch, 1983; Sinn, 1984, all argue that because of the 'tragedy of the commons' 
private property rights ought to be enforced in circumstances where natural resources are 
owned in common. Parsons (1981) and Picard (1980) observed that the formulation of the 
Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) in 1975 and the National Policy on Agricultural 
Development (NPAD) in 1991 and the resultant land grab by the national elite, demonstrate 
the ability of the national elite to allocate resources to its own advantage. Besides the fact 
that the privatized communal land and all other natural resources therein fall into the hands 
of the national elite, the privatization drive expropriates communal resources from communal 
use to private use, even though such resources are major sources of income for rural 
communities. The Game Ranching Policy of 2002 is expected to result in the decline in 
CBNRM CBO revenues and increase in revenue for the privately owned game ranches 
(Mead, 2001). 
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Ophuls (1973:228) argue that "because of the tragedy of the commons, environmental 
problems cannot be solved through cooperation... and the rationale for central government 
with major coercive powers is overwhelming." Weber and social contract theory helps us 
understand why the state is proposed as the best placed actor to solve common property 
resource problems. Social contract theory sees the state as representing the social collective 
or the common good and therefore acts in the interest of the social collective or common 
good. For Weber, the state is the legitimate authority within a territorial boundary and its 
responsibilities involve balancing accumulation and legitimation - that is, the state has to 
facilitate the accumulation of financial capital and at the same time has the responsibility to 
protect its citizens from outside threat and to provide basic public goods to its citizens. Hence 
the state has the power to decide how natural resources within its territorial boundaries are to 
be used for it to achieve its functions. Weber (1920) also sees the state as the only 
institutional actor with permission to use legitimate violence. Thus, for those who suppose 
that there is a 'tragedy of the commons', the state, with its privileges to use legitimate 
violence, is able through its bureaucratic structure to enlist the cooperation of the natural 
resource users for the common good. Thus state control of natural resources is seen as the 
solution to the 'tragedy of the commons'. The idea that the state represents the common good 
assumes that the state knows what the common good is. 
The perception of the state as the epitome of the common good has been contested. 
Marxist and Neo-Marxist theorists perceive of the state as an instrument of class domination. 
In Marxist understanding, the state emerges from the relations of production and not from the 
collective will of the people as social contract writers suggest. The advocacy coalition 
framework as proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) sees the state sphere as highly 
contested and generally not representing the common good, but representing dominant 
advocacy coalitions. Thus seeing the state as the neutral adjudicator in issues of common 
property natural resource management and utilization is flawed. My study utilizes the 
advocacy coalition framework to understand how local communities can increase their 
political capital by forming or getting involved in advocacy coalitions that help them have an 
input into natural resource policy decision-making that affects them. Flora and Flora 
(2004:106) define political capital as the ability of a group to influence the distribution of 
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resources within a social unit, including helping set the agenda of what resources are 
available. Though rural communities depend on local natural resources for their livelihood, 
natural resource use decision are taken beyond the locality with little input from the local 
communities. Ostrom (1990:1) argues that issues of natural resource governance in 
communal areas are political and are resolved through political processes. Thus, CBNRM 
CBOs ought to find means of participating in the political process of natural resource 
governance, and can do this by building their political capital through advocacy coalitions 
and social capital building. 
Research work conducted in developing countries by Chambers, 1983; Blaikie, 1985; 
Richards, 1985; Poffenberger, 1990; Murphree, 1997; Drinkwater, 1991; Lawry, 1989; 
Murombedzi, 1989; 1990; and Ostrom, 1990 all point to the shortcomings of natural resource 
centralization and the subsequent imposition of top-down natural resource policies. Studies 
by Murphree, 1997; Drinkwater, 1991; Lawry, 1989; Murombedzi, 1989; 1990; and Ostrom, 
1990 reveal that centralization and privatization of natural resource management does not 
lead to improved natural resource management. If centralization and privatization are not the 
cure for common property natural resource management problems as empirical studies in the 
developing world has shown, then other alternative strategies ought to be explored. The most 
credible option to centralization and privatization requires the empowerment of local 
communities to become participants in natural resource policy and management decisions. 
According to Gary et al. (2001); NCRCRD (1999); Narayan(1999) and Flora and 
Flora (2004) participatory, bottom-up approaches recognize that ecological health is not to be 
measured in isolation from community economic, social, and cultural health. According to 
Flora and Flora (2003:215), favoring only one form of capital can deplete all capital within a 
community in the future, and each form of capital has the potential to enhance the 
productivity of the others. In a study of one of the CBNRM CBOs in Botswana conducted by 
Boggs (2000), twenty-one residents of Sankuyo Village (which is one of my study's cases) 
were asked to explain the purpose of CBNRM. Only 2% of the respondents mentioned 
natural resource management as a component of CBNRM. 76% reported that it was designed 
to improve the living standards of the local community and bring employment and 14% 
could not explain CBNRM (Boggs, 2000). According to Boggs (2000), empowerment, 
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economic development and improved lifestyles are all discussed outside of the context of 
wildlife management (Boggs, 2000). Thus addressing common property natural resource 
management problems and devising solutions to it ought to be contextualized and holistic. 
As is currently the practice in Botswana's CBNRM program, the central government 
expropriates local natural resources, centralizes them, and devises regulatory ways to be 
followed by local communities in utilizing local natural resources. Arntzen et al. (2003) 
observe that before the adoption of the CBNRM program, it was not clear who was managing 
and controlling wildlife resources outside wildlife protected areas. With the adoption of the 
Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986 and the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act 
of 1992, the DWNP formally endorsed its authority over wildlife resources in areas outside 
protected wildlife areas. Consequently the CBNRM CBOs depend upon state agencies that 
own, control and manage the wildlife resources. The livelihoods of those communities living 
in the vicinity of wildlife protected areas have come to depend upon the state agencies' 
ability to manage these resources and willingness to make the resources available to 
communities in the long term. In a way, these communities have no control over their destiny 
with regard to the availability and use of these resources - there is an impending threat of 
withdrawal of use rights and mismanagement by those managing on 'behalf of the 
communities. 
The relationships that CBNRM CBOs develop with NGOs and the safari operating 
firms have been structured by the central government. The NGO role is limited to building 
community capacity to adopt and implement the CBNRM program. The safari operating 
firms' participation is limited to entering into joint venture agreements with CBNRM CBOs, 
agreements that are regulated by the central government. The relationship between the safari 
operators and CBNRM CBOs is clientelistic. Mitchel et al. (1997) observe that stakeholders 
possess different combinations of critical attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. 
According to Mitchel et al. (1997) highly salient stakeholders are those in possession of all 
the above attributes. In the case of Botswana's CBNRM program, state agencies are the most 
salient stakeholders. In Mitchel et al. (1997) categorization, state agencies fall within the 
category of definitive stakeholders. NGOs and the donor community falls into the category of 
dangerous stakeholders and CBNRM CBOs fall into the category of dependent and or 
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demanding stakeholders. Figure 5.1 below shows the categorization of CBNRM stakeholders 
in terms of stakeholder salience. 
Figure 5.1 Stakeholder salience 
POWER LEGITIMACY 
Discretionary 
Stakeholder 
Dominant 
Stakeholder 
Dormant 
Stakeholder 
State Agencies 
CBNRM 
CBOs Dependent 
Stakeholder 
Dangerous 
Stakeholder 
Demanding * 
Stakeholder Non-stakeholders 
DONOR/NGÔ 
URGENCY 
The NGO and donor community do have resources (power) in the form of money and 
expertise and an interest (urgency) in CBNRM issues but lack legitimacy. Most of the local 
NGOs, if not backed by aid from donor agencies will most likely fall into the category of 
demanding stakeholders. CBNRM CBOs have a limited degree of legitimacy and an interest 
(urgency) in CBNRM but do not have power. The legitimacy that CBNRM CBOs have is 
premised upon the natural resource use lease accorded to them by the central government, the 
owner of these resources. In reality, therefore, the legitimacy that CBNRM CBOs have does 
not give them authority over any natural resources, hence the broken line arrow on figure 5.1 
indicating that CBNRM CBOs might be categorized as demanding stakeholders, implying 
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that they do not have legitimacy. The possession of legitimacy would imply that CBNRM 
CBOs hold the power to govern, and that other organizations consent and submit to their 
authority, which is not the case in the Botswana CBNRM program. According to Weber 
(1968), legitimacy begets authority. 
Mitchel et al. (1997) observed that stakeholders can increase their salience by 
acquiring one or two of the missing stakeholder salience attributes. For instance, CBNRM 
CBOs have limited legitimacy and urgency and lack power and could access power through 
coalition building. As argued above, CBNRM CBOs do not have authority over any natural 
resources, therefore a coalition between CBNRM CBOs who are supposed to have 
legitimacy and urgency and NGOs and the donor community who has power and urgency 
does not increase the salience of any of these non-government stakeholders since the 
government has authority over all natural resources. The government remains the most 
salient stakeholder as a result of their possession of all the stakeholder salience attributes. 
CBNRM CBOs do not bring to the NGO-Donor-CBNRM CBO coalition the needed 
legitimacy to increase the coalitions' salience. As such, the government continues to 'call the 
shots', issue orders and memorandums without negotiating with any of the less salient 
stakeholders. The power that the central government has emanates from its natural resource 
centralization policies and subsequently ownership of all natural resources. Thus advocacy 
coalitions of the excluded ought to develop around the issues of natural resource ownership 
i.e. centralization that favors regulation versus community ownership that favors 
participation. The mental causal models of NGOs and donor agencies involved in 
Botswana's CBNRM program favor community ownership and participation. Despite the 
fact that Botswana's CBNRM program is not based on community ownership and 
participation, NGOs and donor agencies continue to participate in the program as it is. The 
donors and NGOs are too closely linked to the government, and therefore not in a position to 
provide the power and leadership for a true coalition that support community ownership and 
participation. However, the non-government institutional actors are actively involved in 
building network organizations to foster bridging and linking social capital between the 
disparate CBNRM institutional actors. The section that follows discusses the different 
CBNRM network organizations in Botswana. 
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5.3 CBNRM Networking in Botswana 
The preceding section reveals that local communities have little power over decisions 
concerning their own local natural resources. They also often have no forum and or 
information to challenge decisions taken outside their locality by the central government and 
to present an alternative paradigm. Theories of social capital help us understand how local 
communities can build bridging and linking social capital that helps them move out of their 
isolation. Often, local community power can be augmented by connections with the outside 
(Flora and Flora, 2004). Narayan (1999) observes that bridging and linking social capital 
differ in the sense that bridging social capital is horizontal and linking social capital is 
vertical. According to Flora and Flora (2003), both horizontal and vertical dimensions of 
networking are important. Horizontal networks are important for lateral learning and vertical 
networks for accessing regional, national and international resources and organizations (Flora 
and Flora (2003). Increased communication by local communities can result in increased 
availability of information that isolated local communities often lack. 
Evans (1996:189) and Putnam (1993a) observe that social capital is essential for 
synergy. In his analysis of the Italian case, Putnam (1993a) observes that stocks of social 
capital accumulated over longer periods of time was the key ingredient in generating the 
'virtuous circle' in which civic engagement encouraged good government and good 
government in turn enhanced civic engagement. Even in situations were there is no history of 
synergy, Evans (1996:189) maintains that synergy can be constructed. This section of my 
study will helps in answering the research question; what mechanisms are in place to increase 
bridging and linking social capital among the different scales with CBNRM CBOs? There 
are three CBNRM network organizations in Botswana that CBNRM CBOs are involved in or 
represented. These are the Botswana Community Based Organization Network 
(BOCOBONET), the National CBNRM Forum (see Appendices 3 and 4 for attendance at the 
3 rd and 4th National CBNRM Forum and Forum Steering Committee composition) and the 
CBNRM Support Services. 
5.3.1 The Botswana Community Based Organization Network (BOCOBONET) 
Table 5.2 Brief history, desired futures, mental causal models and activities of BOCOBONET 
Brief history Desired 
futures 
Mental causal 
models 
Activities 
BOCOBONET registered as an association in 1999 that 
represents the interests of CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. 
BOCOBONET offices are in Gaborone, Botswana's 
major city. BOCOBONET was initiated by the Natural 
Resource Management Program (NRMP). In 1997 
PACT traveled around the country and met with 
different CBNRM CBOs to promote the idea of an 
association. The PACT promotion drive was followed 
by a workshop held to discuss the idea and resulted in 
the formation of an interim committee with 
representatives from 10 CBOs. Three follow-up 
workshops were held to discuss the constitution and the 
final document was adopted in 1998. The association 
today has a membership of 55 CBNRM CBOs out of 
67 registered CBNRM CBOs (82%), which means 12 
(18%) registered CBNRM CBOs are not members of 
the association. The association holds Annual General 
Meetings (AGM) of member CBNRM CBOs. The 
AGM elects a Committee of 14 members, which meets 
quarterly in a year. The committee appoints an 
Executive Secretary who acts as the secretariat. 
Voice for 
CBNRM 
CBOs in 
policies 
that affect 
them 
Through 
advocacy and 
networking by 
BOCOBONET, 
the voices of the 
CBNRM CBOs 
can be 
represented in 
CBNRM policy 
discourses, 
CBNRM 
relevant 
information 
accessed 
regarding 
CBNRM 
opportunities, 
capacity building 
and 
empowerment 
training offered 
to CBNRM 
CBOs 
Publication of a bi-monthly newsletter Matlhowa 
started in 2000 - funding and staffing constraints 
led initially to irregular publication of the 
Newsletter and finally production was halted in 
2002 
Through the CBNRM Support Program 
BOCOBONET published in 2002 the Botswana 
CBNRM Services Directory — which provides 
contact information to CBNRM CBOs of CBNRM 
related service provider firms and organizations 
Lobbying and advocacy on issues of concern in 
CBNRM such as the central government 
savingram requiring CBNRM CBOs to surrender 
their CBNRM related revenue to the District 
Council. BOCOBONET sent a letter to the 
Ministry of Local Government seeking audience -
several follow-ups were made and there was no 
response from the Ministry of Local Government 
Provides training courses in financial and business 
management, leadership and governance to 
CBNRM CBOs 
Participated in reference groups on important 
studies such as the Rural Development Policy 
Review, formulation of the Poverty Alleviation 
Strategy, National Development Plan 9 discussions 
as well as in the reference group for Botswana's 
Vision 2016 (Arntzen et al., 2003). 
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5.3.1.1 Relationship between BOCOBONET and other CBNRM Institutional Actors 
BOCOBONET relies upon donor funding for much of the organizations operations. 
Donor agencies fund CBNRM CBOs, CBNRM network organizations like BOCOBONET 
and the National CBNRM Forum and also fund local NGOs. In addition to donor funding, 
BOCOBONET member CBNRM CBOs pay a membership registration fee of P750.00 and 
an annual subscription of P200.00. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 below show donor sources of 
funding for BOCOBONET and for CBNRM CBOs, NGOs and CBNRM network 
organizations respectively. 
Table 5.3 Funding sources for BOCOBONET over the years 
Source Year Amount Purpose 
US AID 1999-2000 P202, 696.00 Used to set up and establish the BOCOBONET 
Office and employ the Executive Secretary 
ADF 1999-2001 PI, 100 000.00 Used for programs aimed at capacity building 
for CBNRM CBOs; Leadership and 
Governance programs, CBO strengthening 
program (Nonotsho), Business and Finance 
Training and PRA for newly formed CBOs 
SNV 2000 - 2002 PI00, 000.00 Contribution towards the setting up and 
establishment of the BOCOBONET Office 
AWF 2002 - 2004 P880, 000.00 For CBO capacity building Programs 
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Table 5.4 CBNRM support of selected international donors 
SNV 
(1995-2003) 
GEF 
(1995-2003) 
ADF 
(2000 - 2003) 
WUSC/SIDA 
(1995-2003) 
Support to CBOs 9 137 500:4 Kgalagadi 
CBOs benefit 
1 345 95:8 CBOs 
benefit 
2 819 898 70000 + 2 TAs 2 
CBOs benefit 
Support to NGOs 3 450 000:5 NGOs 
benefit 
267 421 1 478 540 152 739+ 3 Tas: 5 
NGOs benefit 
Support to other 
CBNRM 
institutions 
5 325 000. incl. 
Support Program and 
SNV project costs 
0 0 1 35 174: benefits 
to 9 organizations 
Total CBNRM 
related support 
17 990 278 1 613 416 4 298 438 357913 + 5 TAs 
Average annual 
support 
1 990 278 403 354 1 074 609 
Source: Arntzen et al., 2003 
Figure 5.2 % of donor funding given to CBOs, NGOs and to other CBNRM institutions 
by selected international donors 
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Figure 5.2 above shows CBNRM support from SNV, GEF, ADF and WUSC/CIDA 
for the funding period 1995 to 2003 except for ADF funding, which is for the period 2000 to 
2003. Figure 5.2 shows that ADF has the highest proportion of its total funding going to 
CBOs (66%), followed by SNV (51%), GEF (33%) and WUSC/CIDA (19%). Figure 5.2 also 
shows that GEF has the highest proportion of its funding going to NGOs (67%), followed by 
WUSC/CIDA (43%), ADF (34%) and SNV (19%). Thus CBOs and NGOs rely and compete 
for the same sources of funding. 
Despite BOCOBONET's dependency on funding from external sources, the 
association would like to take a leading role in CBNRM in Botswana. Their argument is that 
local communities and/or their associations, are the primary beneficiaries of the CBNRM 
program, and are, therefore, supposed to be in charge of the activities intended to help them. 
As the representative organization for CBNRM CBOs, BOCOBONET feels that it should 
perform central functions within the CBNRM program if CBNRM CBOs are to be seen as 
primary in the CBNRM process (Jones, 2002). However, after the election of the National 
CBNRM Forum members at the third National CBNRM forum (2003), CBNRM CBO 
representatives noted that the current situation where fourteen BOCOBONET Board 
members were automatically members of the National CBNRM Forum did not lead to the 
desired representative result, as other CBNRM CBOs were usually not informed of decisions 
taken at forum meetings. The CBNRM CBOs also suggested that consideration be given to 
increasing their membership on the national forum, because BOCOBONET Board does not 
represent all CBNRM CBOs. 
At the fourth National CBNRM Forum (2003) the forum expressed that CBOs were 
sometimes confused about the different roles of BOCOBONET and facilitating NGOs. Both 
BOCOBONET and NGOs offer advisory services and direct project implementation at the 
community level. However, while most NGOs work at the local level, BOCOBONET works 
at the national level and in most cases does not have first-hand information about member 
and non-member CBOs. The fourth National CBNRM Forum (2003) noted there are 
instances of conflict between NGOs and BOCOBONET and CBOs are caught in between. 
During the second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, BOCOBONET suggested that 
proper agreements ought to be drawn up between service providers (NGOs) and clients 
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(CBNRM CBOs) (National CBNRM Forum, 2001). BOCOBONET decided to regulate the 
relationship between the NGOs and CBNRM CBOs by having them sign a memorandum of 
understanding that states exactly what kind of services they are providing to CBNRM CBOs 
and for how long. The fourth National CBNRM Forum (2003) advised BOCOBONET to 
involve NGOs in the process of developing a partnership agreement between NGOs and 
CBOs, which BOCOBONET agreed to do (Fourth National CBNRM Forum, 2003). 
According to BOCOBONET, there is competition between them and the IUCN over 
projects and activities (Fieldwork, 2004). BOCOBONET feels that the IUCN should be 
advisors and facilitators at the regional level and now they seem to be competing with local 
NGOs and working on local work than regional work. BOCOBONET maintains that IUCN is 
now competing with the local NGOs on local issues. The conflict between BOCOBONET 
and the IUCN is over the control of the National CBNRM Forum. According to 
BOCOBONET, the National CBNRM Forum ought to be housed at BOCOBONET and the 
IUCN is 'taking away' the National CBNRM Forum from them. The IUCN maintains that 
BOCOBONET does not have the capacity to operate as the National CBNRM secretariat 
(Fieldwork, 2004). The IUCN through its CBNRM Support Services is the secretariat of the 
National CBNRM Forum. BOCOBONET maintains that IUCN was supposed to empower 
them on documentation and capacity building and that has not happened. According to 
BOCOBONET, the CBNRM National Forum secretariat is supposed to be rotational, but the 
IUCN has kept it ever since the inception of the forum, and intends to hand it over to KCS (a 
local NGO) instead of BOCOBONET, a network organization for CBNRM CBOs. 
5.3.2 National CBNRM Forum 
Table 5.5 showing the brief history desired futures, mental causal models and activities of the National CBNRM Forum 
Brief history Desired Mental 
futures causal 
models 
Improved Through 
dialogue collaboration 
between by CBNRM 
CBNRM stakeholders 
stakeholders (state, civil 
society and 
market actors) 
CBNRM 
information 
can be 
exchanged, 
CBNRM 
constraints 
identified and 
mitigated and 
CBNRM 
stakeholders 
can have an 
opportunity to 
contribute to 
CBNRM 
policy 
development 
Activities 
Recommended to the DWNP to consider utilizing community monitoring 
information by community escort guides and consult communities in setting 
annual wildlife hunting quotas - DWNP now send draft annual quotas to 
communities for comment though such comments are never really considered 
in the final setting of the quota. 
Recommended that the central government consider the establishment of a 
Ministry of Environment and Natural resources - The President announced 
the creation of a new Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism -
established in 2004 
Lobbied central government to withdraw the Ministry of Local Government's 
savingram requiring all CBNRM CBOs to surrender their CBNRM generated 
revenue to district councils (savingram appendix 1) - resolution pending 
In June 2001 the 2nd meeting of the National CBNRM Forum was successful 
in inviting the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government to 
discuss the savingram with CBNRM stakeholder groups. 
During the National CBNRM Forum Steering Committee meeting in October 
2002, the forum decided to target Members of Parliament directly and lobby 
for their support in convincing the government to finalize the CBNRM policy 
and submit it to parliament. The National CBNRM Forum organized an 
informative meeting with the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and 
Environment on February 2003. At this meeting, the Members of Parliament 
were briefed on CBNRM by three National CBNRM Forum representatives 
from the NGO sector (IUCN, KCS and Thusano Lefatsheng). 
The National CBNRM 
Forum is a national network 
organization which brings 
together state, civil society, 
market and donor CBNRM 
institutional actors together. 
The forum is an initiative of 
SNV and the IUCN and has 
in the past been funded by 
GEF and HIVOS. The 
National CBNRM Forum 
was officially established 
during its inaugural meeting 
on the 30th to 31st of May 
2000. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
National CBNRM Forum 
meeting was held in June 
2001; November 2001; June 
2003 and November 2003. 
70 
5.3.2.1 Example of National CBNRM Forum advocacy - the Ministry of Local 
Government's Savingram 
On January 30th 2001, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government 
under the direction of the Minister of Local Government sent out a savingram (Appendix 1) 
addressed to all District Commissioners, Council Secretaries, Land Board Secretaries, Tribal 
Secretaries, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Director of the 
DWNP, Senior Private Secretary to the Vice-President, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Affairs, 
Permanent Secretary Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and Permanent 
Secretary Ministry of Lands, Housing and Environment. The savingram required that all 
CBNRM CBOs surrender their CBNRM generated revenue to District Councils. Some of the 
concerns raised in the savingram with regard to CBNRM CBO projects were that: 
a) Only a few people benefit from CBNRM funds, and yet they are meant to benefit 
larger sections of the community 
b) That these funds are earned from natural resources, and as such there is a strong 
feeling that there shouldn't be a departure from the policy of these resources 
benefiting the whole nation as is done with diamonds and other revenue earning 
natural resources 
c) That the original intention whereby funds from these projects could be used in 
undertaking development projects in the participating localities is not working. Quite 
often project identification, formulation and implementation are either deficient or 
duplicating what government is providing through District Councils (Ministry of 
Local Government Savingram, 2001). 
It is important to note that copies of the savingram were neither sent to the affected 
CBNRM CBOs, their network organization (BOCOBONET), the donor agencies, nor the 
CBNRM facilitating NGOs. Correspondence regarding this issue was only sent to 
government departments and CBNRM CBOs were to be informed by district authorities. 
There is no evidence of this issue having been discussed within and between government 
ministries and departments before the issuing of a savingram, despite the fact that CBNRM 
cuts across government departments. The affected CBNRM CBOs, BOCOBONET, the 
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donor community, and the facilitating NGOs learned about the savingram from the 
government media, and yet they are CBNRM stakeholders who have been involved with the 
program from the onset. 
BOCOBONET was the first to respond to the Ministry of Local Government's 
Savingram on February 14th 2001 by sending a letter of protest to the Permanent Secretary in 
the Ministry of Local Government and requesting audience with the minsitry. On February 
20th 2001, BOCOBONET convened a meeting that was attended by CBNRM participating 
NGOs and Donor agencies in Botswana. There were no representatives from government 
departments nor was there a written or public reaction to the savingram by government 
departments involved in CBNRM in Botswana. The February 20th 2001 meeting reinforced 
the need for a broad-based network organization to address the savingram issue and other 
future issues of concern to CBNRM. This broad-based network organization came in the 
form of a National CBNRM Forum, which took on board civil society, market and state 
institutional actors. While the state institutional actors never reacted to the savingram outside 
the National CBNRM Forum, they do participate in Forum activities that lobby for the 
withdrawal of the savingram. Market actors, in this case, safari operators, are not affected by 
the savingram and did not render any written or public reaction to the savingram. Their 
participation in National CBNRM Forum activities is minimal. The NGOs and Donor 
community who invested time and/or financial capital into CBNRM projects seem to have 
played a behind the scene role and were instrumental in the formation of the National 
CBNRM Forum. 
Despite the fact that the savingram was sent out on the 30th of January 2001, audience 
was accorded to the CBNRM institutional actors on June 6th 2001 at the second meeting of 
the National CBNRM Forum. Table 5.6 below shows the attendance at this meeting. 
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Table 5.6 Attendance by stakeholders Groups at the Second Meeting of the National 
CBNRM Forum held 5th and 6th June 2001 
Number of participants 
Stakeholder 2nd meeting of the National CBNRM Forum 
# % 
Civil Society 
CBNRM CBO 11 41 
NGO 5 19 
Network Organization 3 11 
Donor 7 26 
Media 1 3 
27 82 
Market 
Private Sector 1 3 
State 1 3 
Ministry of Lands and Housing 2 6 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 1 3 
DWNP 1 3 
Donor 1 3 
5 15 
Total 33 100 
On the 5th of June 2001 (the first day of the second National CBNRM Forum 
meeting), participants prepared a joint statement to be presented to the Permanent Secretary 
in the Ministry of Local Government the next day (6th June 2001). The statement was 
presented to the Permanent Secretary by one of the members of the National CBNRM 
Forum, Conservation International (CI), an international NGO supporting CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. Some of the issues raised in the statement prepared by members of the National 
CBNRM Forum were as follows: 
a) CBNRM is a tool for the conservation and management of state-owned natural 
resources and the benefits that accrue to the local communities are because of the 
costs they incur in living with state owned natural resources. Hence CBNRM cannot 
be compared to other natural resources like diamonds. 
b) The savingram is jeopardizing the substantial (inter) national donor support that was 
received over ten years and as such tarnishes the image of Botswana as a reliable 
development partner. 
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c) The savingram seems to overlook established government policies and procedures, 
for instance, the Wildlife Conservation Policy (1986), Tourism Policy (1990), the 
Draft CBNRM Policy (2000), Community Based Strategy (1997) etc (Second 
meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 2001). 
In response, the Permanent Secretary argued that local authorities (District Councils) 
were better placed to ensure good governance and sustainable resource management. He also 
argued that communities involved in CBNRM are in remote areas where people are largely 
illiterate and are easily tricked. He maintained that District Councils are better placed to 
protect remote area communities (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 2001). 
The Permanent Secretary further noted that CBNRM should benefit the larger population and 
the savingram represents the feeling of the central government and not just the Ministry of 
Local Government (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 2001). At the same 
meeting, the Permanent Secretary expressed a contradictory position from his earlier 
statement by stating that communities should not fear that their revenue from resource 
management would be taken and spent elsewhere if managed by District Councils. The idea 
by the central government that natural resources are to be used for national development has 
been expressed in different fora. However, it is important to note that this position has been 
flouted by the same central government by adopting policies converting communal 
rangelands into private farms (e.g. the Tribal Grazing Land Policy of 1975, the National 
Policy on Agricultural Development of 1991 and of late the Game Ranching Policy of 2002, 
which give land and wildlife resources rights to individuals for private benefit, though such 
land and wildlife resources constitute national resources). 
Botswana's National Development Plan 9 2003/04 to 2008/09 (2003:246) maintains 
that a government policy on the utilization and management of fees earned from CBNRM 
projects should be put in place and related to the current policies on national revenue. In his 
official opening address to the third National CBNRM Forum, the Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism observed that the official government policy 
states that all natural resources belong to the state, hence the challenge to find a way in which 
CBNRM becomes compliant with central government policy (3rd National CBNRM Forum, 
2003). Later on, at the same meeting, a Botswana ruling party Member of Parliament 
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indicated that the benefits from CBNRM should be ploughed back to the communities and 
not be diverted into government coffers (3rd National CBNRM Forum, 2003). In his official 
opening of the 8th North West District CBNRM Forum on March 2003, a Botswana 
Government minister noted that there is need for CBOs to start searching for answers to the 
increasing number of questions as to why CBNRM programs benefit only a few 
communities, which are located near respective renewable natural resources. He felt that 
utilization of renewable natural resources such as wildlife should be viewed in the same light 
as utilization of non-renewable natural resources such as minerals. He suggested that perhaps 
some revenues obtained from CBNRM activities could be channeled to the public coffers. 
Such a move may address some of the queries from the general public (North West District 
CBNRM Forum, 2003). There are no documented queries from the general public with regard to 
CBNRM. The contradictory position of the central government with regard to CBNRM still 
haunts the program. Other CBNRM institutional actors feel that communities should not be 
dependent on government, but that CBNRM should empower the communities; hence 
communities should keep revenue generated from CBNRM activity and use it in an 
accountable manner for community development (3rd National CBNRM Forum, 2003). 
The second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum impasse with the Permanent 
Secretary over the savingram did not altogether resolve the situation. The Permanent 
Secretary assured the National CBNRM Forum that they will be allowed input into the Draft 
CBNRM Policy, and that their input ought to address those concerns his ministry raised in 
the savingram with regard to CBNRM. If those issues are addressed adequately through 
policy, then the savingram will become obsolete. The National CBNRM Forum had an input 
into the Draft CBNRM Policy. To date the policy has not been finalized and is yet to be 
brought before Parliament for endorsement. The first CBNRM draft policy was put together 
in 2000. Amazingly, a conflicting policy, the Game Ranching Policy, has been brought 
before Parliament and was approved in 2002. When National CBNRM Forum members 
enquired from the Permanent Secretary as to when the savingram will be implemented, the 
Permanent Secretary indicated that an officer in his ministry would have to be appointed to 
consult with the District Councils, but, in the mean time, implementation would be postponed 
until the CBNRM Policy is finalized (Second meeting of the National CBNRM Forum, 
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2001). The future of CBNRM in Botswana is uncertain, especially with the drive towards 
privatization of communal rangelands and a clear government inclination towards private 
game ranching. 
5.3.3 CBNRM Support Services 
Table 5.7 showing the brief history, desired futures, mental causal models and activities of the CBNRM Support Services 
Brief history Desired 
futures 
Mental 
causal 
models 
Activities 
The CBNRM Support Services is an initiative of SNV 
and IUCN, established in May 1999. The CBNRM 
Support Program Phase 1 (May 1999 - December 2003) 
was a joint initiative by SNV and IUCN. The CBNRM 
Support Program Phase 2 started on January 1st 2004 and 
is planned up to the end of December 2006. The Phase 2 
activities are funded by WWF. Quite a sizeable number 
of CBNRM publications can be found at the CBNRM 
Support Services website at (http://www.cbnrm.bw). 
However, it is important to note that such publications are 
not accessible to CBNRM CBOs since they do not own 
computers let alone internet-connection. Of the four 
CBNRM CBOs that my study surveyed, none of them 
have received publications from the CBNRM Support 
Services. This does not mean that the publications are not 
useful. The CBNRM Support Services publications are 
accessible to researchers, potential business investors in 
rural areas, government decision makers and potential 
donors. 
Improved 
dialogue and 
co­
ordination 
between 
CBNRM 
CBOs, 
NGOs, 
private 
sector and 
Government 
Through 
dialogue and 
information 
sharing 
between 
CBNRM 
institutional 
actors, 
CBNRM 
lessons and 
experiences 
are shared 
that help 
improve 
CBNRM in 
Botswana 
The CBNRM Support Services has been 
instrumental in improving the dialogue between 
CBNRM agencies at various levels through 
technical and financial support to: 
- The National CBNRM Forum; 
- The District CBNRM Forum in 
Ngamiland 
- Various workshops and CBNRM 
related conferences. 
In arguing the case on behalf of CBNRM CBOs, 
the CBNRM Support Services in response to the 
Ministry of Local Government savingram, 
provided the central government with detailed 
information on CBNRM performance as well as 
justifying the need for CBNRM 
The CBNRM Support Program functions as the 
secretariat of the National CBNRM Forum 
CBNRM Support Services published 23 papers 
for CBNRM practitioners in Botswana 
A CBNRM web site (http://www.cbnrm.bw) has 
been developed 
Provided partial funding for the CBNRM review 
study carried out in 2003 
Section Break (Next Page), 
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5.4 Discussion 
BOCOBONET was formed as an advocacy coalition for CBNRM CBOs, but has 
since evolved to become in addition to its advocacy role, a network organization as well as a 
CBNRM CBO extension service provider. As an advocacy coalition, it is interested in 
affording CBNRM CBOs voice on central government policies that affect them as was the 
case with the Ministry of Local Government savingram. As a network organization, 
BOCOBONET is interested in disseminating key information regarding CBNRM 
opportunities and new developments to CBNRM CBOs. In its role as a CBNRM CBO 
service provider, it is interested in organizational capacity building of CBNRM CBOs. This 
array of responsibilities is undertaken despite the fact that BOCOBONET is poorly funded 
and relies upon foreign sources of revenue and often finds its resources overstretched. 
BOCOBONET works more like an NGO and therefore compete with NGOs instead of 
facilitating NGO work with member CBNRM CBOs. It duplicates the work of NGOs and 
has not made much impact in its advocacy role. It also has not made much impact in its 
information dissemination role, as evidenced by the irregular publications of their newsletter, 
which ultimately stopped publications in 2002. 
Competition between NGOs and BOCOBONET is over funding. BOCOBONET, 
NGOs and CBNRM CBOs obtain funding from the same sources and this creates potential 
for competition and conflict. A CBNRM review study commissioned by the National 
CBNRM Forum carried out by Amtzen et al. (2003) came to the conclusion that the 
relationship between BOCOBONET and NGOs is characterized by conflict and competition. 
According to Amtzen et al. (2003) NGOs have come to believe that BOCOBONET "owns" 
CBNRM CBOs. Donors fund organizations that offer organizational capacity building to 
CBNRM CBOs and both BOCOBONET and NGOs want to be seen to be doing just that. 
Hence the functional overlap. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) argue that coordination is possible 
when there is belief congruence and functional overlap between organizations. In the case of 
BOCOBONET and NGOs, there is some degree of belief congruence (in terms of community 
empowerment and participation) and functional overlap (in terms of organizational capacity 
building for CBNRM CBOs), but the results do not point towards coordination, but rather, 
competition and conflict. There is no network organization between NGOs, donor and • 
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CBNRM CBOs outside the National CBNRM Forum. Since NGOs, Donors, CBNRM CBOs 
and BOCOBONET seem to have similar desired futures and mental causal models, it could 
be helpful if they had a coalition outside the National CBNRM Forum. However, 
competition over funding between these institutional actors currently makes it hard for the 
formation of such a coalition. 
The National CBNRM Forum is not an advocacy coalition, instead, it is a place where 
different coalitions can discuss and negotiate their different mental causal models. The 
CBNRM institutional actors are brought together into a National CBNRM Forum by similar 
desired futures or common goals. However, though they have common goals, their mental 
causal models for attaining those goals are different. The Ministry of Local Government 
Savingram challenged the common goals of these CBNRM institutional actors facilitating the 
emergence of an issue-based advocacy coalition to defend those common goals. Hence, in 
addressing the savingram incident, the National CBNRM Forum operated like an advocacy 
coalition. The savingram incident illustrated the need for a coalition. BOCOBONET sent a 
letter of protest, but did not get the audience from the Permanent Secretary, which was only 
accorded once a coalition was in place involving civil society, market and state actors. 
However, it is important to note that state institutional actors seem to shy away from 
criticizing government directives, especially those given from high up in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, as was the case with the savingram. 
Other issues that I find interesting for my discussion are those raised by the Ministry 
of Local Government savingram. One of the issues raised by the savingram is that the 
original intention whereby funds from CBNRM projects could be used in undertaking 
development projects in the participating localities is not working since often project 
identification, formulation and implementation are either deficient or duplicating what 
government is providing through local authorities (Ministry of Local Government 
Savingram, 2001). This observation by the central government is more like 'victim 
blaming'. Referring back to the Botswana local government structure (Chapter 3), it is 
important to note that district authorities accountable to the central government carry out 
district planning. The district development plans are drawn with no input from local 
communities (villages). Local communities are therefore not to blame for conflicting district 
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and village level development plans. It is the responsibility of district authorities to integrate 
village level plans into district plans by allowing input from below. 
In his meeting with the National CBNRM Forum, the Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Local Government argued that local authorities (District Council) were better 
placed than CBNRM CBOs to ensure good governance and sustainable resource 
management. He maintained that District Councils are better placed to protect remote area 
communities. Who is local authority in Botswana? Who is local government? And who is 
District Council? What is termed local government (local authority) in Botswana, as Chapter 
3 of this study has shown, are upwardly accountable administrative units that do not account 
to the district residents. Thus in a way, local government is an arm of the central government 
at the district level. Essentially, the central government's argument is that, central 
government is better placed to ensure good governance and sustainable resource management 
and is better placed to protect remote area communities, thus reinforcing its centralization 
tendencies. If CBNRM CBOs were to surrender their CBNRM generated funds, such funds 
would end up in central government coffers and used for 'national development' as the 
savingram proposes. There would therefore be no incentives for CBNRM CBOs to engage in 
CBNRM projects. For local government to be seen as a legitimate participant in CBNRM 
within their district, truly local government structures ought to be put in place that are 
accountable to the district residents instead of the central government. Today, two central 
government departments (DWNP and Department of Tourism) plan for the CBNRM 
program without proper integration with agencies overseeing district development. 
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Chapter 6: Assessment of CBNRM at the Community Level 
Flora (2001) community sustainability capitals guide my assessment of CBNRM at 
the community level. Flora (2001) argues that community development approaches ought to 
move away from community development to community building. The community building 
aspect forms the conceptual framework for assessing my study's CBNRM study cases using 
five community sustainability capitals (Flora, 2001) - natural capital, financial/built capital, 
social capital and human capital). Figure 2.1 shows seven forms of capitals for measuring 
community sustainability. For my study only five of the seven community sustainability 
capitals are assessed. This chapter assesses the level of bonding, bridging and linking social 
capital of the study CBNRM CBOs. Results from this chapter will help answer my study's 
research question: "What differences are there in terms of conflict for those CBNRMs with 
high bridging social capital (dense and diverse networks) and those with low bridging social 
capital?" 
6.1 Context Indicators for study CBNRM CBOs 
Table 6.1 Context Indicators for Study CBNRM CBOs 
CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Population 
Mabele Village = 696 
Kavimba Village = 519 
Satau Village = 730 
Kachikau Village = 881 
Parakarungu Village = 806 
Total Population = 3632 
Pandamatenga Village = 
1,545 
Kazungula Village = 1,665 
Lesoma Village = 410 
Total Population = 3620 
Sankuyo Village = 372 Khwai Village = 395 
Year started 1994 1999 1995 1995 
Total Land Area 2984km2 1085km2 1870km2 1995km2 
Name of CHA CHI and CH2 CH8 NG 33 and NG34 NG18 and NG19 
CBNRM Activities C h i -  M u l t i - p u r p o s e  i n  
communal grazing area 
(Hunting & Photographic) 
CH 2 - Forest Reserve 
Multi-purpose in communal 
grazing area (Hunting & 
Photographic) 
Community multi­
purpose CHA (Hunting 
& Photographic) 
Community multi­
purpose CHA (Hunting & 
Photographic) 
Ethnic composition The Chobe Enclave is 
inhabited by three major 
ethnic groups of which 70% of 
households are Basubiya, 27% 
are Batawana, and 1% are !Xo 
(a Basarwa/Bushman group) 
The kalepa area is inhabited 
by Basubiya, Batawana, 
Basarwa and Bakalanga 
Sankuyo Village is 
primarily a Bayei 
community with 
minority groups of 
Basubiya, Bananjwa, 
Basarwa, and Batawana 
The majority of the 
residents of Khwai 
Village are a section of 
the Basarwa (Bushmen) 
known as the 
Babukakhwae. There is 
also a small number of 
Bayei living in Khwai 
Village. 
Number of villages 
involved 
5 3 1 1 
Table 6.1 (contd) Context Indicators for Study CBNRM CBOs 
CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Organizational CECT Board has 10 members - 2 from KCT Board has 10 members STMT Board has KDT Board 
Structure each of the 5 VTC's 10 members has 10 
Prior to the election of the KCT Board, a members 
VTC's have 10 elected members general meeting is convened to nominate Elections to the 
candidates to the KCT Board. STMT Board are Elections to 
VTC members are elected at the village held every 2 years the KDT 
kgotla by the village residents The nominated names are subjected to a Board are 
vote at one of the member villages' kgotla Besides the elected held every 
Each VTC then nominates 2 members to by the general membership of KCT members, the year 
serve on the executive committee of the STMT Board has 
CECT i.e. the CECT Board Besides the KCT Board, the three member ex-officio Besides the 
villages elect at individual village level a members: Sankuyo elected 
Elections are held every 2 years Village Trust Committee (VTC) Village Chief, members, 
VDC chairperson the KDT 
Besides the elected members, the CECT Elections to the KCT Board and VTCs are and secretary and Board has 
Board has ex-officio members: 5 chiefs held every 2 years Councillor and ex-officio 
and Councillors from the 5 member members of the members: 
villages and members of the TAC Besides the elected members, the KCT TAC members of 
Board has ex-officio members: 3 chiefs and the TAC 
VTC also has ex-officio members as Councillors from the 3 member villages and The general 
follows: Village Chief and Councillor, members of the TAC membership - The general 
VDC chairperson and secretary. residents of membership 
VTC also has ex-officio members as Sankuyo Village - residents 
The general membership - residents of the follows: Village Chief and Councillor, VDC ages 18 + of Khwai 
Chobe Enclave ages 18 + chairperson and secretary Village ages 
The general 18 + 
The general membership only vote at the The general membership - residents of the membership vote 
VTC AGM and have no vote at CECT three KCT villages ages 18 + for the STMT The general 
AGM accept when voting for joint- Board as well as membership 
venture partner as per the Joint venture The general membership vote at the KCT for joint-venture vote for the 
guidelines AGM and VTC AGM as well as for joint- partner as per the KDT Board 
venture partner as per the Joint venture Joint venture 
guidelines guidelines 
Composition of 3 Women 3 Women 7 Women 5 Women 
Board 7 Men 7 Men 3 Men 6 Men 
00 K> 
Figure 6.1 Organizational Structure of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust 
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Figure 6.2 Organizational Structure of the Kalepa Conservation Trust 
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6.2 Process and Impact Indicators for study CBNRM CBOs (also see Appendix 6) 
6.2.1 Outcome 1: Sustainable, healthy ecosystems with multiple community benefits 
Indicator: Investment in natural resource management 
6.2.1.1 Environmental/Natural Capital 
The CECT, KCT, STMT and KDT's mental causal models have their organization 
responsible for protecting, conserving and monitoring the natural resources in the leased 
community hunting areas. However, as my study's indicators for environmental capital point 
out, none of these CBOs has undertaken any conservation related projects or invested money 
in conservation or natural resource protection to date. The closest that these CBOs has come 
towards monitoring of natural resources is represented by the activities of the community 
escort guides (CEGs). However, CEOs activities are limited to monitoring the hunting 
activities of the contract hunting safari operator to ensure that they abide with the hunting 
guidelines offered by the DWNP. CEGs monitoring activities are limited to enforcing the 
DWNP hunting guidelines. Despite the fact that the CEGs are expected to produce reports at 
the end of the hunting season, their reports are rarely referred to by DWNP in setting the 
annual wildlife quota. Though DWNP circulates draft wildlife quotas to community trusts for 
comments, DWNP is nonetheless not expected to integrate those comments into the final 
decision on the wildlife quota awarded (Amtzen et al., 2003). CEGs are not monitoring 
natural resources, but are monitoring the utilization activities of the contract safari operator. 
6.2.2 Outcome 2: Increased use of the skills, knowledge and ability of local people 
Indicator: Using and enhancing skills, knowledge and ability of local people 
6.2.2.1 Human Capital 
Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust 
The CECT constitution states that CECT will strive to educate the residents of the 
Chobe Enclave as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural 
resources. In my study's assessment of training programs undertaken by and for CECT by 
different service providers, none of them touches on the subject of natural resource 
management or building the community's capacity to manage natural resources. The only 
training program that is remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the 
DWNP and only 15 CEGs have been trained. All other training programs are geared towards 
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community capacity building for governance, leadership and financial and business 
management. For instance, PACT/IRCE and later BOCOBONET trained the CECT Board, 
VTCs, CECT Coordinator and Community Action Plan Coordinators (CAPCs) in the above 
stated areas. Besides the training programs, CECT CBNRM activities generated employment 
for some residents of the Chobe Enclave. CECT's current employment stands at 36 and the 
contract safari operator have 50 employees from the Chobe Enclave. In all, there are 86 
people employed in CECT CBNRM related activities out of a total population of 3632. Note 
that this is the total population of the Chobe Enclave and not just the adult population or 
adult population seeking employment. This is because Botswana's population census is 
aggregated for villages. 
Kalepa Conservation Trust 
No data available, because during my fieldwork, KCT had problems (discussed under 
social capital - next section) and records were not accessible. In fact there has been no 
formal hand over of KCT administrative records from the KCT Board that misappropriated 
the funds to later KCT Boards. Kalepa is one of the least studied CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. It is hard to find any past studies done on KCT. However, the KCT constitution 
states that KCT will strive to educate the residents of the Kalepa area as to the importance of 
and in the wise management of their natural resources. The little information that my study 
obtained from KCT suggests that no training programs geared towards natural resource 
management or building the community's capacity to manage natural resources were 
undertaken by KCT. The only training program that is remotely close to that is the training 
program offered to CEGs by the DWNP. 
Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust 
The STMT constitution states that STMT will strive to educate the residents of 
Sankuyo as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources. In 
my study's assessment of training programs undertaken by and for STMT by different 
service providers, none of them touches on the subject of natural resource management or 
building the community's capacity to manage natural resources. The only training program 
that is remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the DWNP, and only 
10 CEGs have been trained. Mogodu Consultancy offered capacity building training for the 
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STMT Board on governance and leadership. Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd trained the STMT 
bookkeeper. Other training programs covered the areas of production, for instance, leather 
works training and on the job cookery skills offered by the contract safari operators. Besides 
the training programs, STMT CBNRM activities generated employment for some residents of 
Sankuyo. STMT current employment stands at 55 and the contract safari operator have 86 
employees from Sankuyo Village. In all there are 141 people employed in STMT CBNRM 
related activities out of a total population of 372. 
Khwai Development Trust 
The KDT constitution states that KDT will strive to educate the residents of Khwai as 
to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources. In my study's 
assessment of training programs undertaken by and for KDT by different service providers, 
none of them touches on the subject of natural resource management or building the 
community's capacity to manage natural resources. The only training program that is 
remotely close to that is the training program offered to CEGs by the DWNP, and only 10 
CEGs have been trained. Eco-tourism Support Services (ESS) trained the KDT Board on 
financial and administrative management. BOCOBONET conducted a leadership-training 
workshop for KDT. Besides the training programs, KDT CBNRM activities generated 
employment for some residents of Khwai. KDT's current employment stands at 14 
employees from the Khwai Village out of a total population of 395. It is important to note 
that before the financial mismanagement problem at KDT and the subsequent withdrawal of 
the wildlife quota by the DWNP, KDT had a total employment of 65. This means that 51 
jobs have been lost. 
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Table 6.6 Summary of Human Capital Measures for Case Study CBNRM CBOs 
CBNRM 
CBO 
Human Capital 
No. of people 
employed by 
CBNRM 
CBO 
No. of people 
employed by 
safari operator 
Total 
employment 
% of the total 
population 
employed in 
CBNRM 
No. of training/capacity 
building programs 
CECT 36 50 86 2 
5 
(Training by PACT, 
DWNP, BOCOBONET 
and RHS) 
KCT No data No data No data No data No data 
STMT 
55 86 141 38 
6 
(Training by private 
consultants, PACT, 
DWNP, BOCOBONET 
and on the job training by 
safari operator) 
KDT 14 8 22 6 3 
(Training by private 
consultants - ESS, 
BOCOBONET and 
DWNP) 
6.2.3 Outcome 3: Strengthened relationships and communication 
Indicator: Participation, communication and relationships 
6.2.3.1 Social Capital 
The CECT, KCT, STMT, KDT constitutions state that these organizations strive to 
equitably share the benefits of the use of natural resources of the leased areas without 
discrimination. To achieve this, CECT, KCT, STMT, and KDT sought to establish a 
representative community based organization, in which the member villages (in cases of 
more than one village) are represented by their VTCs. This kind of representation is premised 
on the belief that the people in the villages have similar interests that can be represented by 
their VTCs. The organizational structures are not based on the representation of identified 
interest groups. 
Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust 
Decision-making within CECT is made mainly within various committees, although 
the general members make decisions on some issues, such as choice of joint venture partner, 
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since this is one of the DWNP guidelines. The general membership is also responsible for 
electing officers and for voting for proposed community projects. The Community Action 
Plan Committee led by the Community Action Plan Coordinator is responsible for proposing 
community projects at the village level. The proceeds from CBNRM activities are invested in 
these projects. For the most part, the CECT Board makes all the major decisions within 
CECT, while the general membership's participation is restricted to voting for officers and 
projects put before them by the Community Action Plan Committee. 
The CECT maintains contacts with a number of CBNRM institutional actors at 
different levels. At the community level, CECT maintains weak contacts with the VDC and 
the Kgotla by having the VDC chairperson and secretary as ex-officio members of the VTCs 
and the five member village chiefs as ex-officio members of the CECT Board. The CECT 
has a joint venture agreement with Rann Hunting Safaris. At the district level, the CECT 
maintains contact with the TAC, which is expected to provide technical advice to the CECT. 
The CECT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, which offers extension services to 
the CECT, and with the Land Board, which is the district land authority. At the national 
level, CECT is a registered member of BOCOBONET and the National CBNRM Forum. 
CECT has contacts with the DWNP that awards the annual wildlife quota and trains the 
CECT CEGS. At the international level, CECT's contacts are with funding, capacity building 
and financial auditing organizations like PACT/IRCE, ADF, AWF and Deloitte and Touch. 
CECT also get and send exchange visitors from/to other CBNRM CBOs in Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. 
Relationships within and between CECT and other institutional actors are not always 
cordial. Examples of conflictual relationships include; 
a) Within the CECT 
i) In 2000 a group of people from the Chobe Enclave came together to form what was 
called 'the concerned group'. The concerned group complained about the lack of 
transparency with regard to CECT Board expenditures and investments (for more 
information see appendix 6). Despite the fact that the relationship between the CECT 
Board and some of its members is conflictual, the CECT Board maintains a good 
relationship with Rann Hunting Safaris - the safari operator that has a joint venture 
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agreement with the CECT. 
ii) Alexander et al. (1999) reported power struggles between some VTCs and VDCs -
conflicts as to whether VDC should be given money by the VTCs from the sale of the 
hunting quota 
b) CECT versus State 
i) Although the CECT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, 
they no longer do, so since the DWNP does not take their comments into account 
ii) CECT is frustrated with the Land Board's delay in approving their Timber 
Salvage Harvesting and Community Lodge projects 
Kalepa Conservation Trust (KCT) 
The general membership of KCT is responsible for electing officers and for voting for 
community projects. The proceeds from CBNRM activities are invested in these projects. 
The general membership also votes for the joint venture partner since this is one of the 
DWNP guidelines for joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators. 
KCT has contacts with other CBNRM institutional actors at different levels. At the 
community level, KCT maintains weak contacts with the VDC and the Kgotla by having the 
VDC chairperson and secretary as ex-officio members of the VTCs and the three member 
village chiefs as ex-officio members of the KCT Board. KCT has a joint venture agreement 
with Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris. At the district level, KCT maintains contact with the 
TAC, which is expected to provide technical advice to KCT. The KCT Board complained 
that the TAC is inactive i.e. they rarely attend KCT Board meetings even though they are ex-
officio members of the Board. The KCT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, which 
offers extension services to the KCT, and with the Land Board which is the district land 
authority. At the national level, KCT is a registered member of BOCOBONET, and therefore 
represented by BOCOBONET at the National CBNRM Forum. KCT never sent a 
representative to the National CBNRM Forum meetings. KCT has contacts with the DWNP 
which awards the annual wildlife quota and trains the KCT CEGS. Information on KCT 
international connections could not be established because of the current problems at KCT. 
There seems to be a general lack of social capital at KCT, as evidenced by the 
mismanagement of KCT funds by the KCT Board. The mismanagement of funds bred 
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mistrust between the KCT Board and the general membership of KCT. It also bred conflict 
between succeeding KCT Boards with the DWNP and the joint venture safari operator. The 
conflict between the succeeding KCT Boards with the DWNP ensued after the DWNP 
withheld the annual wildlife quota from KCT pending the production of an accountability 
report, which the KCT Board failed to produce. While the KCT accountability report remains 
pending, the DWNP decided to release the KCT annual wildlife quota directly to Blackbeard 
and Hepburn Safaris without the consent of KCT, the legal leaseholder to CH 8. The DWNP 
instructed Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris to withhold the sublease money due to KCT until 
KCT produces an accountability report. KCT has since demanded that Blackbeard and 
Hepburn Safaris release the sublease and wildlife quota funds and threatened to expel the 
safari hunting company from CH8 if they do not comply. The DWNP CSD convened a 
mediation meeting in Kasane at the Kasane DWNP offices on June 9, 2004 to resolve the 
KCT-Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris conflict in which TAC members were invited, and 
none of them showed up except DWNP. During the mediation meeting by the Kasane 
Community Service Division of the DWNP, the DWNP Community Liaison Officer 
wondered as to whether KCT has the power to suspend Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris' 
activities in CH 8, since they had the permission to do so from the Director of the DWNP. 
This is despite the fact that KCT is the legal leaseholder to CH 8. During the course of my 
fieldwork, the KCT problem remained unresolved. 
Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust 
During my fieldwork (Fieldwork, 2004), the chairperson of STMT was reluctant to 
grant me an interview in the absence of other Trust Board members, as he felt that all Board 
members ought to be there on any business concerning STMT. I had to drive around the 
village together with the STMT chairperson to roundup STMT Board members. According to 
Arntzen et al., (2003) the general membership of STMT is to a very large extent involved in 
management decisions of STMT. A representative of the Natural Resource Management 
Project has described the STMT as "too democratic" and thereby inefficient, in that the 
committee has virtually no authority to make a decision without community consultation 
(Boggs, 2000). HCH Hunting Safaris (safari operatoring firm which currently has a joint 
venture agreement with STMT) also accused the STMT Board of being overly concerned 
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with issues of consensus building, which, according to HCH, is not good for a business 
venture (Amtzem et al., 2003). STMT argues that HCH does not understand community 
needs (Amtzem et al., 2003). During the 2nd National CBNRM Forum (2001) the Forum 
Chairperson from the private sector noted that the private sector and central government find 
it difficult to work with a big entity, they would prefer to work with one person who has 
decision-making power. 
STMT holds regular meetings with the general membership to discuss progress, 
problems as well as recruit personnel for both STMT and HCH Safaris. STMT benefit 
distribution has been to individual households, community projects and to charity 
organizations. At their annual general meeting, the general membership suggests and put 
forward a list of projects to be carried out by STMT and it is the responsibility of the STMT 
Board to prioritize the proposed projects. The general STMT membership is responsible for 
electing the STMT Board office bearers. The general membership also votes for the joint 
venture partner, since this is one of the DWNP guidelines for joint venture agreements 
between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators. 
STMT maintains contacts with a number of CBNRM institutional actors at different 
levels. At the community level, STMT maintains weak contacts with the VDC and the Kgotla 
by having the VDC chairperson and secretary and the Sankuyo Village chief as ex-officio 
members of the STMT Board. STMT has a joint venture agreement with HCH Hunting 
Safaris. At the district level, the STMT maintains contact with the TAC, which is expected to 
provide technical advice to the STMT. STMT also has contacts with the CSD of the DWNP, 
which offers extension services to STMT, and with the Land Board which is the district land 
authority. STMT also receives capacity building training and services from Concorde 
Agencies (Pty) Ltd, Design Consultancy, Chadwick, Anderson and Partners (Pty) Ltd, 
Mogodu Consultancy, People and Nature Trust, and WhiteCap Agencies (Pty) Ltd. STMT is 
a member of the Northwest District CBNRM Forum. At the national level, STMT is a 
registered member of BOCOBONET and the National CBNRM Forum. STMT has contacts 
with the DWNP which awards the annual wildlife quota and trains STMT CEGS. At the 
international level, STMT contacts are with funding and capacity building organizations like 
PACT/IRCE and the AWF 
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Most of the conflicts involving STMT are with external institutional actors including 
state and the joint venture agreement safari operator. Though issues of conflict within 
CBNRM CBOs was not thoroughly investigated at any of the four study CBNRM CBOs, 
internal conflicts at CECT, KCT and KDT were reported during the institutional actors 
interviews. At STMT, none such instances of internal conflicts were reported. Examples of 
conflictual relationships with other institutional actors include; 
a) STMT versus State 
i) The Sankuyo community believes that wildlife resources are stable in their area 
(Arntzen et al., 2003), and do not understand why wildlife quotas keep changing year 
after year. STMT holds that the unpredictability of the annual revenues due to 
changing wildlife quotas makes it hard to plan STMT activities (Arntzen et al., 2003). 
Their views are based on wildlife monitoring efforts of the CEGS (Arntzen et al., 
2003. Although STMT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quota, they no longer 
do so. STMT finds it difficult to understand why the quotas are being reduced by the 
DWNP (Arntzen et al., 2003) 
ii) The STMT Board complained that the TAC is inactive i.e. they rarely attend STMT 
Board meetings even though they are ex-officio members of the Board 
b) STMT versus HCH Safaris 
i) HCH argues that STMT does not understand business. While the private operator 
wants to get on with business, the STMT spends a lot of time on meetings and 
consensus building, which is considered unproductive by HCH (Arntzen et al., 2003). 
ii) Training to community members and STMT Board promised by HCH Hunting 
Safaris as part of their tender promises has not been fulfilled 
iii) HCH often make late payments and not according to the agreed payment schedules. 
iv) HCH promised to support the village soccer team in their tender documents with P68, 
000.00 per annum and to date only P19, 000.00 has been paid or given. 
Khwai Development Trust 
Unlike CECT and STMT, which were mobilized by DWNP/NRMP, a University of 
Botswana Sociologist, Dr. Gaborone, mobilized the Khwai community for CBNRM 
activities. During the KDT interim phase, a number of interest groups were formed to begin 
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activities that would later be incorporated into KDT activities once registered. The idea 
behind forming these interest groups was to give some organizational form to existing 
informal and traditional activities undertaken by individuals in Khwai - interest groups to be 
created by members of the Khwai community already interested or earning a living from 
similar activities. For instance, those community members involved in grass cutting formed 
the grass-cutting interest group. Some of the interest groups that were to be created included 
the following: 
Thatching Grass Interest Group 
- Craft Making Interest Group 
- Traditional Dance Interest Group 
It is important to note that 'though the initiative of developing interest groups was 
offered to the Khwai community by their advisor Dr. Gaborone, these projects never really 
took off except the thatching grass interest group' (Potts, 2003). According to Potts (2003), 
the above proposal was problematic as a result of disagreements on how funds and revenues 
generated should be used and managed. With regard to craft making, there is limited access 
to craft-making raw materials in the Khwai area. However, the thatching grass interest group 
was able to initiate its activities from 1996 to 1998, generating on average P6,000.00 per 
annum. During my study's fieldwork, none of these groups were operating. 
The General Membership of KDT is responsible for the election of the KDT Board 
and the KDT Board mainly makes all other major decisions within KDT. by the KDT Board. 
KDT maintains contacts with a number of CBNRM institutional actors and individuals at 
different levels. At the community level, unlike the CECT, KCT and STMT, KDT has no 
links with the VDC and the Kgotla. KDT worked with individual researchers interested in 
community capacity building like Dr. Gaborone and Bell. KDT auctions its annual wildlife 
quota to the highest bidding safari company and has no joint veneture agreement with any 
safari operator. At the district level, the KDT maintains contact with the TAC, which is 
expected to provide technical advice to KDT. KDT also has contacts with the CSD of the 
DWNP, which offers extension services to KDT, and with the Land Board, which is the 
district land authority. KDT receives capacity building training and services from Eco-
Tourism Support Services (ESS) and thé Okavango Community Consultants. KDT is a 
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member of the Northwest District CBNRM Forum. At the national level, KDT is not a 
registered member of BOCOBONET, but does send representatives to the National CBNRM 
Forum. KDT has contacts with the DWNP, which awards the annual wildlife quota and trains 
KDT CEGS. At the international level, STMT contacts are with funding and capacity 
building organizations like the Global Environmental Fund (small grant program under the 
UNDP). 
There seems to be a general lack of social capital at KDT, as evidenced by the 
mismanagement of KDT funds by the 2002 KDT Board. The mismanagement of funds bred 
mistrust between the KDT Board and the general membership of KDT. The DWNP withheld 
the KDT annual wildlife quota, which was only released in August 2003. KDT activities 
were suspended between September 2002 and February 2003 because of the withholding of 
the KDT wildlife quota by the DWNP. The DWNP required KDT to account for the financial 
mismanagement before the quota could be released. KDT reported the matter of mismanaged 
funds to the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) for investigation. In 
August 2003, KDT Board succeeded in persuading the DWNP with the help from Eco-
Tourism Support Services (ESS) to have the wildlife quota released. With the help from ESS, 
KDT was able to prepare a report entitled "Steps taken to improve the management and 
functioning of Khwai Development Trust" Examples of KDT conflictual relationships with 
other institutional actors include; 
a) KDT versus State 
i) Although the KDT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, they 
have never commented. KDT feels that their comments will not make any difference 
ii) KDT applied to the Land Board to open and run the Machaba Camp in 2002 (which is 
within the leased area) and their application was not approved by the Land Board 
iii) KDT Board noted that they always invite the TAC to their meetings but TAC 
members often don't honor the invitation. For the Community Liaison Officer 
interview that was going on just before my meeting with the KDT Board, TAC was 
invited and none of the TAC members showed up to assist with the interview 
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This network represents the ex-officio positions held by the VDC and the Kgotla 
(Village Chief) in the activities of the CBNRM CBO and is characterized as a weak 
connection since the VDC and the Chief do not have decision-making powers in 
CBNRM CBO activities. There are non-voting members of the CBNRM CBO Board. 
—— This network represents the business joint venture agreements or auctions that 
CBNRM CBOs have with safari operating companies. 
— This network represents the connections between CBNRM CBOs and the 
resource regulating and supervisory central government agencies. The networks involves 
guidelines and guideline enforcement 
This network represents the connections between CBNRM CBOs and private 
company capacity building firms that provide services to CBNRM CBOs for a fee. 
—" This network represents the connections between CBNRM CBOs and NGOs 
and Donor agencies that provide capacity building services to CBNRM CBOs and the 
CBNRM CBOs is not required to pay for the service. 
______ This network represents the extension services provided by the DWNP and 
the regulatory nature of the relations between the DWNP and CBNRM CBOs 
X ™ ™ — M u l t i - S t a k e h o l d e r  O r g a n i z a t i o n  
Civil Society Organization 
State Organization 
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6.2.4 Outcome 4: Appropriatly diverse and healthy economies 
Indicator: Increasing community resident assets, reducing poverty, and increasing business 
diversity 
6.2.4.1 Financial/Built Capital 
i) CECT 
There has been an increase in incomes generated by CECT over the years from their 
CBNRM activities (for details see appendix 6). CECT invested some of the income generated 
in the construction of office buildings, vehicles and into VTC identified projects. Most such 
VTC projects are income-generating ventures like general dealers, brick making and 
campsites. CECT does not have a relief program targeting its disadvantaged members. 
Though an estimated 20 tonnes of game meat per hunting season is divided between the 
CECT communities, most VTCs sell the meat instead of giving it to community members. 
Groups like the !Xo usually do not have the cash to purchase meat from the VTC (Van der 
Jagt et al., 2000). CECT does not have a community development program requirement in its 
joint venture agreement terms with Rann Hunting Safaris. 
ii) KCT 
No data on financial resources generated from CBNRM activities were available, 
because during my fieldwork, KCT had problems and records were not accessible. Projects 
conducted by KCT could not be ascertained during my study's fieldwork. The general 
impression however, is that like CECT and KDT income from CBNRM activities have 
tended to be channeled into community investment projects and none has been channeled to 
individual households as household benefits. However, Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris who 
have a joint venture agreement with KCT pointed out that their company undertook the 
following projects for KCT as part of their community development program: bought 25, 000 
bricks towards the building of Pandamatenga Community Hall, which during my fieldwork 
was not completed. Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris also undertook relief programs targeting 
disadvantaged groups in the KCT villages. These projects include building six houses in 
Lesoma for destitute, establishing a feeding kitchen for destitute in Kazungula (project 
currently suspended) and giving out game meat to the Kazungula, Pandamatenga and 
Lesoma community. 
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iii) STMT 
There has been an increase in incomes generated by STMT over the years from their 
CBNRM activities (for details see appendix 6). STMT invested some of the income 
generated in the construction of office buildings, individual household benefits (e.g. building 
of toilets in each household in Sankuyo Village), vehicles and community investment 
projects (Kazikini Campsite, Shandereka Cultural Village and Santawani Lodge). STMT 
invested in programs for the disadvantaged, including funeral assistance to bereaved families 
in Sankuyo Village, supply of meat rations to the destitute, supply of firewood and water as 
well as transport to community members, elephant, warthog and ostrich meat are rationed to 
all members of the community at no cost and donated P50 000 (about $10,000.00) to be 
shared equally between Masiela (Orphans) Trust Fund and the National AIDS Coordinating 
Agency (NACA). STMT set aside a portion of their annual wildlife quota for subsistence 
hunting. 
iv) KDT 
KDT has generated income from the auctioning of their annual wildlife quota. 
However, the KDT income, which in 2000 substantially benefited from the sale of lions, was 
in 2001 affected by the ban in lion hunting. Lions were removed from the 2001 KDT wildlife 
quota and this resulted in a loss of about P355, 000.00 (about $54,615.00). Income from 
CBNRM activities have tended to be channeled into community investment projects and 
none has been channeled to individual households as household benefits. KDT has invested 
in building office blocks, craft shop (not operating), vehicles, and constructing and 
improving hunting camps. However, KDT does not have a relief program targeting its 
disadvantaged members except for the subsistence hunting of part of the annual wildlife 
quota. 
6.3 Discussion 
Examining social capital is critical for recognizing the social forces at work in the 
course of development. The impetus to establish networks is to promote the development of 
shared values and trust-based relationships that transcend purely market transactions. Flora 
(2001: 6) observed that communities of place do not have neat, tight boundaries, but 
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influence and are influenced by other parts of society. Communities of place are shaped by 
three sets of institutions: the market, the state, and civil society (Flora, 2001:6). These 
institutions influence the resources available to local access and control (Flora, 2001:6). The 
institutional spheres of market, state and civil society all are critical for communities to 
flourish (Tester, 1992; Zijderveld, 1999). Communities of place establish horizontal and 
vertical networks with market, state and civil society actors at the different levels. Woolcock 
(1998) uses the concepts embeddedness and autonomy to describe the desirable interactions 
within and between community organizations and private and public organizations at the 
micro and macro levels. Woolcock's (1998) model of micro and macro level embeddedness 
and autonomy is an attempt at understanding the creation of social capital based on both top-
down and bottom-up processes. Bottom-up processes of social capital creation entails 
linkages which involve bridging and linking social capital and integration which involves 
bonding social capital. Woolcock (1998) maintains that for development outcomes to be 
achieved in poor communities, linkage needs to be combined with integration. 
Utilizing Woolcock's (2001) theoretical proposals therefore, it is essential for 
CBNRM CBOs to enhance their horizontal/bridging and vertical/linking networks and 
bonding/integration networks. Bridging and bonding social capital is essential for building 
consensus among institutional actors with approximately similar levels of power and desired 
futures while linking social capital helps them access resources, ideas and information from 
institutions higher in the institutional power hierarchy. In the case of my study CBNRM 
CBOs, little attention has been given to horizontal scaling. As figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 
indicates, the study CBNRM CBOs have weak links with other village institutions and no 
direct links between themselves or with any other CBNRM CBOs in Botswana. The 
connection between the VDC (the village institution recognized by the central government as 
the development arm of the local government at the village level) and the CBNRM CBO is 
limited to having the VDC chairperson and secretary holding ex-officio positions within the 
CBNRM CBO. 
The VDC representatives to the CBNRM CBO are not involved in decision making 
since they do not have a vote in matters concerning the CBNRM CBO. In none of the study 
CBNRM CBOs do VDC and CBNRM CBOs have coordinated village/community 
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development projects. Alexander et al. (1999) reported conflicts between some VTCs and 
VDCs over whether VDC projects should be funded by the VTC from the sale of the hunting 
quota. None of the study CBNRM CBOs has funded VDC projects. Rather, the CBOs have 
undertaken independent development projects of their own. The savingram from the Ministry 
of Local Government (Appendix 1) correctly observed that CBNRM CBOs projects 
duplicate local government development efforts. However, district planning is the 
responsibility of local government, which in Botswana has closer ties to the central 
government than to the local communities, and therefore should take the blame on 
uncoordinated planning. The VDC is an arm of the District Council and CBNRM CBOs are 
independent village institutions, with very weak links with the District Council. It is not clear 
how this independent village institutions can work in a coordinated manner with District 
Council linked VDC. 
The connection between the study CBNRM CBOs and the kgotla (Chief) is limited to 
having the chief with ex-officio representation within the CBNRM CBO Board. The chief is 
not involved in decision making, since he/she does not have a vote in matters concerning the 
CBNRM CBO. In Botswana, the kgotla and chieftainship are recognized as the legitimate 
leadership structure at the village level and command a lot of respect within their community. 
The active participation of this institution is likely to increase the legitimacy and enhance 
community confidence in CBNRM CBO Trust Boards. The kgotla and the chief are the 
guardian of the traditions and norms of the local community and are the legitimate 
institutions for sanctions at the village level. Thus the kgotla and the chief embody some of 
the important components of social capital. It is essential to situate CBNRM CBOs within the 
existing institutional context. Pre-existing social capital, networks and norms of reciprocity 
support common property management by granting the social relationships and trust as the 
basis for rules and monitoring. Fox (1996:125) noted that horizontal scaling helps promote 
collective action in defense of common interests. CBNRM CBOs connection to the kgotla 
and chief, an institution that has a long history of promoting collective action, is likely to 
offset locally confined solidarities. Once horizontal networks have been established with and 
between village institutions, the CBNRM CBO could then look out for potential allies in 
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other communities. For instance, alliances could be forged with other CBNRM CBOs in the 
district and beyond. 
It is important to note that none of the study CBNRM CBOs has CBNRM alliances 
with any other CBNRM CBOs within their district except through the District CBNRM 
Forum, which is part of the National CBNRM Forum. For instance, KDT and STMT are less 
than fifty miles apart and CECT and KCT are about one hundred miles apart and yet they do 
not have any CBNRM connections whatsoever outside those provided by the District 
CBNRM Forum, National CBNRM Forum and BOCOBONET. The District CBNRM 
Forum, just like the National CBNRM Forum, is a place where different coalitions can 
discuss and negotiate their different mental causal models. Rozemeijer (2002) argue that: 
The impact of networking in Botswana on the participation of communities in 
CBNRM is limited. The community organizations who are supposed to be part of 
the CBNRM networks hardly participate, let alone benefit in terms of sharing 
information, enhanced co-ordination of services and co-operation with other 
organizations. The CBNRM Support Services web site obviously not, but also 
written documents appear not to be very accessible for community organizations. 
With the communication between Forum and individual communities being 
virtually non-existent one can doubt the level of participation of communities in 
CBNRM-related information sharing and decision-making (Rozemeijer, 2002). 
According to Flora and Flora (1993:56) communities tend to learn best from those 
most like themselves in a process they call horizontal networking lateral learning. They argue 
that people learn more from people like themselves than they do from experts (Flora and 
Flora, 1993:57). Communities that are entrepreneurial form groups to visit other 
communities where they have heard that something important is going on that they wish to 
emulate (Flora and Flora, 1993:57). Other communities also visit them, with those visits 
serving as both learning for the visitors and consultancies for the communities visited (Flora 
and Flora, 1993:57). Of my case study CBNRM CBOs, only CECT has had exchange visits 
with other CBNRM CBOs. However, those visits were with CBNRM CBOs in other 
countries, and there had been no such visits with Botswana-based CBNRM CBOs. CBNRM 
CBO contact in Botswana has been through BOCOBONET. Of my study CBNRM CBOs, 
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the CECT, KCT and STMT are members of BOCOBONET and KDT, just like a handful 
other CBNRM CBOs in Botswana, is not a member of BOCOBONET. BOCOBONET is 
based in Gaborone, Botswana's major city and has little real touch with member CBNRM 
CBOs, partly because most CBNRM CBOs are in remote areas of Botswana and mostly 
because it is poorly funded. For instance, though KCT is a member of BOCOBONET, 
located about one thousand kilometers from Gaborone, there has been no BOCOBONET 
assistance to KCT in their struggle with the DWNP over the withholding of their annual 
wildlife quota and the subsequent release of the quota directly to Blackbeard and Hepburn 
Hunting Safaris without the consent of KCT. BOCOBONET is too far away from the 
member CBNRM CBOs for it to be effective, and might need to set up regional offices in the 
districts. 
The study CBNRM CBOs tend to have vertical, rather than horizontal social capital. 
The District CBNRM Forum and the National CBNRM Forum are examples of networks that 
study CBNRM CBOs are involved in. The District CBNRM Forum and National CBNRM 
Forum involve state, civil society and market stakeholders, all of which tends to have more 
power than the CBNRM CBOs. Fox (1996:124) notes that vertical social capital without 
sufficient horizontal social capital can sideline the base. He argues that if local organizations 
just have vertical social capital, local stakeholders will ultimately have little capacity to 
monitor the activities of their leadership and therefore little capacity to hold them 
accountable (Fox, 1996:124). In his seminal 1993 work, Putnam (1993) found that 
horizontally organized networks support social capital and vertical organized networks stall 
its formation. Putnam (1993:173 -174) observes that vertical networks, no matter how dense 
and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. 
This argument is not meant to minimize the role of vertical networks, but to show that 
vertical networks without horizontal networks stall social capital at the community level. 
Figure 2.3 shows the dimensions of social capital and from this figure it is clear that too 
much vertical networking with little or no horizontal networking results in clientelism. 
Horizontal networking would give CBNRM CBOs a sense of identity and common purpose. 
The desirable situation as portrayed in figure 2.3 is that characterized by a positive balance 
between vertical networking and horizontal networking, characterized as participatory 
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community action, where community action arises from objectives determined through 
participation, with links to external institutions and resources. 
It is important to note that, in addition to the shape of networks, other aspects of 
social organization such as the demographic composition of the organizations membership, 
organizations membership size etc. are also important determinants of social capital. In the 
case of my study CBNRM CBOs, two of the study cases involve more than one village while 
the other two involve one village, hence a smaller population compared to the first two. The 
differences in population size might contribute to disparate levels of social capital within the 
study communities. However, since my study's unit of analysis was institutional actors, the 
contribution of such demographic differences between CBNRM CBOs has not been 
thoroughly studied. Whatever indicators of social capital assessed at the community level 
was based on the information obtained from interviews with community level institutional 
actors and not sampled individuals within the community. From these interviews and existing 
literature, it was possible to get an account of the level of social capital at the community 
level. For instance, CECT has low levels of social capital as evidenced by the existence of 
the 'concerned group', and KDT and KCT have low levels of social capital as indicated by 
the mismanagement of funds and the subsequent conflict that ensued. CECT and KCT 
involve more than one village and KDT involves one village. In a way, for my cases, the 
level of social capital at the community level doesn't seem to be determined by the size of 
the population involved. KDT has a small population and almost dominated by one ethnic 
group and still lacks social capital. STMT has a small population and composed of more than 
one ethnic group and seems to enjoy some degree of social capital at the community level. 
The differences in social capital at the community level between the four study cases appear 
to stem from the differences in the degree of community participation, level of consultation 
and the nature of benefit distribution at the community level. For instance, of the four study 
cases, STMT has more women than men within the STMT Board and distributes benefits 
directly to households compared to the other three study cases. Flora and Flora (1993:56) 
noted that the strength of entrepreneurial social capital is found in diversity, where all voices 
are heard including those of women who are normally marginalized. STMT has been 
criticized by their joint venture partner, HCH Safaris for spending too much time on 
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consensus building, while CECT for instance, has maintained a doser relationship with Rann 
Hunting Safaris than with its constituency. In a way, STMT as compared to CECT has 
worked on bonding and linking social capital, while CECT emphasizes on linking social 
capital with little bonding social capital. 
The other aspect of Botswana's CBNRM that warrants discussion at this stage is the 
disjointing of the five capitals of community sustainability in implementing CBNRM in 
Botswana. The way CBNRM is perceived in Botswana detaches the CBNRM CBO from the 
initiative to invest in natural capital. The CBNRM CBOs do not have the mandate to manage 
natural resources, but are limited to utilizing the annual wildlife quota. CBNRM CBOs lack 
secure tenure to the resources they are utilizing. The state regulations, in fact, do not address 
the long-term rights of CBNRM participating communities. According to Flora (2001) and 
Petty (1998) community sustainability is premised upon community investment in 
community sustainability capitals. Flora (1998) defines sustainability as investing in the 
forms of capital that do not deplete other forms, but rather enhance other forms of capital. In 
Botswana's CBNRM, only four forms of capital have received attention. The state, NGO 
extension services and in some instances market actors have engaged in capacity building 
programs at the community level (human capital); networks have been forged between state, 
market and civil society actors with CBNRM CBOs (social capital); and financial resources 
have been generated and invested in community development projects (financial/built 
capital). There has been no investment either by the CBNRM CBO, state, market and civil 
society into community level natural resource management, conservation and monitoring 
efforts (natural capital). The human, social and financial/built capital aspects of CBNRM are 
not connected to the enhancement of natural capital. Flora (2001:10) argues that successful 
actions to enhance natural capital start from human capital (recognizing the skills, 
knowledge, and abilities of local people) and build social capital (increased communication 
and networks and increased initiative and responsibility). Cortner and Moote (1999) and 
Pomeroy and Beck (1999) observed that these activities are performed as predecessors of 
actions to improve natural capital. In Botswana, the skills and knowledge of the local people 
with regard to natural resource management is disregarded - no attention is paid to issues of 
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cultural capital. Instead human capital development focuses on organizational capacity 
building to oversee utilization of natural resources. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This study identifies the major institutional actors in Botswana's CBNRM program, 
their desired future conditions, mental causal models and actual participation in the program. 
One of the major findings of this study is that state institutional actors tend to dominate the 
program by setting its objectives and determining the role that all other CBNRM institutional 
actors play in the program. The state's ability to dominate the program is premised upon its 
claim to represent the common interest and the existence of a bureaucratic structure that 
supports centralization and top-down decision processes. To understand issues on community 
based natural resource management, it is essential to investigate issues of natural resource 
ownership, which this study did. The Government of Botswana, through legislations and 
policies centralize the ownership of natural resources and subsequently regulate activities by 
local communities, even on land designated as communal, tribal or customary. The Tribal 
Land Act of 1968, for instance, took away control of communal land from tribal chiefs and 
handed it over to central government created Land Boards. My study shows that Land 
Boards, though considered local government institutions are in reality creations of the central 
government and are upwardly accountable. The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, which 
gave rise to the CBNRM program, converted communal/tribal/customary land into WMAs 
and CHAs to be administered by the central government's DWNP. In fact, the DWNP owns 
the wildlife within the WMAs and CHAs and the Land Board owns the land where the 
wildlife is found. CBNRM CBOs apply for use rights from the owners of the wildlife and the 
owners of the land. As my study shows, dispossession and centralization of natural resources 
preceeded the so-called natural resource devolution policies as represented by the CBNRM 
program in Botswana. 
At this point, I will assess my study's research questions and hypothesis proposed at 
the beginning of the study as a way of summarizing the findings of my study. 
Research Question 1 
What are the major market, state, and civil society stakeholding institutions around 
CBNRM in Botswana at the international, national, district, and local level? 
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This study identifies the major stakeholding institutions in Botswana's CBNRM 
program as state - representated by government departments, legislation and policies mostly 
operating at the national level with little local government participation; civil society, as 
represented by CBNRM CBOs involving single and multiple villages, national and 
international NGOs and international donor agencies all interested in CBNRM CBO capacity 
building for CBNRM activities; and market, as reperesented by safari operating firms who 
enter into joint venture business agreements with CBNRM CBOs. 
Research Question 2 
What are the desired future conditions, mental causal models and actual 
participation in CBNRM by institutional actors? 
There is a general agreement between Botswana's CBNRM institutional actors 
regarding the desired futures of the program. All CBNRM institutional actors express natural 
resource conservation and economic development as desired futures for the program. The 
mental causal models for the different CBNRM institutional actors for achieving natural 
resource conservation and bringing about economic development are: 
State 
a) State ownership and regulation of natural resource use is key to sustainable 
mamangement and use of natural resources 
b) Privatization of natural resource management and use is an essential requirement for 
the effective management of communal rangelands and for increased output from the 
use of natural resources 
NGOs and Donor Agencies 
a) The sustainable management of natural resources should be linked with improved 
livelihoods of the local people i.e. sustainable natural resource management has to be 
linked to sustainable livelihoods 
b) Local people are the primary actors in their own development, and any assistance 
accorded them is geared towards building their capacity to plan, implement and 
monitor their development activities 
I l l  
CBNRM CBOs 
a) For sustainable management and use of natural resources in CHAs, CBNRM CBOs 
ought to be involved in utilization, protection, conservation and monitoring of natural 
resources 
Safari Operators 
a) Through joint venture agreements between CBNRM CBOs and safari operators, 
CBNRM CBOs can benefit from the safari operators' skills in tourism development 
The activities for state institutions in CBNRM are to devise off-take regulations and 
award off-take quotas, licenses and permits to user groups. The activities for the CBNRM 
facilitating NGOs and Donor agencies are restricted to CBNRM CBO organizational 
capacity building and funding for utilization of natural resource use leases. CBNRM CBOs 
activities are limited to regulated utilization of the DWNP awarded annual wildlife quota or 
resource use lease or license. The safari operators' activities are limited to buying from the 
CBNRM CBO, the annual wildlife quota for safari hunting. 
Research Question 3 
To what degree do those that share desired future conditions share similar mental 
causal models on how to achieve those conditions? 
Despite the fact that all the CBNRM institutional actors in Botswana's CBNRM 
program share desired futures of natural resource conservation and economic development, it 
is clear that their mental causal models of how to achieve these broad goals differ. While the 
state agencies favor centralization, regulation and privatization of natural resources, civil 
society consisting ofNGO, Donor and CBNRM CBOs all favor local community 
participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring of CBNRM activities. My 
study findings confirm my research hypothesis that CBNRM institutional stakeholders at 
different levels share desired future conditions, but have different mental cauasal models of 
how to reach those desired future conditions. 
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Research Question 4 
What mechanisms are in place to increase bridging and linking social capital among 
the different scales with CBNRM CBOs? 
Chapter 5 section 5.3 and Chapter 6 of my study discusses the mechanisms that are in 
place to increase bridging and linking social capital among the different scales with CBNRM 
CBOs. My study details out those network organizations that link CBNRM CBOs with other 
CBNRM institutional actors. These network organizations are essential to CBNRM CBOs to 
tap into resource rich networks, but since there are mostly vertically organized, CBNRM 
CBOs ought to balance these with horizontal networks. My study found out that CBNRM 
CBOs have weakly developed horizontal networks and that most of their networks are 
vertical. Putnam (1993) sees vertical networks as stalling the development of social capital in 
the absence of horizontal networks. Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 of my study shows that case 
study CBNRM CBOs mostly have linking social capital and very little bridging social 
capital. 
Research Question 5 
What differences are there in terms of conflict for those CBNRMs CBOs with high 
bridging social capital (dense and diverse advocacy coalitions) and those with low bridging 
social capital? 
All of my study's CBNRM CBOs have very little bridging social capital: however, 
they do have linking social capital. Because of the general lack of bridging social capital, it is 
not possible to determine whether the presence or absence of bridging social capital for my 
study CBNRM CBOs contributes to conflict or not. There is also no evidence to suggest that 
the high linking social capital contributed to minimizing or fueling conflict for my study 
CBNRM CBOs. The differences in conflict for my study CBNRM CBOs appear to stem 
from the differences in the degree of community participation in CBNRM CBOs' activities, 
level of consultation by the CBNRM CBO leadership of their constituents and the nature of 
benefit distribution by the CBNRM CBO to its general membership. From my study 
findings, it is not possible to confirm or refute my research hypothesis. 
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Chapter 8: Recommendations 
Recommendation 1 
My study findings indicate that there is no real power transfer in Botswana's 
CBNRM program to local-level institutions. Local-level institutions are only involved in 
implementating rules created by the central government. Studies by Agrawal, 1999; Agrawal, 
1995b, 1996; Dahlman, 1980; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and Schlager, 1995, and Schlager and 
Ostrom, 1992 all point to the desirability for devolving authority and control over the 
management of natural resources at the local level to local-level institutions. My study 
recommends that the central government devolve authority and control over natural resources 
to local-level institutions. The example of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Program cited in this 
text is an example of devolution of natural resource authority and control to local government 
institutions. The shortcomings of the Zimbabwe model however, is that local government 
units are not accountable to the local community, but to the central government. Thus, 
stalling the desirable devolution of authority and control to truly local-level institutions. In 
Botswana too, local government units are accountable to central government than to the local 
community. Devolving natural resource authority and control to current local government 
structures in Botswana will not result in the desirable outcomes of local-level authority and 
control. My study does not recommend that CBNRM CBO activities be meshed into district 
level decision making processes because district level administrative units are extensions of 
the central government. Meshing CBNRM CBOs into district level decision making 
processes would be like centralizing the CBNRM program. However, my study does 
recognize the need for integrated planning at the district level. My study also recognizes the 
need for a true devolution process that creates local government units with a mandate over 
district natural resources that CBNRM CBO activity could be meshed into. Thus, local 
government has to be reformed such that it is accountable and represent the local community, 
than the central government. Local government reforms might include the revival of 
traditional institutions that were undermined by colonial and the post-colonial government, 
institutions that have their roots in the community. 
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Table 8.1 Proposed State and Local Community Relations in Natural Resource Management 
Shift from Shift to 
Current Practice in Botswana Desirable 
Mode of Participation Cooperating Co-learning 
Role of Officials Directive Participant in the process 
Assumptions about sources of 
solutions 
Expert based on best technical 
means 
Emergent, based on shared 
discovery, learning, pooling 
local and expert knowledge 
Assumptions about the role of 
the state 
Has the right to determine the 
public interest 
The public interest is formed by 
aggregation of local interests 
Source: adaptedfrom Jiggins (1998) 
Recommendation 2 
The devolution of authority and control over the management of natural resources at 
the local level to local-level institutions as suggested in recommendation 1 does not imply 
that the state has no role to play in natural resource management. The state has an important 
facilitative role to play in CBNRM. 
Role of the State 
a) Provide clarifications on local community territorial rights. I propose that the 
central government recognize private community-based rights on land tenure and resources 
therein, just as is the case with individual private land tenure and resources rights. 
b) Develop a legal framework that clarifies local community natural resource rights 
and benefits 
c) Develop a legal and policy framework that will provide the parameters within 
which interactions between CBNRM institutional actors can take place 
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Role of Donors 
Donors need to invest in: 
a) Capacity building for NGOs working with CBNRM CBOs on organizational, 
financial, and natural resource management and monitoring 
b) Strengthening BOCOBONET in its advocacy role 
c) Funding CBNRM CBO to obtain services from private sector service providers 
d) Funding CBNRM network and advocacy organizations - the National CBNRM 
Forum, District CBNRM Forums, and BOCOBONET 
Role of NGOs 
a) Provide capacity building services to CBNRM CBOs on organizational and 
financial management. NGOs with knowledge and expertise with natural resource 
management to also provide technical support in that field. However, there is need to respect 
and recognize the role of local knowledge in natural resource management. Local knowledge 
should be phased into technical support programs. Government agencies involvement in 
technical support to CBNRM CBOs should only be in those areas where government 
departments have specialized knowledge and expertise which support NGOs do not have. 
b) The NGO support to CBNRM CBOs should not be indefinite, since this could 
create a dependency situation. There has to be a memorandum of understanding between the 
support NGO and the CBNRM CBO. The memorandum of understanding should clearly 
outline the services to be provided and the time frame. 
Role of BOCOBONET 
BOCOBONET to remain an advocacy organization for CBNRM CBOs and should 
not be involved in extension service provision. To be more effective, BOCOBONET ought to 
open up regional offices in the different districts where there are registered BOCOBONET 
member CBNRM CBOs. These regional BOCOBONET offices can help promote the 
horizontal networking between CBNRM CBOs within districts and across districts. 
116 
Recommendation 3 
There ought to be more CBNRM CBO to CBNRM CBO horizontal networking 
outside BOCOBONET, District CBNRM Forum, and National CBNRM Forum to promote 
horizontal lateral learning. 
Recommendation 4 
Since NGOs, Donors and CBNRM CBOs tend to share desired futures and mental 
causal models for conservation of natural resources and economic development, they ought 
to form an advocacy coalition based upon their congruency of beliefs and/or a network 
organization bringing together all the non-state CBNRM institutional actors. The District 
CBNRM Forum and National CBNRM Forum should be the next upper stage where the non­
government institutional actors can engage and negotiate their mental causal models with 
state agecies. 
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Appendix 1 : Savingram from Ministry of Local Government 
From: Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government 
To: All District Commissioners 
All Council Secretaries 
All Land Board Secretaries 
All Tribal Secretaries 
Reference: LG/3/6/2/1 IV (46) 
Date: 30th of January 2001 
cc: Permanent Secretary MCI 
Director DWNP 
Senior Private Secretary to the VP 
Permanent Secretary MoA 
Permanent Secretary MME&WA 
Permanent Secretary MF&DP 
Permanent Secretary MLH&E 
Subject: Management of funds realized from the Community Based Natural Resources 
Management Project 
Concerns have come at various times and in various forms on the management and use of 
funds accrued from the above mentioned projects all over the country. These concerns have 
included the following: -
1. Only a few people benefit from these funds and yet they are meant to benefit larger 
sections of the community. 
2. These funds are earned from natural resources'and as such there is a strong feeling that 
there shouldn't be a departure from the policy of these resources benefiting the whole nation, 
as is done with diamonds and other revenue earning natural resources. 
3. The handling and use of funds earned is suspect as in some cases, there are not even 
audited reports on their management. 
4. These projects tend to be discriminatory in that if, for instance, there are job opportunities, 
they are wholly reserved for participating localities to the exclusion of other citizens from 
outside these. 
5. The original intention whereby funds from these projects could be used in undertaking 
development projects in the participating localities is not working. Quite often project 
identification, formulation and implementation are either deficient or duplicating what 
Government is providing through local authorities. It has now been decided that funds earned 
from these projects should be managed in trust by the District Councils and whatever is 
decided regarding their use should be done in consultation with the affected communities. 
Full audits must be undertaken before these funds are handed over to the Councils. The 
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participating localities shall with the assistance of the addressees continue to market these 
resources. Any legitimate running costs will, of course, have to be paid out of these funds. 
Addressees are therefore required to act accordingly, and with immediate effect. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Botswana Showing Controlled Hunting Areas Zoned for 
Community Management 
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Appendix 3 Attendance by CBNRM stakeholders at the 3rd and 4th National CBNRM Forum 
Number of participants 
Stakeholder 3 4tn 
# % # % 
Civil Society CBNRM CBO 32 28 11 18 
NGO 12 10 8 13 
Network Organization 4 4 3 5 
Subtotal 48 41 22 36 
Market Private Sector 10 9 6 10 
Subtotal 10 9 6 10 
State District Administration/ District Council 10 9 3 5 
National Assembly/Parliament 3 3 0 0 
Ministry of Agriculture 4 4 2 3 
Ministry of Local Government 1 1 0 0 
Ministry of Lands and Housing 1 1 0 0 
Ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning 
0 0 1 2 
National Museum, Monuments and Art 
gallery 
1 1 1 2 
Ministry of Environment, Wildlife & 
Tourism 
5 4 5 8 
DWNP 11 10 7 12 
Subtotal 36 31 19 31 
Other DONOR 12 10 9 15 
Research Organization 4 4 5 8 
Media 3 3 0 0 
Other 3 3 0 0 
Subtotal 
22 19 14 23 
Total 116 100 61 100 
Source: Proceedings of the 3r and 4' National CBNRM Forum 
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Appendix 4 Organizations Elected to be Members of the National CBNRM Forum for a 
Period of Two Years as per Adopted National CBNRM Forum Terms of Reference 
Stakeholders 
Years CBOs NGOs Private Sector Government District 
Forums/TAC 
2002/2003 14 Thusano HATAB, DWNP, ARB, Ngamiland, 
BOCOBONET Lefatsheng, BOCCIM, DoL, DoT Ghanzi, 
Board KCS, BWMA, (Chair), Kgalagadi, 
members + Permaculture, Representative MFDP/RDCD, Chobe and 
BOCOBONET Chobe of CBNRM NCSA possibly 
Executive Wildlife Trust, related National Kweneng 
Officer VPR&D, consultants CBNRM Forum 
Conservation Chairperson: 
International + DoT 
IUCN (NMMAG 
(Secretariat) interested to 
become 
a member) 
Total 15 7 4 7 5 
2003/2005 14 PTB, BOCCIM and MLG, MLHA Ngamiland 
BOCOBONET ACCORD, Consultants (Museum), District 
Board Kuru Family (ECOSURV MOA, MFDP CBNRM 
members + and VPR&D + and Peer) + (RDCD), MEWT Forum, TACS 
BOCOBONET KCS and CI HATAB and (DOT, DWNP, in Central, 
Executive (Steering BWMA ARB, Forestry, Kgalagadi, 
Officer + Committee (Steering and NCSA), Southern and 
Mmadinare Member) + Committee MLH (DOL) Kgatleng 
Development IUCN Members) Districts + 
Trust and (Secretariat) Ngamiland 
Botlhale jwa and Kweneng 
Phala TAC (Steering 
(Steering Committee 
Committee Members) 
members) + 
Khoinaphu 
CBO (Chair) 
Total 18 8 5 10 6 
Source: Proceedings of the 2n and 3r National CBNRM Forum 
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Appendix 5 Timeline of CBNRM Related Events Over the Years 
Year Event 
1966 Botswana Independence, District Councils established, Chiefs lost their development and 
governance responsibilities to District Councils 
1968 Tribal Land Act 
1969 Critical national election, fear of D Councils developing into centers of opposition and criticism -
DC given supervisory role over D Council 
1974 Agricultural Resources Conservation Act 
1975 Tribal Grazing Land Policy 
1978 Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) 
1981 Veld Products Research and Development (VPR&D) 
1982 Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS) 
1983 Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB) 
1984 Monuments and Relics Act, Thusano Lefatsheng (TL), IUCN 
1986 Wildlife Conservation policy 
1989 Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP), Permaculture Trust Botswana (PTB) 
1990 Tourism Policy, Conservation International (CI) 
1991 National Policy on Agricultural development (NPAD) 
1992 Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act, The U.S. Ambassadors' Special Self-Help Program 
(USASHF), Global Environmental fund (GEF) 
1993 1 registered CBNRM CBO 
1994 Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT) 
1995 NRMP links to PACT for community capacity building - Institutional Reinforcement for 
Community Empowerment (IRCE), 4 registered CBNRM CBO, Sankuyo Tshwaragano 
Conservation Trust (STMT), Khwai Development Trust (KDT) 
1996 CBNRM Policy consultation process 
1997 10 registered CBNRM CBOs 
1999 Joint Venture Guidelines developed, 26 registered CBNRM CBOs, KOMKU, Kalepa Conservation 
Trust (KCT); Botswana Community Based Organization Network (BOCOBONET) 
2000 National CBNRM Forum established, first Draft CBNRM Policy 
2001 First National CBNRM Forum meeting (June), Second National CBNRM Forum (November), lion 
hunting ban, 46 registered CBNRM CBOs 
2002 Game Ranching Policy 
2003 Third National CBNRM Forum (June), Fourth National CBNRM Forum (November), National 
Development Plan (NDP) 9, 67 registered CBNRM CBOs 
2004 Draft CBNRM Policy, lion hunting ban lifted 
Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Benefit 
distribution 
- The VTCs have considered 
distribution of cash payment 
to households but it has 
never been selected as the 
top priority and therefore it 
has never been done (Van 
der Jagt et al., 2000). CECT 
fonds are chanelled into 
community projects 
- An estimated 20 tonnes of 
game meat per hunting 
season is divided between 
the CECT communities and 
most VTCs sell the meat 
instead of giving it to 
community members 
- Sell all of the annual 
wildlife quota to Rann 
Safaris 
- There has been no 
distribution of cash benefits 
to households, KCT funds 
were channeled into 
community projects e.g. 
building of the 
Pandamatenga Community 
Hall 
- Sell all of the annual 
wildlife quota to Blackboard 
and Hepburn safaris 
NB Not much data is 
available on KCT because 
of the current problems 
discussed under 'cases of 
conflict' in sections below. 
In fact there has been no 
formal hand over of KCT 
administrative records from 
the board that 
misappropriated the funds to 
later boards. 
Kalepa is one of the least 
studied CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. It is hard to find 
any past studies done on 
Kalepa. 
- Besides the investments into 
community activities, STMT 
distributes benefits to individual 
households and to charity as follows: 
- Construction of toilets/pit latrines 
for all households in Sankuyo 
Village 
- Cash payment of P250.00 and 
P300.00 per family in the years 2002 
and 2003 respectively 
- Funeral assistance to bereaved 
families: cash of P1000.00 for 
children and P3000.00 for adults 
- Supply of firewood and water as 
well as transport to community 
members 
- Supply of meat rations to the 
destitute 
- Elephant, warthog and ostrich meat 
are rationed to all members of the 
community at no cost 
- On 22nd June 2004, STMT donated 
P50 000 to be shared equally 
between Masiela (Orphans) Trust 
Fund and the National AIDS 
Coordinating Agency (NACA) 
- Keeps part of the annual wildlife 
quota for subsistence hunting 
- There has been no 
distribution of cash 
benefits to households, 
KDT funds are channeled 
into community projects 
e.g. construction of 
campsites, KDT office, 
Craft shop and vehicles. 
NB At the end of the 2002 
financial year, the KDT 
Board could not produce 
an audited report of the 
trust's finances as a result 
of misappropriation of 
trust funds. 
- Keeps part of annual 
wildlife quota for 
subsistence hunting 
Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Programs 
targeting the 
disadvantaged 
The !Xo San group are traditional 
hunters, and have always 
depended upon hunting. During 
the household survey conducted 
by Alexander et al. (1999) 
respondents reported that poorer 
households that depended heavily 
on hunting for a living strongly 
protested at the decision by 
CECT to sell practically the entire 
hunting quota to the Rann 
Hunting Safaris, thus leaving 
fewer animals for local hunting -
these groups might have had 
Special Game Licenses for 
hunting before CHI and CH2 
were leased out to CECT. 
Though an estimated 20 tonnes of 
game meat per hunting season is 
divided between the CECT 
communities, most VTCs sell the 
meat instead of giving it to 
community members. Groups like 
the !Xo usually do not have the 
cash to purchase meat from the 
VTC (Van der Jagt et al., 2000). 
NB CECT does not have a 
community development program 
requirement in its joint venture 
terms 
No wildlife from the quota is set 
aside for subsistence hunting 
The below programs were 
undertaken by Blackbeard and 
Hepburn Safaris for the KCT 
community as part of the joint 
venture agreement community 
development program. These 
programs have been suspended due 
to the current conflicts between 
KCT and Blackbeard and Hepburn 
Safaris. 
The community development 
program included: 
Establishment of a feeding kitchen 
for the destitute in Kazungula 
Building of six houses in Lesoma 
for the destitute 
Giving out game meat to the KCT 
community - when an animal is 
killed Blackbeard and Hepburn 
Safaris hires 10 people from the 
villages to cut it up and the meat is 
transported to the village by the 
safari company and handed over to 
the VDCs to be distributed in the 
villages 
No wildlife from the quota is set 
aside for subsistence hunting 
Funeral assistance to 
bereaved families: cash of 
P1000.00 for children and 
P3000.00 for adults 
Supply of meat rations to the 
destitute 
Supply of firewood and water 
as well as transport to 
community members 
Elephant, warthog and ostrich 
meat are rationed to all 
members of the community at 
no cost 
On 22nd June 2004, STMT 
donated P50 000 to be shared 
equally between Masiela 
(Orphans) Trust Fund and the 
National AIDS Coordinating 
Agency (NACA) - the 
Masiela (Orphans) Trust 
Fund and National AIDS 
Coordinating Agency 
(NACA) are National Relief 
Programs based in Gaborone. 
Part of the wildlife quota is 
set aside for subsistence 
hunting 
Part of the wildlife 
quota is set aside 
for subsistence 
hunting 
Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs 
MEASURE 
CBNRM 
CBO's 
investment 
into 
community 
activities 
CECT 
- CECT constructed an administrative 
office in Kavimba, and has a caravan 
office for marketing purposes in Kasane 
- CECT income from CBNRM activities 
have tended to be channeled into 
community investment projects and 
none has been channeled to individual 
households as household benefits. 
- Kavimba VTC- invested in a campsite 
serviced with flush toilets and showers, 
a small tuck-shop and a tent site. During 
my study's fieldwork, the campsite was 
non-operational. 
- Mabele VTC built and opened a 
community general store in 2000 though 
there were already two other general 
stores in the village. The VTC owns and 
manages the store, which has two full-
time employees and a night watchman 
- Kachikau VTC planned to invest in a 
gas station. To be able to run the gas 
station, the VTC had first to find 
suppliers of petrol and diesel and to date 
have not been able to find any since the 
suppliers do not think it's a financially 
viable project. Whilst the gas station 
project is pending, the Kachikau VTC 
used the gas station site for brick 
making (not operational during my 
study's field work) 
- Satau VTC invested in a Hardware and 
brick making 
- Parakarungu VTC invested in a 
sorghum/maize Grinding mill and 
community shop 
KCT 
- Blackbeard and 
Hepburn Safaris offered 
the following services to 
KCT as part of their 
community development 
program: 
- Established a feeding 
kitchen for destitutes in 
Kazungula - project 
currently suspended 
- Built six houses in 
Lesoma for destitute 
- Bought 25, 000 bricks 
towards the building of 
Pandamatenga 
Community Hall 
- Donated a van to KCT 
- Giving out game meat 
to Kalepa community 
NB Projects conducted 
by KCT could not be 
ascertained during my 
study's fieldwork. The 
general impression 
however, is that like 
CECT and KDT income 
from CBNRM activities 
have tended to be 
channeled into 
community investment 
projects and none has 
been channeled to 
individual households as 
household benefits 
STMT 
- STMT income from 
CBNRM activities have 
tended to be channeled into 
community projects and also 
to individual households as 
household benefits 
- In 1999 Crocodile Camp 
Safaris built the Sankuyo 
community hall and 
equipped it with a television 
set with DSTV and furniture 
for use by the community 
- Plans exist to build houses 
for destitute and orphans 
- Financial support for the 
local soccer team 
- STMT has constructed the 
Kazikini campsite, 
Shandereka Cultural Village, 
Santawani Lodge, STMT 
office in Sankuyo Village 
and rented an office space in 
Maun for marketing STMT 
CBNRM activities 
- In 1999, trust offices were 
constructed through a cost-
sharing arrangement 
between STMT and 
Crocodile Camp Safaris 
(safari operator who had a 
joint venture agreement with 
STMT before HCH hunting 
safaris) 
KDT 
- KDT income from CBNRM 
activities are channeled into 
community investment 
projects and none has been 
channeled to individual 
households as household 
benefits: 
- KDT has set up two hunting 
camps (Zou or Lechwe and 
Nxamtese) serviced with 
ablutions and skinning sheds 
- KDT constructed chalets and 
a dinning room at Zou 
(Lechwe) camp. 
- KDT constructed a craft shop 
(Itekeng Craft Shop) and was 
non-operational during my 
study's fieldwork 
- KDT constructed an 
administrative office building 
in Khawi Village 
- KDT has a website 
(www.khwai. org") developed 
by a researcher from Duke 
University in the United States 
and has not been updated since 
construction by the researcher. 
Some of the KDT Board ' 
members did not know about 
the existence of such a 
website. In any case KDT 
does not have computers let 
alone Internet service. 
Financial/Built Capital - Income Generation and Investment into Community Projects and Activities by Study CBNRM CBOs 
MEASURE CECT KALEPA STMT KDT 
Year Income ($) Year Income Year Income ($) Year Income ($) 
Financial 
revenues 
generated 
1994 13,000.00 1994 No data 1994 
-
1994 
-
1995 40,000.00 1995 No data 1995 
-
1995 
-
1996 64,400.00 1996 No data 1996 43,846.00 1996 
-
1997 92,800.00 1997 No data 1997 53,077.00 1997 
-
1998 92,800.00 1998 No data 1998 69,231.00 1998 
-
1999 186,000.00 1999 No data 1999 71,077.00 1999 
-
2000 189,000.00 2000 No data 2000 80,935.00 2000 184,615.00 
2001 192,650.00 2001 No data 2001 91,609.00 2001 92,307.00 
2002 196,303.00 2002 No data 2002 193,077.00 2002 186,389.00 
2003 200,224.00 2003 No data 2003 299,456.00 2003 220,000.00 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASUR 
E 
CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Cases of conflict f) No report of complaints by 
CECT about the TAC 
f) The KCT complained that the 
TAC was inactive i.e. they rarely 
attend KCT Board meetings even 
though they are ex-ofïicio 
members of the Board 
f) The STMT Board 
complained that the TAC is 
inactive i.e. they rarely attend 
STMT Board meetings even 
though they are ex-officio 
members of the Board 
f) KDT Board noted 
that they always invite 
TAC to their meetings 
but TAC members 
often don't honor the 
invitation. For the 
Community Liaison 
Officer interview that 
was going on just 
before my meeting with 
the KDT Board, TAC 
was invited and none of 
the TAC members 
showed up to assist 
with the interview. 
g) According to RHS; "RES 
leases the land and concession 
rights from CECT and gains 
access to the hunting quota. In 
return, CECT receives cash for 
land rental and the quota 
rights. Rann Hunting Safaris 
provides nothing else and 
CECT asks for nothing else. 
We are happy and the 
community is happy. We have 
one formal meeting with the 
CECT Board at the end of 
each year, ending with a big 
party to review progress and to 
address any concerns" 
(Arntzen et al.., 2004). 
g) The DWNP instructed 
Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris to 
withhold the sublease money due 
to KCT until KCT produces an 
accountability report after the 
mismanagement of trust funds at 
KCT. KCT has since demanded 
that Blackbeard and Hepburn 
Safaris release the wildlife quota 
funds and threatened to 'expel' the 
safari hunting company from CH8 
if they do not comply. 
g) HCH argues that STMT 
does not understand business. 
While the private operator 
wants to get on with business, 
the STMT spends a lot of time 
on meetings and consensus 
building, which is considered 
unproductive by HCH 
(Arntzen et al., 2004). 
g) KDT auctions its 
annual wildlife quota 
and therefore has no 
joint venture agreement 
with any safari 
company 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Cases of 
conflict 
e) In an interview with 
Mr. Steven Rann of 
Rann Hunting Safaris, 
Arntzen et al. (2003) 
found out that the safari 
company was happy 
with the fact that the 
chairperson and 
secretary of the CECT 
Board have remained 
.on the Board since 
1994, seeing this as a 
sign of stability and 
continuity. Mr. Steven 
Rann reported the 
working relationship 
between the CECT 
Board and Rann 
Hunting Safaris as good 
e) KCT annual wildlife quota from 2003 to 2004 was 
withheld from them by the DWNP due to 
mismanagement of trust funds by trust board and 
subsequently released to Blackbeard and Hepburn 
Safaris. The DWNP released the KCT wildlife quota 
directly to Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris (KCT 
JVA partner) without the consent of KCT, the legal 
leaseholder to CH8. Blackbeard and Hepburn had 
written a letter to the Director of DWNP and to the 
Vice President of Botswana requesting them to 
release the wildlife quota directly to them pending 
the KCT accountability report. Their argument was 
that they already have marketed the wildlife quota 
abroad and hunters were already on camp. During 
My fieldwork, I had the opportunity to attend a 
meeting between the KCT Board, Blackbeard and 
Hepburn Safaris and the Community Service 
Division of the DWNP at the DWNP offices in 
Kasane. The meeting was to address the ensuing 
conflict between the KCT Board and Blackbeard and 
Hepburn Safaris. The KCT Board had written a letter 
to Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris to the effect that 
their hunting activities within CH8 (KCT's leased 
area) were illegal and has to stop with immediate 
effect. One of the major arguments at the meeting 
was whether KCT has the power to suspend 
Blackbeard and Hepburn Safaris hunting activities. 
KCT argued that they do have the power since they 
are the legal leaseholders to CH8. Blackbeard and 
Hepburn Safari's argued that if KCT is not able to 
get the wildlife quota for them as agreed in the 
sublease agreement that constitute a breach of 
contract. 
e) STMT has the following 
complaints against HCH: 
- HCH often make late 
payments and not according 
to the agreed payment 
schedules. 
- HCH had promised to 
support the village soccer 
team in their tender 
documents with P68, 000.00 
per annum and to date only 
PI9, 000.00 has been paid 
or given. 
- Training to community 
members and STMT Board 
which has been promised by 
HCH Hunting Safaris as 
part of their tender promises 
has not been forthcoming 
e) KDT auctions its 
annual wildlife 
quota and therefore 
has no joint venture 
agreement with any 
safari company 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Cases of 
conflict 
d) CECT is frustrated with the Land 
Board's delay in approving their 
Timber Salvage Harvesting Project -
CECT planned to undertake this project 
since 1994 
CECT is also frustrated with the Land 
Board over its community lodge 
project - CECT applied for land within 
the leased resource use area for the 
construction of a lodge since 2001 and 
CECT was informed by the Land 
Board that the area they have applied 
for has some cultural significance, and 
an archaeological impact study has to 
be carried out before approval could be 
granted or denied. CECT has ever since 
been awaiting the Land Board's 
response - indicates lack of social 
capital/synergy between CBNRM 
CBOs and regulatory departments 
d) No information d) No report of 
problems between 
Land Board and 
STMT 
d) KDT applied to the Land Board for the 
Machaba camp in 2002 and the Land 
Board did not approve KDT's 
application. Initially KDT operated these 
two campsites after the private owners 
left and the Land Board instructed KDT 
to stop operating those camps without a 
license. KDT then put through an 
application to the Land Board for 
permission to operate the two campsites 
on the 12th February 2003 and did not get 
a response until June 2004. Their 
application was not successful. The 
reason given by the Land Board for not 
approving KDT's application was that the 
carrying capacity of the area would be 
exceeded because more lodges will mean 
more people (visitors, tourists etc) in that 
area. KDT Board members wonders why 
that was not the case when the two lodges 
were run by private operators - indicates 
lack of social capital/synergy between 
CBNRM CBOs and regulatory 
departments 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Cases of 
conflict 
b) Alexander et al. (1999) reported 
power struggles between some 
VTCs and VDCs - conflicts as to 
whether VDC should be given 
money by the VTCs from the sale 
of the hunting quota - indicating a 
lack of bridging social capital 
between village institutions. 
b) No information b) The STMT Five-Year Strategic 
Plan (2004 - 2008) outlines plans for 
STMT Board and Sankuyo VDC 
working closely together to facilitate 
development plan processes in the 
village - this shows an attempt by 
STMT to build bridging social 
capital with other village institutions 
though currently there is no real 
connection between the VDC and the 
STMT 
b) All the study CBNRM 
CBOs allow VDC 
chairperson and secretary 
ex-officio position 
the CBNRM CBO Board, 
and this is not the case at 
Khwai - the VDC is not 
involved at all - indicating a 
lack of bridging social 
capital between village 
institutions. 
c) Although the CECT is allowed 
to comment on the wildlife quotas 
set by DWNP, they no longer do 
so since the DWNP does not take 
their comments into account 
-
indicates lack of social 
capital/synergy between CBNRM 
CBOs and regulatory central 
government departments 
c) No information c) STMT holds that the 
unpredictability of the annual 
revenues due to changing wildlife 
quotas makes it hard to plan Trust 
activities. The Sankuyo community 
believes that wildlife resources are 
stable in the area (Arntzen et al.., 
2003). Their views are based on 
wildlife monitoring efforts of the 
CEGS. Although STMT is allowed to 
comment on the wildlife quota, they 
no longer do so. STMT finds it 
difficult to understand why the 
quotas are being reduced by the 
DWNP (Arntzen et al.., 2003) - lack 
of social capital between CBNRM 
CBOs and regulatory central 
government departments 
c) Although the KDT is 
allowed to comment on the 
wildlife quotas set by 
DWNP, they have never 
commented. KDT feels that 
their comments will not 
make any difference -
indicates lack of social 
capital/synergy between 
CBNRM CBOs and 
regulatory central 
government departments 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Cases of 
conflict 
a) In 2000 a group of people from the 
Chobe Enclave came together to form 
what was called 'the concerned group'. 
The concerned group wrote a letter to 
the Office of the Vice President and the 
TAC alleging mismanagement of trust 
funds by the CECT Board. The 
concerned group voiced that auditing 
work should not only involve 
inspection of accounting books 
submitted by the Trust Board, but also 
an assessment and valuation of all 
CECT assets. To be able to do this, the 
auditors have to be brought to the 
Chobe Enclave. The concerned groups' 
concern was that auditors were in the 
dark as to whether the assets invested in 
as alluded to by the CECT Board were 
actually there. They felt that it would be 
better if auditors were brought down to 
the Chobe Enclave to do the auditing 
and see the assets. According to the 
CECT coordinator, all these had led to 
increased costs and delays as auditors 
required asset reports necessitating the 
need to engage valuators - lack of 
social capital leading to increased 
transaction costs 
a) During fieldwork for my 
study, KCT CBNRM 
activities had been 
suspended due to 
misappropriation of funds 
by the KCT Board. The 
trust funds for the financial 
year 2001 to 2002 were 
misappropriated in the 
estimated sum of two 
million Pula and there is a 
bank overdraft of P2254.96 
(on an account with 
Barclays Bank Botswana) -
the misappropriation of 
funds by the KCT Board is 
a source of mistrust hence 
declining social capital at 
KCT 
a) According to Arntzen et 
al.., (2003) the general 
membership of STMT is to a 
very large extent involved in 
management decisions of the 
Trust. STMT has been 
described by a representative 
of NRMP as "too 
democratic" and thereby 
inefficient, in that the 
committee has virtually no 
authority to make a decision 
without community 
consultation (Boggs, 2000). 
HCH, the safari company 
with a joint venture 
agreement with STMT 
accused STMT of spending 
too much time in consensus 
building. The consensus 
building efforts of STMT have 
resulted in some degree of 
social capital at the 
community level 
a) The 3rd KDT Board's 
term in office (2002) was 
characterized by 
mismanagement of KDT 
funds and at the end of the 
Board's term in office, the 
Board couldn't account for 
missing KDT funds 
resulting in the suspension 
of KDT activities. KDT 
activities were suspended 
because of the withholding 
of the KDT wildlife quota 
by the DWNP. 
The quota was later 
released August 2003. The 
misappropriation of funds 
by the KDT Board is a 
source of mistrust hence 
declining social capital at 
KDT 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KC 
T 
STMT KDT 
National level - CECT is a registered member of - KCT is a - STMT is a member of BOCOBONET 
- Eco-tourism Support 
BOCOBONET member of - STMT Board members attend the Services (ESS) assisted 
- CECT Board members attend the BOCOBON National CBNRM Forum KDT to develop financial 
National CBNRM Forum ET - Contacts with DWNP which awards and administrative 
- Contacts with DWNP which awards 
- KCT Board the annual wildlife quota management systems 
the annual wildlife quota members - The DWNP trained STMT (CEGs 
- KDT is not a member of 
- The DWNP trained CECT (CEGs have never 
attended the 
National 
CBNRM 
Forum 
Contacts 
with DWNP 
BOCOBONET 
- KDT Board members 
attend the National CBNRM 
Forum 
- Contacts with DWNP 
which awards the annual 
wildlife quota 
International 
level 
which Much CECT mobilization and - The DWNP trained KDT 
Much CECT mobilization and awards the other related support was offered (CEGs 
other related support was offered annual by DWNP/NRMP and 
by DWNP/NRMP and wildlife PACT/IRCE 
PACT/IRCE quota PACT assisted STMT to finalize - KDT in its formative stage 
Deloitte and Touch audits CECT - The DWNP their deed of trust, develop a was assisted with financial 
accounting books trained KCT Policies and Procedures Manual aid from Global 
- ADF funded CECT's CEGS and establish a vision and long- Environmental Fund (GEF) 
management plan term strategic development plan. small grant program under 
PACT/IRCE helped in training AWF provided advice and fhnding the UNDP 
Community Action Plan to STMT in renovating Santawani 
Coordinators for each VTC lodge 
AWF funded the development of STMT has recently developed a 
CECTs' management plan in 2004 Five-Year Strategic Plan for the 
CECT get and send exchange years 2004 - 2008 with the 
visitors from CBNRM CBO in assistance from AWF and 
Namibia and Zimbabwe BOCOBONET 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Contacts - CECT has a - KCT has a joint - STMT has a joint venture agreement with HCH Safaris 
- KDT has worked with 
with other joint venture venture - Village chief, Councillor and VDC chairperson and individual researchers like 
institutional agreement with agreement with secretary are ex-officio members of the STMT Board DR. Gaborone and Dr. 
actors at: Rann Hunting Blackbeard and Richard Bell 
Safaris Hepburn 
- KDT auctioned their wildlife 
a) -VDC Hunting Safaris quota to several safari 
Community Chairperson and -VDC operators over the years 
level Secretary are ex- Chairperson and 
officio members Secretary are ex-
of VTCs officio members 
- Village Chief of VTCs 
and Councilor - Village Chief 
are ex-officio and Councilor 
members of the are ex-officio 
CECT Board members of the 
KCT Board 
b) District - The District - The District - The District Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) is - The District Technical 
level Technical Technical expected to provide support to STMT Advisory Committee (TAC) is 
Advisory Advisory - CSD of DWNP offers extension services to KCT expected to provide support to 
Committee Committee - STMT maintains contact with the Land Board KDT 
(TAC) is (TAC) is - STMT is a member of the Northwest District CBNRM - CSD of DWNP offers 
expected to expected to Forum extension services to CECT 
provide support provide support - Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd trained bookkeeper and - KDT maintains contact with 
to CECT to KCT performed financial statements and auditing for STMT the Land Board 
- CSD of DWNP -CSD of DWNP - Design Consultancy facilitated the design and - KDT is a member of the 
offers extension offers extension implementation of the STMT Shandereka Traditional Village Northwest District CBNRM 
services to services to KCT - Chadwick, Anderson and Partners (Pty) Ltd a legal firm in Forum 
CECT - KCT maintains Botswana draw up STMT joint venture agreements - Management plan for NG 18 
-CECT contact with the - People and Nature Trust worked with STMT in setting up and NG 19 was prepared by 
maintains Land Board Kazikiini campsite and Shandereka Cultural Village Okavango Community 
contact with the - Mogodu Consultancy worked on STMT Board training and Consultants 
Land Board capacity building - ESS offers advisory services 
- WhiteCap Agencies (Pty) Ltd carried out a leather products on financial and administrative 
marketing consultancy work for STMT management to KDT 
Social Capital - Participation, Communication and Relationships within Study CBNRM CBOs and with other Stakeholders 
MEASURE CECT KALEPA STMT KDT 
Community 
participation 
in CBNRM 
CBO 
activities 
The process that led to the 
formation of CECT involved a 
series of consultation meetings 
and workshops conducted by 
DWNP/NRMP and PACT/IRCE 
to familiarize Chobe Enclave 
residents with the idea of 
CBNRM 
No data is available on KCT 
because of the current 
problems discussed under 
'cases of conflict' in sections 
below. In fact there has been 
no formal hand over of KCT 
administrative records from 
the board that 
misappropriated the funds to 
later boards. 
The process that led to 
the formation of STMT 
involved a series of 
consultation meetings 
and workshops conducted 
by DWNP/NRMP and 
PACT/IRCE to 
familiarize Sankuyo 
residents with the idea of 
CBNRM 
Unlike CECT and STMT, the 
mobilization of the Khwai 
community for CBNRM 
activities was carried out by Dr. 
Gaborone, an academic at the 
University of Botswana 
The general membership 
participates in voting for office 
bearers and for projects at the 
VTC AGM and for joint-venture 
partner as per the Joint venture 
guidelines 
Kalepa is one of the least 
studied CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. It is hard to find 
any past studies done on 
Kalepa. 
The General Membership 
of STMT is also 
responsible for the 
election of the STMT 
Board. The general 
membership of STMT 
vote for a Joint Venture 
Partner at the beginning 
of each joint venture 
agreement 
The General Membership of 
KDT is also responsible for the 
election of the KDT Board. 
Major decisions within CECT are 
made mainly by the CECT Board 
STMT holds regular 
meetings with the general 
membership to discuss 
progress, problems as 
well as recruit personnel 
for both the Trust and the 
joint venture partner. 
Major decisions within KDT 
are made mainly by the KDT 
Board 
Human Capital - Enhancing and Utilization of Local People's Skills 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Local people 
employed by 
partner Safari 
company 
Rann Safaris employs 50 
seasonal and temporary 
workers for the hunting 
camps 
No. of people employed 
by Rann Safaris = 50 
No data is available on KCT 
because of the current 
problems discussed under 
'cases of conflict' in sections 
below. In fact there has been 
no formal hand over of KCT 
administrative records from 
the board that misappropriated 
the funds to later boards. 
Kalepa is one of the least 
studied CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. It is hard to find 
any past studies done on 
Kalepa. 
No. of people employed in 
the past = Unknown 
No. of people employed now 
= 0 
HCH Safaris employs 56 
Sankuyo residents on a 
seasonal basis 
Game Safaris 
(subcontracted by HCH) 
employs 30 Sankuyo 
residents in its hunting 
and photographic 
operations 
No. of people employed 
by HCH and Game 
Safaris = 86 
3 people were employed by 
Kyriacou, Visser, De Graaf 
and Eaton safari operators in 
2000 as trackers and skinners" 
12 people were employed by 
Jordan Calitz, Greg Butler and 
Game safaris in 2001 as 
trackers and skinners 
NB KDT's does not follow the 
joint venture agreement 
strategy promoted by the 
DWNP, but opted to auction 
their wildlife quota to the 
highest bidder. 
Average No. of people 
employed by safari 
operators = 8 
Human Capital - Enhancing and Utilization of Local People' s Skills 
MEASURE CECT KCT STMT KDT 
Local people 
employed 
5 Community Action Plan 
Coordinators trained by PACT 
have been employed by CECT 
as VTC project managers 
1 CECT Coordinator who is 
from the local community 
15 CEGs trained by the DWNP 
employed by CECT (3 from 
each of the 5 CECT Villages) 
1 General Duties Assistant 
(GDA) from the local 
community 
1 Driver from the local 
community 
1 Administrative Secretary 
running the CECT office in 
Kasane 
5 Radio operators - one in each 
of the CECT villages 
Parakarungu VTC - 4 
employees (2 for the 
sorghum/maize grinding mill 
and 2 for the general dealer store 
Mabele VTC - employs 3 people 
at its general dealer store 
No. of people employed = 
36 
No data is available on KCT 
because of the current 
problems discussed under 
'cases of conflict' in 
sections below. In fact there 
has been no formal hand 
over of KCT administrative 
records from the board that 
misappropriated the funds to 
later boards. 
Kalepa is one of the least 
studied CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. It is hard to find 
any past studies done on 
Kalepa. 
No. of people employed in 
the past = Unknown 
No. of people employed 
now = 0 
1 Bookkeeper 
1 Community Liaison 
Officer 
10 CEGs trained by the 
DWNP employed by 
STMT 
2 administrative 
assistants 
2 drivers 
2 security guards 
1 Sales and marketing 
Officer 
1 assistant sales and 
marketing officer based 
in the Maun office 
15 Sankuyo residents 
working at Kazikini 
Campsite 
20 employees at 
Santawani Lodge 
No. of people 
employed = 55 
NB Due to the KDT financial 
problems resulting from 
mismanagement of funds and the 
temporary close down of KDT 
activities in the late 2002 and 
early 2003, all the KDT 
employees lost their jobs. 
Lost jobs: 
40 Khwai residents employed to 
open new hunting tracks on 
seasonal basis 
22 Khwai residents who worked 
in hunting camps as waitresses, 
managers, escort guides and tent 
ladies 
1 KDT Manager 
1 KDT Administrator 
1 KDT Accounts Officer 
Total lost jobs = 65 
Current jobs 
10 CEGs trained by the DWNP 
employed by KDT 
2 Bookkeepers 
1 Driver 
1 Community Liaison Officer 
No. of people employed = 14 
NB No. of jobs lost =51 
Human Capital - Enhancing and Utilization of Local People's Skills 
MEASURE CECT KALEPA STMT KDT 
Capacity 
building/training 
programs 
PACT/IRCE helped each 
VTC by training 
Community Action Plan 
Coordinators (CAPC) who 
are responsible for 
supervising the 
implementation of village 
projects 
CEGs trained by the DWNP 
Besides CAPC's 
PACT/IRCE trained the 
CECT Board, the CECT 
Coordinator, and some 
members of the Community 
on financial management, 
business management skills, 
governance, leadership 
skills, meeting skills, 
understanding joint ventures 
and the CBNRM concept 
BOCOBONET also trained 
the CECT Board and VTC 
on leadership and financial 
management skills 
No data is available on KCT 
because of the current 
problems discussed under 
'cases of conflict' in 
sections below. In fact there 
has been no formal hand 
over of KCT administrative 
records from the board that 
misappropriated the funds to 
later boards. 
Kalepa is one of the least 
studied CBNRM CBOs in 
Botswana. It is hard to find 
any past studies done on 
KCT. 
Capacity building by PACT, 
DWNP and BOCOBONET. 
STMT Board training and 
capacity building by Mogodu 
Consultancy 
Concorde Agencies (Pty) Ltd 
trained the STMT booldceeper 
CEGs trained by the DWNP 
In 1996, 5 STMT members 
were trained in bookkeeping, 
6 were sent for leatherwork 
training in Zimbabwe, and 3 
were sent to Kenya for 
training in PRA in Kenya. 
Training in cookery and camp 
management by Crocodile 
Camp Safaris (had a joint 
venture agreement with 
STMT before HCH hunting 
safaris) 
Eco-tourism Support Services 
(ESS) trained the KDT Board 
on financial and 
administrative management 
CEGs trained by the DWNP 
BOCOBONET helped KDT 
by conducting a leadership 
training workshop 
Appendix 6 Process and Impact Indicators for study CBNRM CBOs 
Natural Capital - Community Wildlife Conservation and Monitoring Related Efforts 
MEASURE CECT KALEPA STMT KDT 
Conservation 
projects undertaken 0 0 0 0 
Money invested in 
conservation 
0 0 0 0 
Community 
management & 
monitoring 
Community Escort 
Guides (CEGs) Activities: 
to ensure that hunting 
safari operators abide to 
hunting guidelines offered 
by the DWNP i.e. 
enforcing DWNP hunting 
guidelines 
Community Escort 
Guides (CEGs) 
Activities: to ensure 
that hunting safari 
operators abide to 
hunting guidelines 
offered by the DWNP 
i.e. enforcing DWNP 
hunting guidelines 
Community Escort Guides 
(CEGs) 
Activities: to ensure that 
hunting safari operators abide 
to hunting guidelines offered 
by the DWNP i.e. enforcing 
DWNP hunting guidelines 
Community Escort Guides 
(CEGs) 
Activities: to ensure that hunting 
safari operators abide to hunting 
guidelines offered by the DWNP 
i.e. enforcing DWNP hunting 
guidelines 
139 
References 
Agrawal, A., 1999. Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural 
Resource Conservation. World Development Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 629 - 649. 
Agrawal, A., and Ribot, J., 1999. Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with 
South Asian and West African Environmental Cases. The Journal of Developing Areas 33: 
473 - 502. 
Agrawal, A., 1996. The Community versus the Market and the State. Journal of Agricultural 
and Environmental Ethics 9(1), 1-15. 
Agrawal, A., 1995b. Institutions for Disadvantaged Groups. Paper Prepared for the 
Development of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development, United Nations, New 
York. 
Alexander, E., Molokomme, I., and Murray, M., 1999. Chobe Enclave End of Project 
Evaluation Final Report. NRMP/USAID, Gaborone, Botswana. 
Arntzen, J., Molokomme, K., Tshosa, O., Moleele, N., Mazambani, D., and Terry, B., 2003. 
Final report of the review of Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana. 
Center for Applied Research. Gaborone, Botswana. Study carried out for the National 
CBNRM Forum. 
Baker, R., and Githundu, C., 2002. Resource Management Institutions in the Changing 
World: Role of Community Based Institutions for Poverty Reduction and Sustainable 
Development. School of Resource Environment and Society. Australian National University 
Berkes, F., Kislalioglu, M., Folke, C., and Gadgil, M., 1998. Exploring the Basic Ecological 
Units: Ecosystem-like Concepts in Traditional Societies. Ecosystems 1 (5): 408 -415. 
Blaikie, P., 1985. The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries. London: 
Longman. 
Boggs, P., 2000. Community Power, Participation, Conflict and Development Choice: 
Community Wildlife Conservation in the Okavango Region of Northern Botswana. IIED. 
Brenner, S., and Cohran, P., 1991. A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm: Implications for 
Business and Social Theory and Research. Proceedings of the International Society of 
Business and Society: 449 - 467. 
Bromley, D., 1991. Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
140 
Butler, V., 1998. Controversy in Kenya: Unquiet on the Western Front. International Wildlife 
28 (6): 12-23. 
Camoy, M., 1984. The State and Political Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
New Jersey 
Cassidy, L., 2000. CBNRM and Legal Rights to Resources in Botswana. CBNRM Network 
Occasional Paper No. 4. CBNRM Support Programme. SNV/IUCN. Gaborone. Botswana. 
Cassidy, L., and Madzwamuse, M., (eds.) 1999. Community Mobilisation in CBNRM in 
Botswana. Report of Workshop Proceedings. SNV/IUCN. Gaborone. Botswana. 
Chambers, R., 1983. Rural Development: Putting the Last First. New York: Wiley Press. 
Chevalier, J., 2001. Natural Resource Project/Conflict Management: Stakeholders doing 
"Class Analysis". Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. 
Http://www.Carleton.ca/jchevali/STAKEH2.html 
Chisholm, D., 1989. Coordination without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in 
Multiorganizational Systems. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cohen, J., and Peterson, S., 1999. Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing 
Countries. Connecticut: Kumarian Press. 
Cortner, H., and Moote M., 1999. The Politics of Ecosystem Management. Washington D C.: 
Island Press. 
Croll, E., and Parkin, D., (eds) 1992. Bush Base: Forest Farm, Culture, Environment and 
Development. London: Routledge. 
Dahlman, C., 1980. The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of 
Economic Institution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Demsetz, H., 1967. Towards a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review 62: 
347-359. 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks, 1999. Joint Venture Guidelines. DWNP, 
Gaborone. Botswana. 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks, 1986. Wildlife Conservation Policy. Gaborone: 
Government Printer. Botswana. 
141 
Drinkwater, M., 1991. The State and Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas. 
London: Macmillan Press. 
Dubois, O., 1999. Assessing Local Resilience and Getting Roles Right in Collaborative 
Forest Management: Some Current Issues and Potential Tools, with special Reference to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In Pluralism and Sustainable Forestry and Rural development: 
Proceedings of an International Workshop, Rome, 9-12 December 1997. Forest and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN. 
Evans, P. "Introduction: Development strategies across the public-private divide." In Evans, 
Peter. 1996. State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development. 
International and Area Studies. 
Evans, P. "Government action, social capital, and development: reviewing the evidence on 
synergy." In Evans, Peter. 1996. State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in 
Development. International and Area Studies. Page 170 - 194. 
Evans, P., 1996. State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development. 
International and Area Studies. 
Fay C., and de Foresta, H., 2001. "Progress towards Recognizing the Rights and 
Management Potentials of Local Communities in Indonesian-State-defined Forest Areas." In 
Vira B., and Jeffery R, 2001. Analytical issues in participatory natural resource 
management. New York: Palgrave. 
Fenger, M. and Klok P., 2001. 'Interdependency, Beliefs, and Coalition Behavior: A 
Contribution to the Advocacy Coalition Framework.' Policy Sciences 34: 157 - 170. 
Fieldwork, 2004. Field Research Conducted between May 20th 2004 and 20th August 2004 by 
Mulale Kutlwano (Author) 
Fisher R., 1999. Devolution and Decentralization of Forest Management in Asia and Pacific. 
Unasylva. 
Flora, C., and Flora, J., with Susan Fey., 2004. Rural Communities: Legacy and Change, 2nd 
edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Flora, C., and Flora, J., "Social Capital." In Brown, D., and Swanson, L., 2003. Challenges 
for Rural America in the Twenty-First Century. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
University Park, Pennsylvania. 
Flora, C., "Shifting Agroecosystems and Communities." In Flora C., (ed) 2001. Interactions 
be tween  Agroecosys tems  and  Rura l  Communi t ies .  Boca  Raton :  CRC Press .  Pp .  5 -11 .  
142 
Flora, J., Flora, C., Campana, F., Garcia Bravo, M., and Fernândez-Baca, E., 2000. Social 
Capital and Advocacy Coalitions: Examples from Ecuador. International Farming Systems 
Association Meeting. Santiago, Chile. 
Flora, C., Gasteyer, S., Fernandez-Baca, E., Banerji, D., Bastian, S., and Aleman, S., 2000. 
Local Participation in Research & Extension for Conservation & Development of Natural 
Resources: A summary of approaches. Paper Presented at the Sixteenth Meeting of the 
International Farming Systems Association. Santiago, Chile. November 30, 2000. North 
Central Regional Center for Rural Development. 
Flora, C., "Sustainable Production and Consumption Patterns: Community Capitals." In 
Benneh, G., Hindar, G., Walloe, K., and Wijkman, A., (eds) 1998. The Brundtland 
Commission's Report Ten Years, Sotting, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, 1998, 115. 
Flora, C., and Flora, J., 1993. Entrepreneurial Social Infrastructure: A Necessary Ingredient. 
ANNALS, AAPSS, 529. 
Folke, C. and Berkes, F, 1995. "Mechanisms that Link Property Right to Ecological 
Systems," in Hanna, S. and M. Manasinghe, eds. Property Rights and the Environment. 
Beijer Institute/World Bank. 
Fortmann, L., 1989. "Peasant and Official Views of Rangeland Use in Botswana. Fifty Years 
of Devastation?" Land Use Policy 6:197-189. 
Fortmann, L., 1986. The Role of Local Institutions in Communal Area Development in 
Botswana. Land Tenure Center. University of Wisconsin - Madison. Research Paper 91. 
Fox, J., "How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in 
Rural Mexico." In Evans, P., 1996. State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in 
Development. International and Area Studies. Pp 120 - 125. 
Friedman, H., "Decentralized Development in Asia: Local Political Alternatives." In Cheema 
S.G. and Rondinelli D. (eds) 1983. Decentralization and Development: Policy Implications 
in Developing Countries. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi. 
Gadgil, M., and Guha, R., 1995. Ecology and Equity: Use and Abuse of Nature in 
Contemporary India. London: Routledge. UK. 
Gadgil, M., and Guha, R., 1992. This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Gray, G., Enzer, M., and Kusel, J. 2001. Understanding Community-Based Forest Ecosystem 
Management: An Editorial Synthesis. Journal of Sustainable Forestry Vol. 12, No. 3/4, pp. 1 
-23. 
143 
Gasper, D., "Development Planning and Decentralization in Botswana." In Wekwete, K., and 
de Valk, P., (eds) 1990. Decentralizing for Participatory Planning? Vermont: Gower 
Publishing Company Limited. 
Government of Botswana, 2001. Report of the Second Presidential Commission on the Local 
Government Structure in Botswana. Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana, 1997. Community Based Strategy for Rural Development. 
Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana, 1992. Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act. Gaborone: 
Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana, 1991. National Policy on Agricultural Development. Gaborone: 
Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana. 1990. Tourism Policy. Government Paper No. 2 of 1990. 
Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana. 1975. Government Paper No. 2 of 1975: National Policy on Tribal 
Grazing Land. Gabrone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana, 1974. Agricultural Resources Conservation Act. Gaborone: 
Government Printer. Botswana. 
Government of Botswana, 1970. Monuments and relics Act. Gaborone: Government Printer. 
Botswana. 
Government of Botswana. 1968. Tribal Land Act 1968. Gaborone: Government Printer. 
Botswana. 
Granovetter, M., 1973. "The Strength of Weak TiesAmerican Journal of Sociology 78: 
1360-1380. 
Guha, R., 1989. The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the 
Himalaya, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Gujadhur, T., 2001. Joint Venture Options for Communities and Safari Operators in 
Botswana. CBNRM Support Programme. Occasional Paper 6. 
Gujadhur, T., 2000. "It's Good to Feel Like we Own the Land..." The People's View of 
Community Land Rights under CBNRM in Botswana. CBNRM Support Programme. 
Hardin, G., 1968. 'Tragedy of the Commons.' Science 162: 1243 -1248. 
144 
Hill, K., 1996. Zimbabwe's Wildlife Utilization Programs: Grassroots Democracy or an 
Extension of State Power? African Studies Reviews 39 (1): 103 - 123. 
Hobbes, T., 1968. Leviathan. Edited with Introduction by MacPherson, C. Baltimore: 
Penguin Books. 
Jiggins, J., "Participation as Opportunity: The Concept and Context." In Freden, J. and Anna, 
F., (eds) 1998. New Initiatives for Forest and Natural resource Management by Local 
communities - Mutual Learning between the South and the North. Sweedish University of 
Agricultural sciences. 
Jones, B., 2002. Lessons Learned in the Southern African Region on the Formation, 
Structure, Funding and Functioning of National Associations to Represent Community-Based 
CBOs Working on Common Property Natural Resource Management. A Consultancy Report 
to the Namibian Association of Community-Based Natural Resource Management Support 
Organizations (NACSO). 
Johnson, O., 1972. Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and Land Tenure System. 
Journal of Law and Economics 15: 259 - 276. 
Kakoyannis, C., Shindler, B., and Stankey, G., 2001. Understanding the Social Acceptability 
of Natural Resources Decision-Making Process by Using a Knowledge Base Modelling 
Approach. Gen. Tech. Rep. PNW-GTR-518. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station. 40p. 
Mathur, K., "Administrative Decentralization in Asia". In Cheema, S., and Rondinelli, D., 
(eds) 1983. Decentralization and Development: Policy Implications in Developing Countries. 
Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi. 
Langton, S., "What is Citizen Participation?" In Langton, S., (ed) 1978 (pp. 13 - 24). Citizen 
Participation in America: Essays on the State of the Art. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Lawry, S., 1990. Tenure Policy Towards Common Property Natural Resources in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Natural Resources Journal 30: 403 - 422. 
Lawry, S., 1989. Tenure Policy and Natural Resource Management in Sahelian West Africa. 
Land Tenure Centre, Madison: University of Wisconsin. 
Locke, John., 1960. Two Treaties of Government. Laslett, P., (ed). Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lynch, O., 1998. Law, Pluralism and the Promotion of Sustainable Community Based Forest 
Manangement. Unasylva 194, Vol. 49. 52 - 56. 
145 
Mandondo, A., 2000. Situating Zimbabwe's Natural Resource Governance Systems in 
History. CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 32, December 2000, Jakarta: CIFOR. 
Mazur, R., and Titilola, S., 1992. "Social and Economic Dimensions of Local Knowledge 
Systems in African Sustainable Agriculture." Sociologia-Ruralis, Vol. 32 (2-3): 264-286. 
Mbaiwa, J., 2003. Enclave Tourism and its Socio-economic Impacts in the Okavango Delta, 
Botswana. Tourism Management. ELSEVIER. 
McNeill, J., 2000. Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the 
Twentieth Century World, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York. 
Mead, B., (ULG Consultants) 2001. Botswana Wildlife Management Association Economic 
Analysis of Commercial Consumptive Use of Wildlife in Botswana: A Study Commissioned 
by BWMA. Gables House, Kenilworth Road Leamington Spa, CV32 6JX. United Kingdom. 
Mehta, J., and Kellert, S., 1998. Local Attitudes towards Community Based Conservation 
Policy and Programmes in Nepal: A Case Study in the Makalu- Baran Conservation Area. 
Environmental Conservation 25 (4) 320 - 333. 
Meinzen-Dick, R., and Knox, A., 1999. Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution 
of Natural Resource Management: A Conceptual Framework. In R. Meinzen-Dick, A. Knox 
and M. Di Gregorio (eds). Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural 
Resource Management - Exchange of Knowledge and Implications for Policy. Proceedings 
of the International Conference in Puerto Azul, The Philippines, 21-25 June, 1999, pp. 41-73. 
Michels, R., 1949. Political Parties, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Glencoe, III: Free 
Press. 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2003. National Development Plan 9: 
2003/04-2008/09. Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Ministry of Finance and development Planning, 2002. Revised National Policy for Rural 
Development: Government Paper No: 3. Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 1972. Rural Development in Botswana: 
Government Paper No. 1. Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Ministry of Local Government Lands and Housing, 1997. District Planning Handbook. 
Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
146 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism (MTIWT), 2004. Community Based 
Natural Resource Management Policy. CBNRM Policy (Draft 2004). Gaborone: 
Government Printer. Botswana. 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, Wildlife and Tourism (MTIWT), 2002. Game Ranching Policy 
for Botswana. Gaborone: Government Printer. Botswana. 
Mitchell, R., Agle, B., and Wood, D., 1997. Toward a Theory of Stakeholder 
Identification and Salience. Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts. 
Academy of Management Review 22 (4) 853 - 866. 
Murombedzi, J., 1990. The Need for Appropriate Local Level Common Property Resource 
Management Institutions in Communal Tenure Regimes: CASS Occasional Paper Series: 
Centre for Applied Social Sciences: University of Zimbabwe. 
Murombedzi, J., 1989. The Need for Appropriate Local Level, Common Property Resource 
Management in UZ, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Murphree, M., 1997. Congruent Objectives, Competing Interests and Strategic Compromise. 
Concept and Process in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME. Paper Presented to the 
Conference on Representing Communities: Histories and Politics of Community Based 
Resource Management. Georgia, USA: 1 - 3 June. Helen. 
Narayan, D., 1999. "Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty." Policy Research 
Working Paper 2167, Poverty Division, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network, The World Bank, August. Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapita/library/narayan.pdf. 
National CBNRM Forum in Botswana, 2001. Minutes of the Second Meeting of the National 
CBNRM Forum on the 5th and 6th of June 2001. Gaborone. Botswana. 
National CBNRM Forum in Botswana, 2001. Proceedings of the Second National CBNRM 
Forum, November 2001. Gaborone. Botswana. 
National CBNRM Forum in Botswana, 2003. Proceedings of the National CBNRM Forum, 
November 2003. Gaborone. Botswana. 
National CBNRM Forum in Botswana, 2003. Proceedings of the National CBNRM Forum, 
June 2003. Gaborone. Botswana. 
North, D., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
North Central Regional Center for Rural Development, 1999. Measuring Community 
Success and Sustainability: An Interactive Workbook. Iowa State University. Ames, Iowa. 
147 
North West District Council (NWDC), 2003. District Development Plan 6: 2003/4 - 2008/9. 
North West District Council. Maun. Botswana. 
Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Ophuls, W., 1973. Leviathan or Oblivion. In H. Daly (ed) Toward a Steady State Economy, 
pp. 215 -230. San Franscisco: Freeman. 
Ostrom, E., and Schlager, E., The Formation of Property Rights. In Hanna, S., Folke, C., and 
Maler, K., (eds) 1995. Rights to Nature., Washington, DC: Island Press 
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Parker, S., Annapuma Conservation Area Project: In Pursuit of Sustainable Development? In 
Auty, R., and Brown, K., (eds) 1997. Approaches to Sustainable Development. Pp 144 - 168. 
London: Pinter. 
Picard, L., 1980. Bureaucrats, Cattle and Public Policy: Land Tenure Changes in Botswana. 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3. 
Poffenberger, M., (ed) 1990. Keepers of the Forest: Land Management Alternatives in 
Southeast Asia. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian. 
Pomeroy, C., and Beck, J., 1999. Experiment in Fisheries Co-management : Evidence from 
Big Creek, Society and Natural Resources, 12, 719. 
Potts, F., 2003. A Case Study on Khwai. Presentation at the Fourth National CBNRM Forum 
on June 12th 2003. Gaborone. Botswana. 
Pretty, J., 1998. The Living Land: Agriculture, Food and Community Regeneration in Rural 
Europe. London: Eastern Publications. 
Putman, R., 1995b. "Turning In, Turning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital 
in america." P.S.: Political Science and Politics XXVIII (4): 664 - 683. 
Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., and Nanetti, R., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civil Traditions 
in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Putnam, R, 1993a. Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
148 
Putnam, R., 1993b. "The Prosperus Community: Social Capital and Public Life." American 
Prospec t  A  (13) :  35-42 .  
Reuschemeyer, D., and Evans, P., "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an 
Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention. " In Evans P., Rueschemeyer, 
D., and Skocpol, T., (eds) 1985. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. Pp. 44 - 55. 
Richards, P., 1985. Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and Food Production in 
West Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Riker, W., "Introduction". In Riker, W., (ed) 1993. Agenda formation. Ann arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press. 
Rondinelli, D., "Decentralization of Development in East Africa." In Cheema, S., and 
Rondinelli, D., (eds) 1983. Decentralization and Development: Policy Implications in 
Developing Countries. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi. 
Rondinelli, D., and Cheema, S., (eds) 1983. Decentralization and Development: Policy 
Implications in Developing Countries. Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, London and New 
Delhi. 
Rousseau, J., 1967. Social Contract. Edited with an introduction by Lester G. Crocker. New 
York: Pocket Books. 
Rozemeijer, N., 2002. Network Who? The impact of "Networks" on the Participation of 
Communities in Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) in Botswana. 
The Ninth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common 
Property (IASCP) Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, 17-21 June 2002. Panel: Transcending barriers: 
The role of networks in natural resource management. 
Sabatier, P., and Jenkins-Smith, H., (eds) 1993. Policy Change and Learning: an Advocacy 
Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 13-39. 
Schlager, E., and Blomquist, W., 1996. "A Comparison of three Emerging Theories of the 
Policy Process". Political Research Quarterly. 49(3): 651 - 672. 
Schlager, E., 1995. "Policy Making and Collective Action: Defining Coalitions within the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework". Policy Sciences 28: 243 - 270 
Schlager, E., and Ostrom, E., 1992. Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics 68 (3), 249 - 262 
Scout Wilson Consultants, 2001. Integrated Programme for the Eradication of Tsetse and 
Tyrpanosomiasis from Ngamiland: Environmental Impact Assessment, Draft Final Report. 
149 
Scout Wilson Resource Consultants, Edinburgh. 
Shiva, V., 1989. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development, London: ZED Books. 
Sinn, H., 1984. Common Property Resources, Storage Facilities and Ownership Structures: A 
Coumot Model of the Oil Market. Economica 51; 235 - 252. 
Skocpol, T., 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, M., 1993. Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in 
Britain and the United States. Harvester Wheatsheaf. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 
Tokyo and Singapore. Pp. 48 - 56. 
Smith, R., 1981. Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights 
in Wildlife. CATO Journal 1: 439 - 468. 
Strong, M., "Environment and Development: The United Nations Road from Stockholm to 
Rio." Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 1992, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 112-115. 
Tester, K., 1992. Civil Society. New York: Routledge. 
Turner, M., and Hulme, D., 1997. Governance, Administration and Development: Making 
the State Work. Connecticut: Kumarian Press. 
UNCED (United Nations Commission for Environment and Development), 1992. Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development. The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development. Rio de Janeiro, United Nations General Assembly. 
Uphoff, N., 1986. Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook with Cases. 
West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Van der Jagt C., Gujadhur, T., and Van Bussel, F., 2000. "Community Benefits through 
CBNRM in Botswana." CBNRM Support Programme Occasional Paper No. 2. Gaborone. 
Vira, B., Dubois, O., Daniels, S., and Walker, G., 1998. Institutional Pluralism in Forestry: 
Consideration of Analytical and Operational Tools. Unasylva 194, Vol. 49, 35 - 42. 
Wainwright, C., and Wehrmeyer, W., 19998. Succession Integrating Conservation and 
Development? A Study from Zambia. World Development 26 (6): 933 - 944. 
Weber, M., 1922/1968. Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press. 
150 
Weber, M., 1864 - 1920. The Vocation Lectures: Politics as a Vocation. Edited and with an 
Introduction by Owen, D., and Strong, T., Translated by Livingstone, R. Hackett Publishing 
Company. 2004. Indianapolis and Cambridge. 
Welch, W., 1983. The Political Feasibility of Full Ownership Property Rights: The Cases of 
Pollution and Fisheries. Policy Studies 16: 165 - 180. 
White, R, 1993. Livestock Development and Pastoral Production on Communal Rangelands 
in Botswana. Gaborone: The Botswana Society. 
Woolcock, M., 2001. The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic 
Outcomes, in Helliwell, J., (ed) The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained 
Economic Growth and Well-Being, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). 
Woolcock, M., and Narayan, D., 2000. Social Capital: Implications for DevelopmentTheory, 
Research Policy, The World Bank Research Observer 15 (2): 225 - 249. 
Woolcock, M., 1998. Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical 
Synthesis and Policy Framework. Theory and Society 27:151 - 208. 
Zafonte, M., and Sabatier, P., 1998. "Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as 
Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems." Journal of Theoretical Politics 
10 (4): 473 - 505 
Zijderveld, A., 1999. The Waning of the Welfare State: The End of Comprehensive State 
Succor, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ. 
Zufferey, F., 1986. A Study of Local Institutions and Resource Management Inquiry in 
Eastern Central District - Botswana. Land Tenure Center. University of Wisconsin -
Madison. 
Websites 
http://www.huntingreport.com 
http : //www. safariclub.org 
http ://www.chnrm. bw 
http://www.khwai.org 
